FAQ H. No document will make you a hacker

time( &(CLtmp->Time) ); \
CLtmp->SRCip.s_addr = SIP.s_addr; \
CLtmp->DSTip.s_addr = DIP.s_addr; \
CLtmp->SRCport = SPORT; \
CLtmp->DSTport = DPORT; \
CLtmp->Length = MIN(LEN,MAXBUFLEN); \
bcopy( (u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)CLtmp->Data, CLtmp->Length); \
CLtmp->PKcnt = 1; \
CLtmp->Next = CLroot; \
CLtmp->Last = NULL; \
CLroot = CLtmp; \
}

register struct CREC *GET_NODE(Sip,SP,Dip,DP)
register struct in_addr Sip,Dip;
register u_int SP,DP;
{ register struct CREC *CLr = CLroot;

while(CLr != NULL) {
if( (CLr->SRCport == SP) && (CLr->DSTport == DP) &&
IPeq(CLr->SRCip,Sip) && IPeq(CLr->DSTip,Dip) )
break;
CLr = CLr->Next;
}
return(CLr);
}

#define ADDDATA_NODE(CL,DATA,LEN) { \
bcopy((u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)&CL->Data[CL->Length],LEN); \
CL->Length += LEN; \
}

#define PR_DATA(dp,ln) { \
register u_char lastc=0; \
while(ln-- >0) { \
if(*dp < 32) { \
switch(*dp) { \
case '\0': if((lastc=='\r') || (lastc=='\n') || lastc=='\0') \
break; \
case '\r': \
case '\n': fprintf(LOG,"\n : "); \
break; \
default : fprintf(LOG,"^%c", (*dp + 64)); \
break; \
} \
} else { \
if(isprint(*dp)) fputc(*dp,LOG); \
else fprintf(LOG,"(%d)",*dp); \
} \
lastc = *dp++; \
} \
fflush(LOG); \
}

void END_NODE(CLe,d,dl,msg)
register struct CREC *CLe;
register u_char *d;
register int dl;
register char *msg;
{
fprintf(LOG,"\n-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: %s --\n", Ptm(&CLe->Time));
fprintf(LOG," PATH: %s(%s) =>", Symaddr(CLe->SRCip),SERVp(CLe->SRCport));
fprintf(LOG," %s(%s)\n", Symaddr(CLe->DSTip),SERVp(CLe->DSTport));
fprintf(LOG," STAT: %s, %d pkts, %d bytes [%s]\n",
NOWtm(),CLe->PKcnt,(CLe->Length+dl),msg);
fprintf(LOG," DATA: ");
{ register u_int i = CLe->Length;
register u_char *p = CLe->Data;
PR_DATA(p,i);
PR_DATA(d,dl);
}

fprintf(LOG,"\n-- \n");
fflush(LOG);

if(CLe->Next != NULL)
CLe->Next->Last = CLe->Last;
if(CLe->Last != NULL)
CLe->Last->Next = CLe->Next;
else
CLroot = CLe->Next;
free(CLe);
}

/* 30 mins (x 60 seconds) */
#define IDLE_TIMEOUT 1800
#define IDLE_NODE() { \
time_t tm; \
time(&tm); \
if(LastTIME<tm) { \
register struct CREC *CLe,*CLt = CLroot; \
LastTIME=(tm+IDLE_TIMEOUT); tm-=IDLE_TIMEOUT; \
while(CLe=CLt) { \
CLt=CLe->Next; \
if(CLe->Time <tm) \
END_NODE(CLe,(u_char *)NULL,0,"IDLE TIMEOUT"); \
} \
} \
}

void filter(cp, pktlen)
register char *cp;
register u_int pktlen;
{
register struct ip *ip;
register struct tcphdr *tcph;

{ register u_short EtherType=ntohs(((struct ether_header *)cp)->ether_type);

if(EtherType < 0x600) {
EtherType = *(u_short *)(cp + SZETH + 6);
cp+=8; pktlen-=8;
}

if(EtherType != ETHERTYPE_IP) /* chuk it if its not IP */
return;
}

/* ugh, gotta do an alignment :-( */
bcopy(cp + SZETH, (char *)Packet,(int)(pktlen - SZETH));

ip = (struct ip *)Packet;
if( ip->ip_p != IPPROTO_TCP) /* chuk non tcp pkts */
return;
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(Packet + IPHLEN);

if(!( (TCPD == IPPORT_TELNET) ||
(TCPD == IPPORT_LOGINSERVER) ||
(TCPD == IPPORT_FTP)
)) return;

{ register struct CREC *CLm;
register int length = ((IPLEN - (IPHLEN * 4)) - (TCPOFF * 4));
register u_char *p = (u_char *)Packet;

p += ((IPHLEN * 4) + (TCPOFF * 4));

if(debug) {
fprintf(LOG,"PKT: (%s %04X) ", TCPflags(tcph->th_flags),length);
fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s] => ", inet_ntoa(IPS),SERVp(TCPS));
fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s]\n", inet_ntoa(IPD),SERVp(TCPD));
}

if( CLm = GET_NODE(IPS, TCPS, IPD, TCPD) ) {

CLm->PKcnt++;

if(length>0)
if( (CLm->Length + length) < MAXBUFLEN ) {
ADDDATA_NODE( CLm, p,length);
} else {
END_NODE( CLm, p,length, "DATA LIMIT");
}

if(TCPFL(TH_FIN|TH_RST)) {
END_NODE( CLm, (u_char *)NULL,0,TCPFL(TH_FIN)?"TH_FIN":"TH_RST" );
}

} else {

if(TCPFL(TH_SYN)) {
ADD_NODE(IPS,IPD,TCPS,TCPD,p,length);
}

}

IDLE_NODE();

}

}

/* signal handler
*/
void death()
{ register struct CREC *CLe;

while(CLe=CLroot)
END_NODE( CLe, (u_char *)NULL,0, "SIGNAL");

fprintf(LOG,"\nLog ended at => %s\n",NOWtm());
fflush(LOG);
if(LOG != stdout)
fclose(LOG);
exit(1);
}

/* opens network interface, performs ioctls and reads from it,
* passing data to filter function
*/
void do_it()
{
int cc;
char *buf;
u_short sp_ts_len;

if(!(buf=malloc(CHUNKSIZE)))
Pexit(1,"Eth: malloc");

/* this /dev/nit initialization code pinched from etherfind */
{
struct strioctl si;
struct ifreq ifr;
struct timeval timeout;
u_int chunksize = CHUNKSIZE;
u_long if_flags = NI_PROMISC;

if((if_fd = open(NIT_DEV, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: nit open");

if(ioctl(if_fd, I_SRDOPT, (char *)RMSGD) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_SRDOPT)");

si.ic_timout = INFTIM;

if(ioctl(if_fd, I_PUSH, "nbuf") < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_PUSH \"nbuf\")");

timeout.tv_sec = 1;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
si.ic_cmd = NIOCSTIME;
si.ic_len = sizeof(timeout);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&timeout;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSTIME)");

si.ic_cmd = NIOCSCHUNK;
si.ic_len = sizeof(chunksize);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&chunksize;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSCHUNK)");

strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, device, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
ifr.ifr_name[sizeof(ifr.ifr_name) - 1] = '\0';
si.ic_cmd = NIOCBIND;
si.ic_len = sizeof(ifr);
si.ic_dp = (char *)𝔦
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCBIND)");

si.ic_cmd = NIOCSFLAGS;
si.ic_len = sizeof(if_flags);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&if_flags;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSFLAGS)");

if(ioctl(if_fd, I_FLUSH, (char *)FLUSHR) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_FLUSH)");
}

while ((cc = read(if_fd, buf, CHUNKSIZE)) >= 0) {
register char *bp = buf,
*bufstop = (buf + cc);

while (bp < bufstop) {
register char *cp = bp;
register struct nit_bufhdr *hdrp;

hdrp = (struct nit_bufhdr *)cp;
cp += sizeof(struct nit_bufhdr);
bp += hdrp->nhb_totlen;
filter(cp, (u_long)hdrp->nhb_msglen);
}
}
Pexit((-1),"Eth: read");
}
/* Authorize your program, generate your own password and uncomment here */
/* #define AUTHPASSWD "EloiZgZejWyms" */

void getauth()
{ char *buf,*getpass(),*crypt();
char pwd[21],prmpt[81];

strcpy(pwd,AUTHPASSWD);
sprintf(prmpt,"(%s)UP? ",ProgName);
buf=getpass(prmpt);
if(strcmp(pwd,crypt(buf,pwd)))
exit(1);
}
*/
void main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
char cbuf[BUFSIZ];
struct ifconf ifc;
int s,
ac=1,
backg=0;

ProgName=argv[0];

/* getauth(); */

LOG=NULL;
device=NULL;
while((ac<argc) && (argv[ac][0] == '-')) {
register char ch = argv[ac++][1];
switch(toupper(ch)) {
case 'I': device=argv[ac++];
break;
case 'F': if(!(LOG=fopen((LogName=argv[ac++]),"a")))
Zexit(1,"Output file cant be opened\n");
break;
case 'B': backg=1;
break;
case 'D': debug=1;
break;
default : fprintf(ERR,
"Usage: %s [-b] [-d] [-i interface] [-f file]\n",
ProgName);
exit(1);
}
}

if(!device) {
if((s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: socket");

ifc.ifc_len = sizeof(cbuf);
ifc.ifc_buf = cbuf;
if(ioctl(s, SIOCGIFCONF, (char *)&ifc) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl");

close(s);
device = ifc.ifc_req->ifr_name;
}

fprintf(ERR,"Using logical device %s [%s]\n",device,NIT_DEV);
fprintf(ERR,"Output to %s.%s%s",(LOG)?LogName:"stdout",
(debug)?" (debug)":"",(backg)?" Backgrounding ":"\n");

if(!LOG)
LOG=stdout;

signal(SIGINT, death);
signal(SIGTERM,death);
signal(SIGKILL,death);
signal(SIGQUIT,death);

if(backg && debug) {
fprintf(ERR,"[Cannot bg with debug on]\n");
backg=0;
}

if(backg) {
register int s;

if((s=fork())>0) {
fprintf(ERR,"[pid %d]\n",s);
exit(0);
} else if(s<0)
Pexit(1,"fork");

if( (s=open("/dev/tty",O_RDWR))>0 ) {
ioctl(s,TIOCNOTTY,(char *)NULL);
close(s);
}
}
fprintf(LOG,"\nLog started at => %s [pid %d]\n",NOWtm(),getpid());
fflush(LOG);

do_it();
}

20. What is an Internet Outdial?

An Internet outdial is a modem connected to the Internet than you can
use to dial out. Normal outdials will only call local numbers. A GOD
(Global OutDial) is capable of calling long distance. Outdials are an
inexpensive method of calling long distance BBS's.

21. What are some Internet Outdials?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from CoTNo #5:

Internet Outdial List v3.0
by Cavalier and DisordeR


Introduction
------------
There are several lists of Internet outdials floating around the net these
days. The following is a compilation of other lists, as well as v2.0 by
DeadKat(CoTNo issue 2, article 4). Unlike other lists where the author
just ripped other people and released it, we have sat down and tested
each one of these. Some of them we have gotten "Connection Refused" or
it timed out while trying to connect...these have been labeled dead.


Working Outdials
----------------
as of 12/29/94

NPA IP Address Instructions
--- ---------- ------------
215 isn.upenn.edu modem

217 dialout.cecer.army.mil atdt x,xxxXXXXX

218 modem.d.umn.edu atdt9,xxxXXXX

303 yuma.acns.colostate.edu 3020

412 myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu 2600 Press D at the prompt


412 gate.cis.pitt.edu tn3270,
connect dialout.pitt.edu,
atdtxxxXXXX

413 dialout2400.smith.edu Ctrl } gets ENTER NUMBER: xxxxxxx

502 outdial.louisville.edu

502 uknet.uky.edu connect kecnet
@ dial: "outdial2400 or out"

602 acssdial.inre.asu.edu atdt8,,,,,[x][yyy]xxxyyyy

614 ns2400.acs.ohio-state.edu

614 ns9600.acs.ohio-state.edu

713 128.249.27.153 atdt x,xxxXXXX

714 modem.nts.uci.edu atdt[area]0[phone]

804 ublan.virginia.edu connect hayes, 9,,xxx-xxxx

804 ublan2.acc.virginia.edu connect telnet
connect hayes



Need Password
-------------

206 rexair.cac.washington.edu This is an unbroken password
303 yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU login: modem
404 128.140.1.239 .modem8|CR
415 annex132-1.EECS.Berkeley.EDU "dial1" or "dial2" or "dialer1"
514 cartier.CC.UMontreal.CA externe,9+number
703 wal-3000.cns.vt.edu dial2400 -aa


Dead/No Connect
---------------

201 idsnet
202 modem.aidt.edu
204 dial.cc.umanitoba.ca
204 umnet.cc.manitoba.ca "dial12" or "dial24"
206 dialout24.cac.washington.edu
207 modem-o.caps.maine.edu
212 B719-7e.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
212 B719-7f.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
212 DIALOUT-1.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
212 FREE-138-229.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
212 UP19-4b.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
215 wiseowl.ocis.temple.edu "atz" "atdt 9xxxyyyy"
218 aa28.d.umn.edu "cli" "rlogin modem"
at "login:" type "modem"
218 modem.d.umn.edu Hayes 9,XXX-XXXX
301 dial9600.umd.edu
305 alcat.library.nova.edu
305 office.cis.ufl.edu
307 modem.uwyo.edu Hayes 0,XXX-XXXX
313 35.1.1.6 dial2400-aa or dial1200-aa
or dialout
402 dialin.creighton.edu
402 modem.criegthon.edu
404 broadband.cc.emory.edu ".modem8" or ".dialout"
408 dialout.scu.edu
408 dialout1200.scu.edu
408 dialout2400.scu.edu
408 dialout9600.scu.edu
413 dialout.smith.edu
414 modems.uwp.edu
416 annex132.berkely.edu atdt 9,,,,, xxx-xxxx
416 pacx.utcs.utoronto.ca modem
503 dialout.uvm.edu
513 dialout24.afit.af.mil
513 r596adi1.uc.edu
514 pacx.CC.UMontreal.CA externe#9 9xxx-xxxx
517 engdial.cl.msu.edu
602 dial9600.telcom.arizona.edu
603 dialout1200.unh.edu
604 dial24-nc00.net.ubc.ca
604 dial24-nc01.net.ubc.ca
604 dial96-np65.net.ubc.ca
604 gmodem.capcollege.bc.ca
604 hmodem.capcollege.bc.ca
609 128.119.131.11X (X= 1 - 4) Hayes
609 129.119.131.11x (x = 1 to 4)
609 wright-modem-1.rutgers.edu
609 wright-modem-2.rutgers.edu
612 modem_out12e7.atk.com
612 modem_out24n8.atk.com
614 ns2400.ircc.ohio-state.edu "dial"
615 dca.utk.edu dial2400 D 99k #
615 MATHSUN23.MATH.UTK.EDU dial 2400 d 99Kxxxxxxx
616 modem.calvin.edu
617 128.52.30.3 2400baud
617 dialout.lcs.mit.edu
617 dialout1.princeton.edu
617 isdn3.Princeton.EDU
617 jadwingymkip0.Princeton.EDU
617 lord-stanley.Princeton.EDU
617 mpanus.Princeton.EDU
617 mrmodem.wellesley.edu
617 old-dialout.Princeton.EDU
617 stagger.Princeton.EDU
617 sunshine-02.lcs.mit.edu
617 waddle.Princeton.EDU
619 128.54.30.1 atdt [area][phone]
619 dialin.ucsd.edu "dialout"
703 modem_pool.runet.edu
703 wal-3000.cns.vt.edu
713 128.249.27.154 "c modem96" "atdt 9xxx-xxxx"
or "Hayes"
713 modem12.bcm.tmc.edu
713 modem24.bcm.tmc.edu
713 modem24.bcm.tmc.edu
714 mdmsrv7.sdsu.edu atdt 8xxx-xxxx
714 modem24.nts.uci.edu
714 pub-gopher.cwis.uci.edu
801 dswitch.byu.edu "C Modem"
808 irmodem.ifa.hawaii.edu
902 star.ccs.tuns.ca "dialout"
916 129.137.33.72
916 cc-dnet.ucdavis.edu connect hayes/dialout
916 engr-dnet1.engr.ucdavis.edu UCDNET <ret> C KEYCLUB <ret>
??? 128.119.131.11X (1 - 4)
??? 128.200.142.5
??? 128.54.30.1 nue, X to discontinue, ? for Help
??? 128.6.1.41
??? 128.6.1.42
??? 129.137.33.72
??? 129.180.1.57
??? 140.112.3.2 ntu <none>
??? annexdial.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de
??? dial96.ncl.ac.uk
??? dialout.plk.af.mil
??? ee21.ee.ncu.edu.tw cs8005
??? im.mgt.ncu.edu.tw guest <none>
??? modem.cis.uflu.edu
??? modem.ireq.hydro.qc.ca
??? modems.csuohio.edu
??? sparc20.ncu.edu.tw u349633
??? sun2cc.nccu.edu.tw ?
??? ts-modem.une.oz.au
??? twncu865.ncu.edu.tw guest <none>
??? vtnet1.cns.ut.edu "CALL" or "call"


Conclusion
----------
If you find any of the outdials to have gone dead, changed commands,
or require password, please let us know so we can keep this list as
accurate as possible. If you would like to add to the list, feel free
to mail us and it will be included in future versions of this list,
with your name beside it. Have fun...

[Editors note: Updates have been made to this document after
the original publication]

22. What is this system?

AIX
~~~
IBM AIX Version 3 for RISC System/6000
(C) Copyrights by IBM and by others 1982, 1990.
login:

[You will know an AIX system because it is the only Unix system that]
[clears the screen and issues a login prompt near the bottom of the]
[screen]


AS/400
~~~~~~
UserID?
Password?

Once in, type GO MAIN


CDC Cyber
~~~~~~~~~
WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.
COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1987.

88/02/16. 02.36.53. N265100
CSUS CYBER 170-730. NOS 2.5.2-678/3.
FAMILY:

You would normally just hit return at the family prompt. Next prompt is:

USER NAME:


CISCO Router
~~~~~~~~~~~~
FIRST BANK OF TNO
95-866 TNO VirtualBank
REMOTE Router - TN043R1

Console Port

SN - 00000866

TN043R1>


DECserver
~~~~~~~~~
DECserver 700-08 Communications Server V1.1 (BL44G-11A) - LAT V5.1
DPS502-DS700

(c) Copyright 1992, Digital Equipment Corporation - All Rights Reserved

Please type HELP if you need assistance

Enter username> TNO

Local>


Hewlett Packard MPE-XL
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MPE XL:
EXPECTED A :HELLO COMMAND. (CIERR 6057)
MPE XL:
EXPECTED [SESSION NAME,] USER.ACCT [,GROUP] (CIERR 1424)
MPE XL:


GTN
~~~
WELCOME TO CITIBANK. PLEASE SIGN ON.
XXXXXXXX

@
PASSWORD =

@

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID:-1->
PLEASE ENTER YOUR PASSWORD:-2->

CITICORP (CITY NAME). KEY GHELP FOR HELP.
XXX.XXX
PLEASE SELECT SERVICE REQUIRED.-3->


Lantronix Terminal Server
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Lantronix ETS16 Version V3.1/1(940623)

Type HELP at the 'Local_15> ' prompt for assistance.

Login password>


Meridian Mail (Northern Telecom Phone/Voice Mail System)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MMM MMMERIDIAN
MMMMM MMMMM
MMMMMM MMMMMM
MMM MMMMM MMM MMMMM MMMMM
MMM MMM MMM MMMMMM MMMMMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMMMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM

Copyright (c) Northern Telecom, 1991


Novell ONLAN
~~~~~~~~~~~~
<Control-A aka smiley face>N

[To access the systems it is best to own a copy of ONLAN/PC]


PC-Anywhere
~~~~~~~~~~~
<Control-A aka smiley face>P

[To access the systems it is best to own a copy of PCAnywhere Remote]


PRIMOS
~~~~~~
PRIMENET 19.2.7F PPOA1

<any text>

ER!

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

CONNECT
Primenet V 2.3 (system)
LOGIN (you)
User id? (system)
SAPB5 (you)
Password? (system)
DROWSAP (you)
OK, (system)


ROLM CBX II
~~~~~~~~~~~
ROLM CBXII RELEASE 9004.2.34 RB295 9000D IBMHO27568
BIND DATE: 7/APR/93
COPYRIGHT 1980, 1993 ROLM COMPANY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
ROLM IS A REGISTERED TRADEMARK AND CBX IS A TRADEMARK OF ROLM COMPANY.
YOU HAVE ENTERED CPU 1
12:38:47 ON WEDNESDAY 2/15/1995

USERNAME: op

PASSWORD:

INVALID USERNAME-PASSWORD PAIR


ROLM-OSL
~~~~~~~~
MARAUDER10292 01/09/85(^G) 1 03/10/87 00:29:47
RELEASE 8003
OSL, PLEASE.
?


System75
~~~~~~~~
Login: root
INCORRECT LOGIN

Login: browse
Password:

Software Version: G3s.b16.2.2

Terminal Type (513, 4410, 4425): [513]


Tops-10
~~~~~~~
NIH Timesharing

NIH Tri-SMP 7.02-FF 16:30:04 TTY11
system 1378/1381/1453 Connected to Node Happy(40) Line # 12
Please LOGIN
.


VM/370
~~~~~~
VM/370
!


VM/ESA
~~~~~~
VM/ESA ONLINE

TBVM2 VM/ESA Rel 1.1 PUT 9200

Fill in your USERID and PASSWORD and press ENTER
(Your password will not appear when you type it)
USERID ===>
PASSWORD ===>

COMMAND ===>


Xylogics Annex Communications Server
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Annex Command Line Interpreter * Copyright 1991 Xylogics, Inc.


Checking authorization, Please wait... -
Annex username: TNO - Optional security check
Annex password: - Not always present

Permission granted
annex:

23. What are the default accounts for XXX?

AIX
~~~
guest guest


AS/400
~~~~~~
qsecofr qsecofr /* master security officer */
qsysopr qsysopr /* system operator */
qpgmr qpgmr /* default programmer */

also

ibm password
ibm 2222
ibm service
qsecofr 1111111
qsecofr 2222222
qserv qserv
qsvr qsvr
secofr secofr
qsrv ibmce1


DECserver
~~~~~~~~~
ACCESS
SYSTEM


Dynix (The library software, not the UnixOS)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(Type 'later' to exit to the login prompt)
setup <no password>
library <no password>
circ <Social Security Number>


Hewlett Packard MPE-XL
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
HELLO MANAGER.SYS
HELLO MGR.SYS
HELLO FIELD.SUPPORT HPUNSUP or SUPPORT or HP
HELLO OP.OPERATOR
MGR CAROLIAN
MGR CCC
MGR CNAS
MGR CONV
MGR COGNOS
OPERATOR COGNOS
MANAGER COGNOS
OPERATOR DISC
MGR HPDESK
MGR HPWORD
FIELD HPWORD
MGR HPOFFICE
SPOOLMAN HPOFFICE
ADVMAIL HPOFFICE
MAIL HPOFFICE
WP HPOFFICE
MANAGER HPOFFICE
MGR HPONLY
FIELD HPP187
MGR HPP187
MGR HPP189
MGR HPP196
MGR INTX3
MGR ITF3000
MANAGER ITF3000
MAIL MAIL
MGR NETBASE
MGR REGO
MGR RJE
MGR ROBELLE
MANAGER SECURITY
MGR SECURITY
FIELD SERVICE
MANAGER SYS
MGR SYS
PCUSER SYS
RSBCMON SYS
OPERATOR SYS
OPERATOR SYSTEM
FIELD SUPPORT
OPERATOR SUPPORT
MANAGER TCH
MAIL TELESUP
MANAGER TELESUP
MGR TELESUP
SYS TELESUP
MGE VESOFT
MGE VESOFT
MGR WORD
MGR XLSERVER

Common jobs are Pub, Sys, Data
Common passwords are HPOnly, TeleSup, HP, MPE, Manager, MGR, Remote


Major BBS
~~~~~~~~~
Sysop Sysop


Mitel PBX
~~~~~~~~~
SYSTEM


NeXTSTEP
~~~~~~~~
root NeXT
signa signa
me <null> (Rumored to be correct, not checked)


Nomadic Computing Environment (NCE) on the Tadpole Technologies SPARCBook3
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fax <no password>


PICK O/S
~~~~~~~~
DSA # Desquetop System Administrator
DS
DESQUETOP
PHANTOM


Prolog
~~~~~~
PBX PBX
NETWORK NETWORK
NETOP <null>


Radio Shack Screen Savers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
RS<STORE_ID_NUMBER>


Rolm
~~~~
CBX Defaults

op op
op operator
su super
admin pwp
eng engineer


PhoneMail Defaults

sysadmin sysadmin
tech tech
poll tech


RSX
~~~
SYSTEM/SYSTEM (Username SYSTEM, Password SYSTEM)
1,1/system (Directory [1,1] Password SYSTEM)
BATCH/BATCH
SYSTEM/MANAGER
USER/USER

Default accounts for Micro/RSX:

MICRO/RSX

Alternately you can hit <CTRL-Z> when the boot sequence asks you for the
date and create an account using:

RUN ACNT
or RUN $ACNT

(Numbers below 10 {oct} are privileged)

Reboot and wait for the date/time question. Type ^C and at the MCR prompt,
type "abo at." You must include the . dot!

If this works, type "acs lb0:/blks=1000" to get some swap space so the
new step won't wedge.

type " run $acnt" and change the password of any account with a group
number of 7 or less.

You may find that the ^C does not work. Try ^Z and ESC as well.
Also try all 3 as terminators to valid and invalid times.

If none of the above work, use the halt switch to halt the system,
just after a invalid date-time. Look for a user mode PSW 1[4-7]xxxx.
then deposit 177777 into R6, cross your fingers, write protect the drive
and continue the system. This will hopefully result in indirect blowing
up... And hopefully the system has not been fully secured.


SGI Irix
~~~~~~~~
4DGifts <no password>
guest <no password>
demos <no password>
lp <no password>
nuucp <no password>
tour <no password>
tutor <no password>


System 75
~~~~~~~~~
bcim bcimpw
bciim bciimpw
bcms bcmspw, bcms
bcnas bcnspw
blue bluepw
browse looker, browsepw
craft crftpw, craftpw, crack
cust custpw
enquiry enquirypw
field support
inads indspw, inadspw, inads
init initpw
kraft kraftpw
locate locatepw
maint maintpw, rwmaint
nms nmspw
rcust rcustpw
support supportpw
tech field


Taco Bell
~~~~~~~~~
rgm rollout
tacobell <null>


Verifone Junior 2.05
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Default password: 166816


VMS
~~~
field service
systest utep


XON / XON Junior
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Default password: 166831

24. What port is XXX on?

The file /etc/services on most Unix machines lists the port
assignments for that machine. For a complete list of port
assignments, read RFC (Request For Comments) 1700 "Assigned Numbers"

25. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

Trojan:

Remember the Trojan Horse? Bad guys hid inside it until they could
get into the city to do their evil deed. A trojan computer program is
similar. It is a program which does an unauthorized function, hidden
inside an authorized program. It does something other than what it
claims to do, usually something malicious (although not necessarily!),
and it is intended by the author to do whatever it does. If it's not
intentional, its called a 'bug' or, in some cases, a feature :) Some
virus scanning programs detect some trojans. Some virus scanning
programs don't detect any trojans. No virus scanners detect all
trojans.

Virus:

A virus is an independent program which reproduces itself. It may
attach to other programs, it may create copies of itself (as in
companion viruses). It may damage or corrupt data, change data, or
degrade the performance of your system by utilizing resources such as
memory or disk space. Some virus scanners detect some viruses. No
virus scanners detect all viruses. No virus scanner can protect
against "any and all viruses, known and unknown, now and forevermore".

Worm:

Made famous by Robert Morris, Jr. , worms are programs which reproduce
by copying themselves over and over, system to system, using up
resources and sometimes slowing down the systems. They are self
contained and use the networks to spread, in much the same way viruses
use files to spread. Some people say the solution to viruses and
worms is to just not have any files or networks. They are probably
correct. We would include computers.

Logic Bomb:

Code which will trigger a particular form of 'attack' when a
designated condition is met. For instance, a logic bomb could delete
all files on Dec. 5th. Unlike a virus, a logic bomb does not make
copies of itself.

26. How can I protect myself from viruses and such?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

The most common viruses are boot sector infectors. You can help protect
yourself against those by write protecting all disks which you do not
need write access to. Definitely keep a set of write protected floppy
system disks. If you get a virus, it will make things much simpler.
And, they are good for coasters. Only kidding.

Scan all incoming files with a recent copy of a good virus scanner.
Among the best are F-Prot, Dr. Solomon's Anti-virus Toolkit, and
Thunderbyte Anti-Virus. AVP is also a good program. Using more than
one scanner could be helpful. You may get those one or two viruses that
the other guy happened to miss this month.

New viruses come out at the rate of about 8 per day now. NO scanner can
keep up with them all, but the four mentioned here do the best job of
keeping current. Any _good_ scanner will detect the majority of common
viruses. No virus scanner will detect all viruses.

Right now there are about 5600 known viruses. New ones are written all
the time. If you use a scanner for virus detection, you need to make
sure you get frequent updates. If you rely on behavior blockers, you
should know that such programs can be bypassed easily by a technique
known as tunnelling.

You may want to use integrity checkers as well as scanners. Keep in
mind that while these can supply added protection, they are not
foolproof.

You may want to use a particular kind of scanner, called resident
scanners. Those are programs which stay resident in the computer memory
and constantly monitor program execution (and sometimes even access to
the files containing programs). If you try to execute a program, the
resident scanner receives control and scans it first for known viruses.
Only if no such viruses are found, the program is allowed to execute.

Most virus scanners will not protect you against many kinds of trojans,
any sort of logic bombs, or worms. Theoretically, they _could_ protect
you against logic bombs and/or worms, by addition of scanning strings;
however, this is rarely done.

The best, actually only way, to protect yourself is to know what you
have on your system and make sure what you have there is authorized by
you. Make frequent backups of all important files. Keep your DOS
system files write protected. Write protect all disks that you do not
need to write to. If you do get a virus, don't panic. Call the support
department of the company who supplies your anti-virus product if you
aren't sure of what you are doing. If the company you got your
anti-virus software from does not have a good technical support
department, change companies.

The best way to make sure viruses are not spread is not to spread them.
Some people do this intentionally. We discourage this. Viruses aren't
cool.

27. Where can I get more information about viruses?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

Assembly language programming books illustrate the (boring) aspect of
replication and have for a long time. The most exciting/interesting
thing about viruses is all the controversy around them. Free speech,
legality, and cute payloads are a lot more interesting than "find first,
find next" calls. You can get information about the technical aspects
of viruses, as well as help if you should happen to get a virus, from
the virus-l FAQ, posted on comp. virus every so often. You can also pick
up on the various debates there. There are alt.virus type newsgroups,
but the level of technical expertise is minimal, and so far at least
there has not been a lot of real "help" for people who want to get -rid-
of a virus.

There are a lot of virus experts. To become one, just call yourself
one. Only Kidding. Understanding viruses involves understanding
programming, operating systems, and their interaction. Understanding
all of the 'Cult of Virus' business requires a lot of discernment. There
are a number of good papers available on viruses, and the Cult of Virus;
you can get information on them from just about anyone listed in the
virus-l FAQ. The FTP site ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de is a pretty
reliable site for programs and text.

28. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from: Computer Security Basics
by Deborah Russell
and G.T. Gengemi Sr.

A message is called either plaintext or cleartext. The process of
disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance is called
encryption. An encrypted message is called ciphertext. The process
of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption.

The art and science of keeping messages secure is called cryptography,
and it is practiced by cryptographers. Cryptanalysts are
practitioners of cryptanalysis, the art and science of breaking
ciphertext, i.e. seeing through the disguise. The branch of
mathematics embodying both cryptography and cryptanalysis is called
cryptology, and it's practitioners are called cryptologists.

29. What is PGP?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from: PGP(tm) User's Guide
Volume I: Essential Topics
by Philip Zimmermann

PGP(tm) uses public-key encryption to protect E-mail and data files.
Communicate securely with people you've never met, with no secure
channels needed for prior exchange of keys. PGP is well featured and
fast, with sophisticated key management, digital signatures, data
compression, and good ergonomic design.

Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a
high security cryptographic software application for MS-DOS, Unix,
VAX/VMS, and other computers. PGP allows people to exchange files or
messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience. Privacy means
that only those intended to receive a message can read it.
Authentication means that messages that appear to be from a particular
person can only have originated from that person. Convenience means
that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles of
managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software. No
secure channels are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes
PGP much easier to use. This is because PGP is based on a powerful
new technology called "public key" cryptography.

PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
public key cryptosystem with the speed of conventional cryptography,
message digests for digital signatures, data compression before
encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management.
And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other
software implementations. PGP is public key cryptography for the
masses.

30. What is Tempest?

Tempest stands for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance
Technology.

Computers and other electronic equipment release interference to their
surrounding environment. You may observe this by placing two video
monitors close together. The pictures will behave erratically until you
space them apart.

What is important for an observer is the emission of digital pulses (1s
and 0s) as these are used in computers. The channel for this radiation
is in two arrangements, radiated emissions and conducted emissions.
Radiated emissions are assembled when components in electrical devices
form to act as antennas. Conducted emissions are formed when radiation
is conducted along cables and wires.

Although most of the time these emissions are simply annoyances, they
can sometimes be very helpful. Suppose we wanted to see what project a
target was working on. We could sit in a van outside her office and use
sensitive electronic equipment to attempt to pick up and decipher the
radiated emissions from her video monitor. These emissions normally
exist at around 55-245 Mhz and can be picked up as far as one kilometer
away.

A monitoring device can distinguish between different sources emitting
radiation because the sources emanating the radiation are made up of
dissimilar elements and so this coupled with other factors varies the
emitted frequency. For example different electronic components in VDUs,
different manufacturing processes involved in reproducing the VDUs,
different line syncs, etc... By synchronizing our raster with the
targets raster we can passively draw the observed screen in real-time.
This technology can be acquired by anyone, not just government agencies.

The target could shield the emissions from her equipment or use
equipment that does not generate strong emissions. However, Tempest
equipment is not legal for civilian use in the United States.

Tempest is the US Government program for evaluation and endorsement of
electronic equipment that is safe from eavesdropping. Tempest
certification refers to the equipment having passed a testing phase and
agreeing to emanations rules specified in the government document NACSIM
5100A (Classified). This document sets forth the emanation levels that
the US Government believes equipment can give off without compromising
the information it is processing.

31. What is an anonymous remailer?

This FAQ answer was written by Raph Levien:

An anonymous remailer is a system on the Internet that allows you to
send e-mail or post messages to Usenet anonymously.

There are two sorts of remailers in widespread use. The first is the
anon.penet.fi style, the second is the cypherpunk style. The remailer
at anon.penet.fi is immensely popular, with over 160,000 users over its
lifetime, and probably tens of thousands of messages per day. Its main
advantage is that it's so easy to use. The cypherpunks mailers, which
provide much better security, are becoming more popular, however, as
there is more awareness of them.

The user of the anon.penet.fi system first needs to get an anonymous id.
This is done either by sending mail to somebody who already has one (for
example, by replying to a post on Usenet), or sending mail to
[e-mail]. In either case, penet will mail back the new anon
id, which looks like [e-mail]. If an123456 then sends
mail to another user of the system, then this is what happens:

1. The mail is transported to anon.penet.fi, which resides somewhere in
the vicinity of Espoo, Finland.

2. These steps are carried out by software running on anon.penet.fi.
Penet first looks up the email address of the sender in its
database, then replaces it with the numeric code. All other
information about the sender is removed.

3. Then, penet looks up the number of the recipient in the same
database, and replaces it with the actual email address.

4. Finally, it sends the mail to the actual email address of the
recipient.

There are variations on this scheme, such as posting to Usenet (in which
step 3 is eliminated), but that's the basic idea.

Where anon.penet.fi uses a secret database to match anon id's to actual
email addresses, the cypherpunks remailers use cryptography to hide the
actual identities. Let's say I want to send email to a real email
address, or post it to Usenet, but keep my identity completely hidden.
To send it through one remailer, this is what happens.

1. I encrypt the message and the recipient's address, using the public
key of the remailer of my choice.

2. I send the email to the remailer.

3. When the remailer gets the mail, it decrypts it using its private
key, revealing as plaintext the message and the recipient's address.

4. All information about the sender is removed.

5. Finally, it sends it to the recipient's email address.

If one trusts the remailer operator, this is good enough. However, the
whole point of the cypherpunks remailers is that you don't _have_ to
trust any one individual or system. So, people who want real security
use a chain of remailers. If any one remailer on the "chain" is honest,
then the privacy of the message is assured.

To use a chain of remailers, I first have to prepare the message, which
is nestled within multiple layers of encryption, like a Russian
matryoshka doll. Preparing such a message is tedious and error prone,
so many people use an automated tool such as my premail package.
Anyway, after preparing the message, it is sent to the first remailer in
the chain, which corresponds to the outermost layer of encryption. Each
remailer strips off one layer of encryption and sends the message to the
next, until it reaches the final remailer. At this point, only the
innermost layer of encryption remains. This layer is stripped off,
revealing the plaintext message and recipient for the first time. At
this point, the message is sent to its actual recipient.

Remailers exist in many locations. A typical message might go through
Canada, Holland, Berkeley, and Finland before ending up at its final
location.

Aside from the difficulty of preparing all the encrypted messages,
another drawback of the cypherpunk remailers is that they don't easily
allow responses to anonymous mail. All information about the sender is
stripped away, including any kind of return address. However the new
alias servers promise to change that. To use an alias server, one
creates a new email address (mine is [e-mail]). Mail sent to
this new address will be untraceably forwarded to one's real address.

To set this up, one first encrypts one's own email address with multiple
layers of encryption. Then, using an encrypted channel, one sends the
encrypted address to the alias server, along with the nickname that one
would like. The alias server registers the encrypted address in the
database. The alias server then handles reply mail in much the same way
as anon.penet.fi, except that the mail is forwarded to the chain of
anonymous remailers.

For maximum security, the user can arrange it so that, at each link in
the chain, the remailer adds another layer of encryption to the message
while removing one layer from the email address. When the user finally
gets the email, it is encrypted in multiple layers. The matryoshka has
to be opened one doll at a time until the plaintext message hidden
inside is revealed.

One other point is that the remailers must be reliable in order for all
this to work. This is especially true when a chain of remailers is used
-- if any one of the remailers is not working, then the message will be
dropped. This is why I maintain a list of reliable remailers. By
choosing reliable remailers to start with, there is a good chance the
message will finally get there.

32. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?

The most popular and stable anonymous remailer is anon.penet.fi,
operated by Johan Helsingus. To obtain an anonymous ID, mail
[e-mail].

The server at anon.penet.fi does it's best to remove any headers or
other information describing its true origin. You should make an effort
and try to omit information detailing your identity within such messages
as quite often signatures not starting with "--" are including within
your e-mail, this of course is not what you want. You can send messages
to:

[e-mail]

Here you are addressing another anonymous user and your E-Mail message
will appear to have originated from anon.penet.fi.

[e-mail]

Here you are posting an anonymous message to a whole Usenet group and in
this case to alt.security which will be posted at the local site (in
this case Finland).

[e-mail]

If you send a message to this address you will be allocated an identity
(assuming you don't already have one). You can also confirm your
identity here as well.

You can also set yourself a password, this password helps to
authenticate any messages that you may send. This password is included
in your outgoing messages, to set a password send E-Mail to
[e-mail] with your password in the body of your text e.g.:

To: [e-mail]
Subject:
TN0_rUlEz

For more information on this anonymous server send mail to:

[e-mail]

Anonymous Usenet posting is frowned upon by other users of Usenet groups
claiming their opinions are worthless. This is because they believe
anonymity is used to shield ones self from attacks from opponents, while
on the other hand it can be used to protect ones self from social
prejudice (or people reporting ones opinions to ones superiors). Also
if you are thinking this is a useful tool to use to hid against the