To the Reichschancellor of Germany, Mr. A. Hitler
Thank you for the letter.
I do hope that the поп-aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union will he a pivotal moment in the history of political relations between our countries and will contribute to their improvement.
The peoples of our countries need peaceful relations. The agreement of the German government to sign a поп-aggression treaty will serve as a basis to eliminate political tensions and establish peace and cooperation between our two countries.
The Soviet government authorised me to let you know that it agrees to see Mr. Ribbentrop in Moscow on 23rd August.
J. Stalin'[122]
The economic agreement that the USSR needed had already been signed and the funds would be received. A non-aggression pact with the Germans could now be signed, which the USSR also needed in order to avoid a possible war with Germany and finish the current war with Japan. Molotov hands Stalin's response to the German ambassador and… And here came the moment which was the reason, dear reader, why we made such a long introduction into the hot August of 1939. The most interesting and the least studied part of the story of the non-aggression pact begins. Pure miracles ensue…
Story one
Story two
Story three
Story four
Thank you for the letter.
I do hope that the поп-aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union will he a pivotal moment in the history of political relations between our countries and will contribute to their improvement.
The peoples of our countries need peaceful relations. The agreement of the German government to sign a поп-aggression treaty will serve as a basis to eliminate political tensions and establish peace and cooperation between our two countries.
The Soviet government authorised me to let you know that it agrees to see Mr. Ribbentrop in Moscow on 23rd August.
J. Stalin'[122]
The economic agreement that the USSR needed had already been signed and the funds would be received. A non-aggression pact with the Germans could now be signed, which the USSR also needed in order to avoid a possible war with Germany and finish the current war with Japan. Molotov hands Stalin's response to the German ambassador and… And here came the moment which was the reason, dear reader, why we made such a long introduction into the hot August of 1939. The most interesting and the least studied part of the story of the non-aggression pact begins. Pure miracles ensue…
Story one
Concerning inert Germans and Stalin's letter
Let us imagine a situation. Adolf Hitler puts his prestige at stake and, in spite of diplomatic etiquette, addressed the head of another state, bypassing his foreign minister. No such thing had happened in German-Russian relations before. Having written that letter, Hitler put himself in a very vulnerable position. He showed how important it was for him to come to an arrangement. He revealed his cards. He exposed himself even before the negotiations started. And he is waiting for an answer. On 21st August, 1939 there is no news in the whole Third Reich which would be more important than Stalin's answer.
Here is the question for you: how long did it take to pass the message from the Soviet government? As we know, at 5 p.m. the envelope with the message got into the German ambassador's hands. And when did it reach Hitler?
Let us try to calculate. We will give fifteen minutes to Ambassador Schulenburg to say his goodbyes to Molotov and walk to the car, then, say, twenty minutes to drive to the Embassy. Around ten minutes to take his coat off and suchlike, about twenty minutes to cipher the message. Ten more minutes to send the message to Berlin – the document is tiny, there are only 14 lines. In total, we get 75 minutes. Let us round it up to 90, as the German ambassador is not very young and therefore does not walk very fast. So, an hour and a half in total. What are the time expenditures in Berlin? Deciphering would take 20 minutes, delivering to the Fuhrer another 20 minutes. Let it be an hour. An hour in Berlin and an hour and a half in Moscow. It means that passing Stalin's response from the Kremlin to Adolf Hitler could take two and a half hours at the most. And this would be without too much haste, in a very laid-back manner. Whereas Hitler must have ordered this material to be given top priority due to its urgency and importance. Everyone should have run! What happened in reality?
Stalin's response was passed to Hitler nine hours later![123]
How could it have happened that the most expected document in Germany was delivered to Hitler with such a delay? Did it get lost on the way? Just compare two and a half hours and nine hours. Who held the message up for so long? I think you will agree that it raises a lot of questions. Hitler must have asked these questions, too, as he really was looking forward to Stalin's answer. 'In utter anxiety, practically unable to control his nerves, Hitler was waiting for an answer. He could not sleep and that is why he called Hermann Goering in the middle of the night to share his worries with him and express his irritation about Russian stolidity'.[124] And the Fuhrer's misgivings concerning Stalin were completely unfounded, as the head of the USSR replied at lightning speed. So, where was the response? Who kept it from Hitler? And when Stalin's letter finally got through to the addressee, the Führer's reaction was rather peculiar. 'Hitler was given a note at dinner. He quickly ran through it, blushing thoroughly, stared in front of himself for some time and then hit the table in front of him so hard that it clinked and shouted in a failing voice, 'It's all right! It's all right!'[125] There is other evidence. When Hitler received the message that Ribbentrop could fly to Moscow on 23rd August, he exclaimed: 'This is one hundred per cent victory! And though I never do, I am going to have a bottle of champagne'.[126]
Could Adolf Hitler take no notice of the strange delay in the delivery of this important information simply out of joy that Stalin had replied and agreed to move the negotiations closer? He could have done. But the senior officials of his secret services were obliged to examine the situation. Why? Because when the head of state runs around his residence in anxiety and is constantly on the phone, asking, 'Where is Stalin's answer?' a delay in delivering information by six – seven (!) hours has a very short and concise name: sabotage. Or maybe even a louder one: a diversion. This 'delay' could have resulted in a turning point in history. In fact, world history could have been completely different.
Let us approach this question from a different point of view. It would seem that to entirely conceal from Hitler the fact that Stalin had replied would have been impossible. So what is the difference between delivering the message two hours later and nine hours later? The difference is enormous. The difference is as big as between the mornings of 10th and 11th September 2001. Let us pose another question: who would be interested in making it look like there had been no response from Stalin? Who would be interested in driving Hitler mad with Stalin's silence in response to Hitler's PERSONAL LETTER? What results would it produce? What could Adolf Hitler have done having not received Stalin's message? What would have happened had Hitler's patience snapped earlier?
Curiously enough, it is pretty easy to answer these questions. The Fuhrer was a gambler. He played two boards at the same time, both the West and the East. When, six years later, Adolf Hitler shot himself in the Fuhrerbunker, Stalin was abundantly clear about it ('The scoundrel's game is over!'). These words tell us the whole truth of the Second World War. Hitler's game-playing with everyone at the same time led him to a defeat. He said more than once that fighting on two fronts would be disastrous and impossible for Germany, that such a war scenario was the biggest mistake made by Kaiser Wilhelm II. And that he, Hitler, was not going to make the same mistake. Therefore, in August, 1939 Hitler was to come to an agreement either with the West or with the East. And it would be even better if he managed to make an arrangement with one side and then with the other centre of power, as well. And should the proposal of the English prove more interesting, the friendship with the Kremlin could be forgotten about again.[127]
But let us go back to the question of what Hitler would have done had Stalin's response been some five hours later. The answer is that he would have continued negotiating. But not with Russians. With whom then? There is only one answer to this: with the English. It is an historical fact that on 21st August, 1939 the German ruler asked London to have a meeting with Goering on 22nd August and received a positive answer.[128] In those fateful August days there were two aeroplanes at the Berlin airfield. One of them, the Fuhrer's personal Junkers, was waiting for the Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, in order to take him to Moscow. And the other plane was a Lockheed A-12 of the British secret service.[129] Hermann Goering was ready to board it and fly to London. Both flights and both visits were planned for the same day, 23rd August, 1939. Goering's flight was organised personally by the head of the British intelligence in order to avoid publicity.
Fatman, which was Goering's nickname, was to meet not just anybody but Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. And the whole arrangement was kept under a veil of complete secrecy. He was to fly not straight to London but first land at a small airfield near a town called Bonvington in Herefordshire. From there Goering was to be delivered straight to Chequers, the official residence of the British Prime Minister. It was planned to dismiss Chamberlain's staff for the sake of secrecy, and replace all its members with officers of the British secret service. It was also planned to disconnect all the phones…[130]
This was not the first occasion when, at crucial political moments, one of the leaders of the Third Reich would fly to London in order to make arrangements in real time and in person. For example, when German troops invaded Austria in spring, 1938, Ribbentrop was in the British capital. The excuse not to make this visit official was found in the process. Ribbentrop, who used to be the German ambassador in London, now became the head of the Foreign Ministry. And in this new position he just wanted to see his all friends and throw something akin to a farewell party.[131] As a result, England recognised the Anschluss (annexation) of Austria to Germany despite having a treaty with Austrians in which the British promised to protect their independence.
In August 1939 only one flight could take place. And it is exactly where Hitler's envoy would fly and which country the Fuhrer chooses to make an arrangement with that the flight was for.[132] Having no response from Stalin was supposed to prod Hitler into negotiating with the English. The German leader simply did not have any other options. This is why we can state that the supposed lack of response from Stalin could have meant an entirely different scenario for Europe. And this scenario would have been even more tragic for Russia, as straight after defeating Poland the German troops would have turned up at the Russian borders and the Russian Army would have had to fight the Wehrmacht on its own and two years earlier and France or England would not have been obliged to reinforce Russia.
Who would have found it profitable if a war between Russia and Germany had started in September 1939? England. Who would have found it profitable to pit two peoples against one another in order to then join the battle second when the rivals had bled white? England. And a nine-hour delay in delivering the urgent and important letter is an historical fact which no one can deny. So, who could have tried to impede negotiations between Germany and Russia through holding up a message from one head of state to the other? The answer is obvious. There is one thing I do not understand: why has no one else tried to answer this fascinating question before, since answering it makes a lot of things clear. Even too clear. This was a question of national importance and Great Britain used the help of the secret service apart from all diplomatic sources…
Who could have provided the 'extra' six hours for Stalin's letter? English agents in German institutions. What institution exactly is not really that important; Foreign Ministry, intelligence, ciphers, Ribbentrop's deputies. If you want to know who exactly was responsible, get hold of German archives; they must have the answer. Such a blunder could not have remained unpunished. Either the German secret service or Ribbentrop himself must have reacted to this obvious sabotage. There must have been a reaction – severe but concealed. Within a month someone must have drowned, died in a car crash or of a sudden heart attack. Quietly. With no publicity. With nothing but a portrait at work with a black ribbon. Some crying colleagues. A true Aryan. Blind Death has taken him away. With a pension for the heartbroken widow.
I do not know what happened to the British agent who put everything at stake performing the task of his bosses in London; I do not know his name. But I do know names and surnames of other real foreign agents who were in Germany back then.
Here is the question for you: how long did it take to pass the message from the Soviet government? As we know, at 5 p.m. the envelope with the message got into the German ambassador's hands. And when did it reach Hitler?
Let us try to calculate. We will give fifteen minutes to Ambassador Schulenburg to say his goodbyes to Molotov and walk to the car, then, say, twenty minutes to drive to the Embassy. Around ten minutes to take his coat off and suchlike, about twenty minutes to cipher the message. Ten more minutes to send the message to Berlin – the document is tiny, there are only 14 lines. In total, we get 75 minutes. Let us round it up to 90, as the German ambassador is not very young and therefore does not walk very fast. So, an hour and a half in total. What are the time expenditures in Berlin? Deciphering would take 20 minutes, delivering to the Fuhrer another 20 minutes. Let it be an hour. An hour in Berlin and an hour and a half in Moscow. It means that passing Stalin's response from the Kremlin to Adolf Hitler could take two and a half hours at the most. And this would be without too much haste, in a very laid-back manner. Whereas Hitler must have ordered this material to be given top priority due to its urgency and importance. Everyone should have run! What happened in reality?
Stalin's response was passed to Hitler nine hours later![123]
How could it have happened that the most expected document in Germany was delivered to Hitler with such a delay? Did it get lost on the way? Just compare two and a half hours and nine hours. Who held the message up for so long? I think you will agree that it raises a lot of questions. Hitler must have asked these questions, too, as he really was looking forward to Stalin's answer. 'In utter anxiety, practically unable to control his nerves, Hitler was waiting for an answer. He could not sleep and that is why he called Hermann Goering in the middle of the night to share his worries with him and express his irritation about Russian stolidity'.[124] And the Fuhrer's misgivings concerning Stalin were completely unfounded, as the head of the USSR replied at lightning speed. So, where was the response? Who kept it from Hitler? And when Stalin's letter finally got through to the addressee, the Führer's reaction was rather peculiar. 'Hitler was given a note at dinner. He quickly ran through it, blushing thoroughly, stared in front of himself for some time and then hit the table in front of him so hard that it clinked and shouted in a failing voice, 'It's all right! It's all right!'[125] There is other evidence. When Hitler received the message that Ribbentrop could fly to Moscow on 23rd August, he exclaimed: 'This is one hundred per cent victory! And though I never do, I am going to have a bottle of champagne'.[126]
Could Adolf Hitler take no notice of the strange delay in the delivery of this important information simply out of joy that Stalin had replied and agreed to move the negotiations closer? He could have done. But the senior officials of his secret services were obliged to examine the situation. Why? Because when the head of state runs around his residence in anxiety and is constantly on the phone, asking, 'Where is Stalin's answer?' a delay in delivering information by six – seven (!) hours has a very short and concise name: sabotage. Or maybe even a louder one: a diversion. This 'delay' could have resulted in a turning point in history. In fact, world history could have been completely different.
Let us approach this question from a different point of view. It would seem that to entirely conceal from Hitler the fact that Stalin had replied would have been impossible. So what is the difference between delivering the message two hours later and nine hours later? The difference is enormous. The difference is as big as between the mornings of 10th and 11th September 2001. Let us pose another question: who would be interested in making it look like there had been no response from Stalin? Who would be interested in driving Hitler mad with Stalin's silence in response to Hitler's PERSONAL LETTER? What results would it produce? What could Adolf Hitler have done having not received Stalin's message? What would have happened had Hitler's patience snapped earlier?
Curiously enough, it is pretty easy to answer these questions. The Fuhrer was a gambler. He played two boards at the same time, both the West and the East. When, six years later, Adolf Hitler shot himself in the Fuhrerbunker, Stalin was abundantly clear about it ('The scoundrel's game is over!'). These words tell us the whole truth of the Second World War. Hitler's game-playing with everyone at the same time led him to a defeat. He said more than once that fighting on two fronts would be disastrous and impossible for Germany, that such a war scenario was the biggest mistake made by Kaiser Wilhelm II. And that he, Hitler, was not going to make the same mistake. Therefore, in August, 1939 Hitler was to come to an agreement either with the West or with the East. And it would be even better if he managed to make an arrangement with one side and then with the other centre of power, as well. And should the proposal of the English prove more interesting, the friendship with the Kremlin could be forgotten about again.[127]
But let us go back to the question of what Hitler would have done had Stalin's response been some five hours later. The answer is that he would have continued negotiating. But not with Russians. With whom then? There is only one answer to this: with the English. It is an historical fact that on 21st August, 1939 the German ruler asked London to have a meeting with Goering on 22nd August and received a positive answer.[128] In those fateful August days there were two aeroplanes at the Berlin airfield. One of them, the Fuhrer's personal Junkers, was waiting for the Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, in order to take him to Moscow. And the other plane was a Lockheed A-12 of the British secret service.[129] Hermann Goering was ready to board it and fly to London. Both flights and both visits were planned for the same day, 23rd August, 1939. Goering's flight was organised personally by the head of the British intelligence in order to avoid publicity.
Fatman, which was Goering's nickname, was to meet not just anybody but Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. And the whole arrangement was kept under a veil of complete secrecy. He was to fly not straight to London but first land at a small airfield near a town called Bonvington in Herefordshire. From there Goering was to be delivered straight to Chequers, the official residence of the British Prime Minister. It was planned to dismiss Chamberlain's staff for the sake of secrecy, and replace all its members with officers of the British secret service. It was also planned to disconnect all the phones…[130]
This was not the first occasion when, at crucial political moments, one of the leaders of the Third Reich would fly to London in order to make arrangements in real time and in person. For example, when German troops invaded Austria in spring, 1938, Ribbentrop was in the British capital. The excuse not to make this visit official was found in the process. Ribbentrop, who used to be the German ambassador in London, now became the head of the Foreign Ministry. And in this new position he just wanted to see his all friends and throw something akin to a farewell party.[131] As a result, England recognised the Anschluss (annexation) of Austria to Germany despite having a treaty with Austrians in which the British promised to protect their independence.
In August 1939 only one flight could take place. And it is exactly where Hitler's envoy would fly and which country the Fuhrer chooses to make an arrangement with that the flight was for.[132] Having no response from Stalin was supposed to prod Hitler into negotiating with the English. The German leader simply did not have any other options. This is why we can state that the supposed lack of response from Stalin could have meant an entirely different scenario for Europe. And this scenario would have been even more tragic for Russia, as straight after defeating Poland the German troops would have turned up at the Russian borders and the Russian Army would have had to fight the Wehrmacht on its own and two years earlier and France or England would not have been obliged to reinforce Russia.
Who would have found it profitable if a war between Russia and Germany had started in September 1939? England. Who would have found it profitable to pit two peoples against one another in order to then join the battle second when the rivals had bled white? England. And a nine-hour delay in delivering the urgent and important letter is an historical fact which no one can deny. So, who could have tried to impede negotiations between Germany and Russia through holding up a message from one head of state to the other? The answer is obvious. There is one thing I do not understand: why has no one else tried to answer this fascinating question before, since answering it makes a lot of things clear. Even too clear. This was a question of national importance and Great Britain used the help of the secret service apart from all diplomatic sources…
Who could have provided the 'extra' six hours for Stalin's letter? English agents in German institutions. What institution exactly is not really that important; Foreign Ministry, intelligence, ciphers, Ribbentrop's deputies. If you want to know who exactly was responsible, get hold of German archives; they must have the answer. Such a blunder could not have remained unpunished. Either the German secret service or Ribbentrop himself must have reacted to this obvious sabotage. There must have been a reaction – severe but concealed. Within a month someone must have drowned, died in a car crash or of a sudden heart attack. Quietly. With no publicity. With nothing but a portrait at work with a black ribbon. Some crying colleagues. A true Aryan. Blind Death has taken him away. With a pension for the heartbroken widow.
I do not know what happened to the British agent who put everything at stake performing the task of his bosses in London; I do not know his name. But I do know names and surnames of other real foreign agents who were in Germany back then.
Story two
About a Russian agent
This man was not just an agent; he was considered the most valuable agent of the USSR in Nazi Germany. A book about him is actually called 'His Majesty the Agent'[133]. With a capital letter as they use for royalty. And this is not for nothing – Willy Lehmann was indeed a very precious agent. For as many as twelve years he supplied very sensitive information to Moscow under the pseudonym of Breitenbach, while working not just for an agency but for the Gestapo. 'Willy Lehmann took the initiative and offered his services himself… Lehmann spent twelve years working for Soviet intelligence. During that period he did not make a single professional mistake, nothing that could have attracted any suspicion',[134] says the author of the book, Theodore Gladkov, about the agent. Having started working with Soviet intelligence even before the Nazis came to power, he passed on the last piece of sensitive information on 19th June, 1941. On that day, Lehmann reported the exact and accurate day of the German invasion of the USSR.[135] After that, contact with him was broken.
As a result, there was a very strange situation: there was a very precious agent but no contact with him. 'By spring 1942 the Centre managed to restore contact with none of their agents in Berlin'[136]. That means there was physically no one who could have contacted Lehmann. Then it was decided to send some liaisons over the front line. Two agents were sent to Berlin and both were arrested by Willy Lehmann's colleagues' from the Gestapo. One of them held on to the last and died under torture; the other one started collaborating with the Nazis. A radio game started. Later on, the arrested Soviet agent insisted that he had given a coded sign that he was working under control which, allegedly, had not been noticed by the radio operators of the Centre. On 4th December, 1941 a password and terms of contact with Breitenbach were sent to the receiver controlled by the Gestapo…
In December, after the 11th, the telephone rang in Lehmann's apartment. Late at night. There was nothing special in it for an agent. It might have been an urgent call. In his many years of service, it had happened many times… A service Horch was already waiting for him. He opened the door, dived into the car, and immediately handcuffs clicked on his wrists… There was no warrant for his arrest. He was to be delivered, and that is it… No one knew of Lehmann's case except for the head of Gestapo, Mueller and a few more people. Lehmann was doomed. He was denied even a mockery of a trial from the very beginning, even with a predetermined death penalty… And there was nothing but a short message in the internal Nazi 'Bulletin on 29th January, 1943 which said that 'Willy Lehmann gave his life for the Fiihrer and the Reich. The only truth in this message must have been the month of his death – December 1942.'[137]
In a very quiet, peaceful, family-like manner. He gave his life for the Fiihrer and the Reich. Well, why trouble the public? Why cause puzzlement and anxiety? Nothing happened to Lehmann's wife. Could it have been different if her husband had lost his life for the sake of Germany? 'Margaret Lehmann was not subjected to any sanctions or oppressions. Not out of humanism, of course, but purely to keep the secret. In the beginning she was told that Willy died during a 'secret' mission.[138]
It is very, very seldom that truth does come to the surface. Secret services sacredly keep their secrets.
As a result, there was a very strange situation: there was a very precious agent but no contact with him. 'By spring 1942 the Centre managed to restore contact with none of their agents in Berlin'[136]. That means there was physically no one who could have contacted Lehmann. Then it was decided to send some liaisons over the front line. Two agents were sent to Berlin and both were arrested by Willy Lehmann's colleagues' from the Gestapo. One of them held on to the last and died under torture; the other one started collaborating with the Nazis. A radio game started. Later on, the arrested Soviet agent insisted that he had given a coded sign that he was working under control which, allegedly, had not been noticed by the radio operators of the Centre. On 4th December, 1941 a password and terms of contact with Breitenbach were sent to the receiver controlled by the Gestapo…
In December, after the 11th, the telephone rang in Lehmann's apartment. Late at night. There was nothing special in it for an agent. It might have been an urgent call. In his many years of service, it had happened many times… A service Horch was already waiting for him. He opened the door, dived into the car, and immediately handcuffs clicked on his wrists… There was no warrant for his arrest. He was to be delivered, and that is it… No one knew of Lehmann's case except for the head of Gestapo, Mueller and a few more people. Lehmann was doomed. He was denied even a mockery of a trial from the very beginning, even with a predetermined death penalty… And there was nothing but a short message in the internal Nazi 'Bulletin on 29th January, 1943 which said that 'Willy Lehmann gave his life for the Fiihrer and the Reich. The only truth in this message must have been the month of his death – December 1942.'[137]
In a very quiet, peaceful, family-like manner. He gave his life for the Fiihrer and the Reich. Well, why trouble the public? Why cause puzzlement and anxiety? Nothing happened to Lehmann's wife. Could it have been different if her husband had lost his life for the sake of Germany? 'Margaret Lehmann was not subjected to any sanctions or oppressions. Not out of humanism, of course, but purely to keep the secret. In the beginning she was told that Willy died during a 'secret' mission.[138]
It is very, very seldom that truth does come to the surface. Secret services sacredly keep their secrets.
Story three
About an English agent
This story is of particular interest because its main character was a regular German diplomat which, however, did not stop him from working for English intelligence. Our character was called Wolfgang zu Putlitz. He came from an ancient and noble family, did his military service in the Kaiser's army and after Germany's defeat in the First World War he became a diplomat. His well-known surname and connections helped him take the post of Head of the Consular Department in the German embassy in London in 1936.[139] And it seems like he was recruited. Why 'seems'? Because in his memoirs, Putlitz, being a man of sound judgement, does not say anything specific about his connections with English intelligence.[140] He tells his readers about his 'friendship' with the English. Yet the results of this friendship are so telling that there can be no doubt about the nature of this relationship.
The German diplomat writes about many interesting things. For example, just before the beginning of the Second World War, he is appointed at the German mission in Holland. Being a German diplomat, he is commissioned to… get a large batch of oil and other strategic raw materials to the Reich. It did not have time to get through the German-Dutch border before Germany's attack against Poland and was blocked. Where are the raw materials from? They are from England.[141] As an English agent, Putlitz is trying to do the opposite and prevent the Nazis from getting a single drop of the oil. And he writes a letter to… the English intelligence centre (as he does not admit to being an agent, he just 'sends them a letter'!). How does he know the address? 'Everyone in the Hague knew that the British intelligence centre was located in the passport agency of the British consulate in Scheveningen, and that it was headed by a certain Captain Stevens'[142], says Putlitz in his memoirs.
Is this not charming? Everyone knew. All the boys and every single old lady. It is just over there, the English intelligence centre. Maybe there was even a sign? For convenience. But let us put all jokes aside. As you may have the future. Therefore, nothing bad was to be written about the Nazis. Nothing guessed already, as a result, the oil successfully got through to Germany with the help of employees from the Shell company. And as for Putlitz himself, the English 'suddenly' decided to bring him over to Britain so that he would not hinder strategic supplies to Germans. And yet, Putlitz says that he was not an agent but just 'friends' with some English people. I would like to draw your attention to the way they were going to bring him over. Putlitz's 'friend', Lord Vansittart, said,[143] 'If it is necessary, I will send a British torpedo boat to Scheveningen to bring Putlitz. But it would be better if Stevens could find an aeroplane in Holland'[144].
The Second World War had begun. The British fleet had been placed in operational readiness and was about to start battle operations. And Lord Vansittart was ready to send a torpedo boat for his friend. Did military vessels really have nothing more important to do? Did the English have so many torpedo boats that any lord could send one of them anywhere during a war 'to get a friend of his'? And did the head of the English Intelligence Department, Captain Stevens, really have nothing else to do except look for a plane for someone who had simply written a note to him?
We will have no questions left if we read the episode where Putlitz describes the way he was met in England. What is more, we will be convinced that Putlitz had provided the English with rather important information. We do not know what information exactly, but, obviously, rather sensitive. You can judge for yourself. Putlitz flew to Britain on a plane which had been found for him by British intelligence in Holland. The man who was meeting him shook his hand and said, 'Your arrival has been the most promising event in the whole war so far'. Quite some appreciation. 'No customs formalities were complied with; no one even looked at our passports'[145], says Putlitz about the meeting. Indeed, why trouble oneself with formalities? There is no point in them. Why check passports of any passengers flying from Holland? Yes, Great Britain had joined a world war, and what? Yes, Holland has borders with Germany, and what? It does not really matter that the tulip country is neutral and the Germans freely move around it.
After having a glass of champagne to celebrate the successful arrival of the escaped German diplomat… he was offered British citizenship.[146] Whereas, according to the martial law, every citizen of the country which is in a war with Britain has to be interned until the end of the war. Put simply, citizens of the enemy state are sent to a concentration camp until the end of the war.[147] This is unpleasant but necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage. And on this occasion a German citizen is offered to become British. Simply out of kindness, of course, out of friendship. But noble zu Putlitz refuses to become a British citizen. After this, he is not arrested either, and he can freely travel around the country. Lord Vansinttart even invites him over to his villa.
Then Putlitz leaves Britain and goes to the USA. When four years later, on 6th January 1945 (apparently, after accomplishing another task for English intelligence) Putlitz was coming off the boat in Liverpool, things were even funnier. And even more telling. There someone to meet him again. The same person as in 1939, actually. There was a hand-shake again. And extraordinary negligence' again, 'He had papers that allowed me to go ashore without being searched'[148]. The reaction of an ordinary English customs officer at the sight of all these miracles is the best illustration of the situation: 'Casting a suspicious look at me, the immigration officer mumbled, And I thought we were fighting Germans!"[149]
…In 1948 Wolfgang zu Putlitz did decide to take British citizenship and got a British passport within three weeks. I do not know what exactly he did for Britain but his story is perfect evidence of the fact that there were English agents in the German Foreign Ministry, who were rather successful. And therefore they were quite generously rewarded if they remained alive. Here, of course, you can ask where these agents come from. What can I say? Money had always been the best key to a human heart. Do you really think that all the so-called progressive journalists, all those pseudo-human rights activists and all those dissidents sincerely believe in democracy in Washington and London FOR NOTHING?
…Germany was plunged into famine and poverty in November 1918. Darkness and horror covered the country. As many as 21 years are left until 1939. An agent would be helped to go up the career ladder (the West conveniently had full control over 'democracy' in the Weimar republic); he was assisted and provided with money. And this agent, who may have done nothing of importance for London before 1939, could change history completely. Had the Fuhrer's envoy flown to London instead of Moscow in 1939, all the expenses on the part of the agent and the patience of his bosses would have been worth it. Who knows, maybe it was actually Putlitz himself? Maybe he made an attempt, which did not work out, but survived?
Yet, the story of strange and amazing things happening while such a disliked non-aggression treaty was being signed does not end here. The English would never have become a great nation if they had given up after the first failure. Yes, Hitler did receive Stalin's letter and cancelled Goering's flight to London.[150] Is that it? No. We will give it another try. What if Ribbentrop's aircraft does not make it to Moscow?
The German diplomat writes about many interesting things. For example, just before the beginning of the Second World War, he is appointed at the German mission in Holland. Being a German diplomat, he is commissioned to… get a large batch of oil and other strategic raw materials to the Reich. It did not have time to get through the German-Dutch border before Germany's attack against Poland and was blocked. Where are the raw materials from? They are from England.[141] As an English agent, Putlitz is trying to do the opposite and prevent the Nazis from getting a single drop of the oil. And he writes a letter to… the English intelligence centre (as he does not admit to being an agent, he just 'sends them a letter'!). How does he know the address? 'Everyone in the Hague knew that the British intelligence centre was located in the passport agency of the British consulate in Scheveningen, and that it was headed by a certain Captain Stevens'[142], says Putlitz in his memoirs.
Is this not charming? Everyone knew. All the boys and every single old lady. It is just over there, the English intelligence centre. Maybe there was even a sign? For convenience. But let us put all jokes aside. As you may have the future. Therefore, nothing bad was to be written about the Nazis. Nothing guessed already, as a result, the oil successfully got through to Germany with the help of employees from the Shell company. And as for Putlitz himself, the English 'suddenly' decided to bring him over to Britain so that he would not hinder strategic supplies to Germans. And yet, Putlitz says that he was not an agent but just 'friends' with some English people. I would like to draw your attention to the way they were going to bring him over. Putlitz's 'friend', Lord Vansittart, said,[143] 'If it is necessary, I will send a British torpedo boat to Scheveningen to bring Putlitz. But it would be better if Stevens could find an aeroplane in Holland'[144].
The Second World War had begun. The British fleet had been placed in operational readiness and was about to start battle operations. And Lord Vansittart was ready to send a torpedo boat for his friend. Did military vessels really have nothing more important to do? Did the English have so many torpedo boats that any lord could send one of them anywhere during a war 'to get a friend of his'? And did the head of the English Intelligence Department, Captain Stevens, really have nothing else to do except look for a plane for someone who had simply written a note to him?
We will have no questions left if we read the episode where Putlitz describes the way he was met in England. What is more, we will be convinced that Putlitz had provided the English with rather important information. We do not know what information exactly, but, obviously, rather sensitive. You can judge for yourself. Putlitz flew to Britain on a plane which had been found for him by British intelligence in Holland. The man who was meeting him shook his hand and said, 'Your arrival has been the most promising event in the whole war so far'. Quite some appreciation. 'No customs formalities were complied with; no one even looked at our passports'[145], says Putlitz about the meeting. Indeed, why trouble oneself with formalities? There is no point in them. Why check passports of any passengers flying from Holland? Yes, Great Britain had joined a world war, and what? Yes, Holland has borders with Germany, and what? It does not really matter that the tulip country is neutral and the Germans freely move around it.
After having a glass of champagne to celebrate the successful arrival of the escaped German diplomat… he was offered British citizenship.[146] Whereas, according to the martial law, every citizen of the country which is in a war with Britain has to be interned until the end of the war. Put simply, citizens of the enemy state are sent to a concentration camp until the end of the war.[147] This is unpleasant but necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage. And on this occasion a German citizen is offered to become British. Simply out of kindness, of course, out of friendship. But noble zu Putlitz refuses to become a British citizen. After this, he is not arrested either, and he can freely travel around the country. Lord Vansinttart even invites him over to his villa.
Then Putlitz leaves Britain and goes to the USA. When four years later, on 6th January 1945 (apparently, after accomplishing another task for English intelligence) Putlitz was coming off the boat in Liverpool, things were even funnier. And even more telling. There someone to meet him again. The same person as in 1939, actually. There was a hand-shake again. And extraordinary negligence' again, 'He had papers that allowed me to go ashore without being searched'[148]. The reaction of an ordinary English customs officer at the sight of all these miracles is the best illustration of the situation: 'Casting a suspicious look at me, the immigration officer mumbled, And I thought we were fighting Germans!"[149]
…In 1948 Wolfgang zu Putlitz did decide to take British citizenship and got a British passport within three weeks. I do not know what exactly he did for Britain but his story is perfect evidence of the fact that there were English agents in the German Foreign Ministry, who were rather successful. And therefore they were quite generously rewarded if they remained alive. Here, of course, you can ask where these agents come from. What can I say? Money had always been the best key to a human heart. Do you really think that all the so-called progressive journalists, all those pseudo-human rights activists and all those dissidents sincerely believe in democracy in Washington and London FOR NOTHING?
…Germany was plunged into famine and poverty in November 1918. Darkness and horror covered the country. As many as 21 years are left until 1939. An agent would be helped to go up the career ladder (the West conveniently had full control over 'democracy' in the Weimar republic); he was assisted and provided with money. And this agent, who may have done nothing of importance for London before 1939, could change history completely. Had the Fuhrer's envoy flown to London instead of Moscow in 1939, all the expenses on the part of the agent and the patience of his bosses would have been worth it. Who knows, maybe it was actually Putlitz himself? Maybe he made an attempt, which did not work out, but survived?
Yet, the story of strange and amazing things happening while such a disliked non-aggression treaty was being signed does not end here. The English would never have become a great nation if they had given up after the first failure. Yes, Hitler did receive Stalin's letter and cancelled Goering's flight to London.[150] Is that it? No. We will give it another try. What if Ribbentrop's aircraft does not make it to Moscow?
Story four
About loafers in air defence and strict comrade Stalin
The atmosphere at the end of August 1939 was tense and edgy. Poland, for example, just a week before it had to become the 'guiltless victim of Hitler's aggression'… was firing on German airliners (!) flying over its territory. Not trespassing on its air area but just passing on their way to other countries. One can read about this completely freely in the book by Hitler's interpreter, Paul Schmidt, who went to Moscow together with Ribbentrop. This book has been published several times in England and in the USA and no one has ever questioned this story: 'In the course of a brief visit to the aerodrome restaurant, I had learnt that both Condors[151] were having fighter cover. In the last few days, such was the tension which had already developed between Germany and Poland, Lufthansa machines had often been fired on by Polish anti-aircraft batteries'.[152]
Imagine the following picture: an aircraft with the German foreign minister is flying to the USSR to sign this treaty between Berlin and Moscow for Great Britain which was so unwanted for Britain. And gets shot down by the Polish air defence. What does it mean? For Germany it would be an excuse to declare war on Poland. And it would mean that there would be no treaty with the USSR. When did Ribbentrop fly to Moscow? 'On 23rd August in the afternoon between 4 and 5 p.m., we arrived at Moscow airport in the Fiihrer's aircraft', says the German foreign minister himself.[153] I should remind you that the attack against Poland is planned for 26th August. Hitler might just have no time to send another minister to the Kremlin. Or may even not want to. Hitler did not break off contact with the West. Should Ribbentrop be unable to make it, the Führer, being a fatalist, would immediately send Goering to London.
Imagine the following picture: an aircraft with the German foreign minister is flying to the USSR to sign this treaty between Berlin and Moscow for Great Britain which was so unwanted for Britain. And gets shot down by the Polish air defence. What does it mean? For Germany it would be an excuse to declare war on Poland. And it would mean that there would be no treaty with the USSR. When did Ribbentrop fly to Moscow? 'On 23rd August in the afternoon between 4 and 5 p.m., we arrived at Moscow airport in the Fiihrer's aircraft', says the German foreign minister himself.[153] I should remind you that the attack against Poland is planned for 26th August. Hitler might just have no time to send another minister to the Kremlin. Or may even not want to. Hitler did not break off contact with the West. Should Ribbentrop be unable to make it, the Führer, being a fatalist, would immediately send Goering to London.
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