См. также: Суньцзы. Искусство войны

    1.Laying Plans
    2.Waging War
    3.Attack by Stratagem
    4.Tactical Dispositions
    6.Weak Points and Strong
    8.Variation in Tactics
    9.The Army on the March
    11.The Nine Situations
    12.The Attack by Fire
    13.The Use of Spies

    [This is the basic text of Sun Tzu on the Art of War. It was
    extracted from Mr. Giles' complete work as titled above. The
    commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded
    within it, has been released as suntzu10.txt (or suntzu10.zip).
    This is being released only as an adjunct to that work, which
    contains a wealth of commentary upon this text.]


    1.Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to
    the State. 2.It is a matter of life and death, a road either to
    safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can
    on no account be neglected. 3.The art of war, then, is governed
    by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's
    deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions
    obtaining in the field. 4.These are:

    1.The Moral Law; 2.Heaven; 3.Earth; 4.The Commander;
    5.Method and discipline.

    5.The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord
    with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of
    their lives, undismayed by any danger. 6. 7.Heaven signifies
    night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. 8.Earth
    comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open
    ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. 9.The
    Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely,
    benevolence, courage and strictness. 10.By method and
    discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in
    its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the
    officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach
    the army, and the control of military expenditure. 11.These
    five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows
    them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
    12.Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine
    the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a
    comparison, in this wise:-- 13.

    1.Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral
    law? 2.Which of the two generals has most ability? 3.With whom
    lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? 4.On which
    side is discipline most rigorously enforced? 5.Which army is
    stronger? 6.On which side are officers and men more highly
    trained? 7.In which army is there the greater constancy both in
    reward and punishment?

    14.By means of these seven considerations I can forecast
    victory or defeat. 15.The general that hearkens to my counsel
    and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in
    command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts
    upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!
    16.While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also
    of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary
    rules. 17.According as circumstances are favorable, one should
    modify one's plans. 18.All warfare is based on deception.
    19.Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using
    our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must
    make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must
    make him believe we are near. 20.Hold out baits to entice the
    enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. 21.If he is secure at all
    points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength,
    evade him. 22.If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
    irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
    23.If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces
    are united, separate them. 24.Attack him where he is
    unprepared, appear where you are not expected. 25.These
    military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged
    beforehand. 26.Now the general who wins a battle makes many
    calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The
    general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
    beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few
    calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It
    is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely
    to win or lose.


    1.Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are
    in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots,
    and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions
    enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and
    at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items
    such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,
    will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.
    Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 2.When you
    engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then
    men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If
    you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
    3.Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the
    State will not be equal to the strain. 4.Now, when your weapons
    are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your
    treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take
    advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be
    able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 5.Thus, though
    we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been
    seen associated with long delays. 6.There is no instance of a
    country having benefited from prolonged warfare. 7.It is only
    one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can
    thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
    8.The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither
    are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. 9.Bring war
    material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the
    army will have food enough for its needs. 10.Poverty of the
    State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by
    contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army
    at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. 11.On the
    other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up;
    and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained
    away. 12.When their substance is drained away, the peasantry
    will be afflicted by heavy exactions. 13.With this loss of
    substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people
    will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be
    dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots,
    worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,
    spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy
    wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. 14.
    15.Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy.
    One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty
    of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is
    equivalent to twenty from one's own store. 16.Now in order to
    kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may
    be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their
    rewards. 17.Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more
    chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the
    first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the
    enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with
    ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
    18.This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own
    strength. 19.In war, then, let your great object be victory,
    not lengthy campaigns. 20.Thus it may be known that the leader
    of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom
    it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.


    1.Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best
    thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;
    to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better
    to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a
    regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy
    them. 2.Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not
    supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the
    enemy's resistance without fighting. 3.Thus the highest form of
    generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to
    prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order
    is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst
    policy of all is to besiege walled cities. 4.The rule is, not
    to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The
    preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
    implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the
    piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three
    months more. 5.The general, unable to control his irritation,
    will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the
    result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town
    still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a
    siege. 6.Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's
    troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without
    laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without
    lengthy operations in the field. 7.With his forces intact he
    will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without
    losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method
    of attacking by stratagem. 8.It is the rule in war, if our
    forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to
    one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army
    into two. 9.If equally matched, we can offer battle; if
    slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite
    unequal in every way, we can flee from him. 10.Hence, though an
    obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it
    must be captured by the larger force. 11.Now the general is the
    bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points;
    the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the
    State will be weak. 12.There are three ways in which a ruler
    can bring misfortune upon his army:-- 13.(1) By commanding the
    army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that
    it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. 14.(2) By
    attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers
    a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an
    army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. 15.(3)
    By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,
    through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
    circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
    16.But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is
    sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply
    bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
    17.Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:

    1.He will win who knows when to fight and when not to
    fight. 2.He will win who knows how to handle both superior and
    inferior forces. 3.He will win whose army is animated by the
    same spirit throughout all its ranks. 4.He will win who,
    prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. 5.He will
    win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the

    18.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know
    yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If
    you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained
    you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy
    nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.


    1.Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put
    themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited
    for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. 2.To secure
    ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
    opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy
    himself. 3.Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself
    against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
    4.Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being
    able to do it. 5.Security against defeat implies defensive
    tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the
    offensive. 6.Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
    strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. 7.The
    general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret
    recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes
    forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand
    we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory
    that is complete. 8.To see victory only when it is within the
    ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. 9.Neither
    is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the
    whole Empire says, "Well done!" 10.To lift an autumn hair is no
    sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of
    sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick
    ear. 11.What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who
    not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. 12.Hence his
    victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit
    for courage. 13.He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
    Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of
    victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already
    defeated. 14.Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a
    position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the
    moment for defeating the enemy. 15.Thus it is that in war the
    victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has
    been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and
    afterwards looks for victory. 16.The consummate leader
    cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and
    discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. 17.In
    respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement;
    secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation;
    fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
    18.Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of
    quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity;
    Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing
    of chances. 19.A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as
    a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
    20.The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of
    pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

      V. ENERGY

    1.Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same
    principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question
    of dividing up their numbers. 2.Fighting with a large army
    under your command is nowise different from fighting with a
    small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and
    signals. 3.To ensure that your whole host may withstand the
    brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is
    effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. 4.That the impact of
    your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this
    is effected by the science of weak points and strong. 5.In all
    fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but
    indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
    6.Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as
    Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
    like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the
    four seasons, they pass away to return once more. 7.There are
    not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these
    five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. 8.There
    are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red,
    white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues
    than can ever been seen. 9.There are not more than five
    cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet
    combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be
    tasted. 10.In battle, there are not more than two methods of
    attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in
    combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. 11.The
    direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is
    like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. Who can
    exhaust the possibilities of their combination? 12.The onset of
    troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll
    stones along in its course. 13.The quality of decision is like
    the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and
    destroy its victim. 14.Therefore the good fighter will be
    terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision. 15.Energy
    may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the
    releasing of a trigger. 16.Amid the turmoil and tumult of
    battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder
    at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without
    head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. 17.Simulated
    disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear
    postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
    18.Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a
    question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of
    timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength
    with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.
    19.Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move
    maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy
    will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at
    it. 20.By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then
    with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. 21.The
    clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and
    does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability
    to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. 22.When
    he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were
    like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log
    or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when
    on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
    round-shaped, to go rolling down. 23.Thus the energy developed
    by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled
    down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the
    subject of energy.


    1.Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits
    the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever
    is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive
    exhausted. 2.Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
    the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on
    him. 3.By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
    to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can
    make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. 4.If the enemy
    is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with
    food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force
    him to move. 5.Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to
    defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
    6.An army may march great distances without distress, if it
    marches through country where the enemy is not. 7.You can be
    sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places
    which are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense
    if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked. 8.Hence
    that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know
    what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent
    does not know what to attack. 9.O divine art of subtlety and
    secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you
    inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
    10.You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make
    for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from
    pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the
    enemy. 11.If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an
    engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart
    and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place
    that he will be obliged to relieve. 12.If we do not wish to
    fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though
    the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.
    All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in
    his way. 13.By discovering the enemy's dispositions and
    remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces
    concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. 14.We can form
    a single united body, while the enemy must split up into
    fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate
    parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the
    enemy's few. 15.And if we are able thus to attack an inferior
    force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire
    straits. 16.The spot where we intend to fight must not be made
    known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a
    possible attack at several different points; and his forces
    being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall
    have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
    17.For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his
    rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van;
    should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should
    he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends
    reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
    18.Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against
    possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our
    adversary to make these preparations against us. 19.Knowing the
    place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate
    from the greatest distances in order to fight. 20.But if
    neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be
    impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to
    succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the
    rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest
    portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and
    even the nearest are separated by several LI! 21.Though
    according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in
    number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of
    victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. 22.Though the
    enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.
    Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their
    success. 23.Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity
    or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out
    his vulnerable spots. 24.Carefully compare the opposing army
    with your own, so that you may know where strength is
    superabundant and where it is deficient. 25.In making tactical
    dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal
    them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the
    prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the
    wisest brains. 26.How victory may be produced for them out of
    the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot
    comprehend. 27.All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
    but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is
    evolved. 28.Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one
    victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite
    variety of circumstances. 29.Military tactics are like unto
    water; for water in its natural course runs away from high
    places and hastens downwards. 30.So in war, the way is to avoid
    what is strong and to strike at what is weak. 31.Water shapes
    its course according to the nature of the ground over which it
    flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe
    whom he is facing. 32.Therefore, just as water retains no
    constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
    33.He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent
    and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born
    captain. 34.The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
    are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way
    for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon
    has its periods of waning and waxing.


    1.Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands
    from the sovereign. 2.Having collected an army and concentrated
    his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements
    thereof before pitching his camp. 3.After that, comes tactical
    maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The
    difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the
    devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. 4.Thus, to
    take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out
    of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach
    the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of
    DEVIATION. 5.Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an
    undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. 6.If you set a fully
    equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the
    chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to
    detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice
    of its baggage and stores. 7.Thus, if you order your men to
    roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without
    halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a
    stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the
    leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of
    the enemy. 8.The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones
    will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army
    will reach its destination. 9.If you march fifty LI in order to
    outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first
    division, and only half your force will reach the goal. 10.If
    you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your
    army will arrive. 11.We may take it then that an army without
    its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
    without bases of supply it is lost. 12.We cannot enter into
    alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our
    neighbors. 13.We are not fit to lead an army on the march
    unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its
    mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes
    and swamps. 14.We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to
    account unless we make use of local guides. 15.In war, practice
    dissimulation, and you will succeed. 16.Whether to concentrate
    or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
    17.Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that
    of the forest. 18.In raiding and plundering be like fire, is
    immovability like a mountain. 19.Let your plans be dark and
    impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a
    thunderbolt. 20.When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil
    be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,
    cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
    21.Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. 22.He will
    conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the
    art of maneuvering. 23.The Book of Army Management says: On the
    field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough:
    hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary
    objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of
    banners and flags. 24.Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are
    means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on
    one particular point. 25.The host thus forming a single united
    body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone,
    or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of
    handling large masses of men. 26.In night-fighting, then, make
    much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of
    flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes
    of your army. 27.A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a
    commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
    28.Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday
    it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only
    on returning to camp. 29.A clever general, therefore, avoids an
    army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is
    sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying
    moods. 30.Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of
    disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of
    retaining self-possession. 31.To be near the goal while the
    enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is
    toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is
    famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength. 32.To
    refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect
    order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and
    confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.
    33.It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the
    enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. 34.Do not
    pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers
    whose temper is keen. 35.Do not swallow bait offered by the
    enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
    36.When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not
    press a desperate foe too hard. 37.Such is the art of warfare.


    1.Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands
    from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his
    forces 2.When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country
    where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not
    linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in
    situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate
    position, you must fight. 3.There are roads which must not be
    followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must
    be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of
    the sovereign which must not be obeyed. 4.The general who
    thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation
    of tactics knows how to handle his troops. 5.The general who
    does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the
    configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn
    his knowledge to practical account. 6.So, the student of war
    who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even
    though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to
    make the best use of his men. 7.Hence in the wise leader's
    plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be
    blended together. 8.If our expectation of advantage be tempered
    in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part
    of our schemes. 9.If, on the other hand, in the midst of
    difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may
    extricate ourselves from misfortune. 10.Reduce the hostile
    chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them,
    and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious
    allurements, and make them rush to any given point. 11.The art
    of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's
    not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the
    chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we
    have made our position unassailable. 12.There are five
    dangerous faults which may affect a general:

    1.Recklessness, which leads to destruction; 2.cowardice,
    which leads to capture; 3.a hasty temper, which can be provoked
    by insults; 4.a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
    5.over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and

    13.These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous
    to the conduct of war. 14.When an army is overthrown and its
    leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five
    dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.


    1.Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping
    the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over
    mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. 2.Camp in
    high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to
    fight. So much for mountain warfare. 3.After crossing a river,
    you should get far away from it. 4.When an invading force
    crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it
    in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across,
    and then deliver your attack. 5.If you are anxious to fight,
    you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has
    to cross. 6.Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and
    facing the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. So
    much for river warfare. 7.In crossing salt-marshes, your sole
    concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
    8.If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and
    grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. So much
    for operations in salt-marches. 9.In dry, level country, take
    up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your
    right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in front, and
    safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.
    10.These are the four useful branches of military knowledge
    which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several
    sovereigns. 11.All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny
    places to dark. 12.If you are careful of your men, and camp on
    hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,
    and this will spell victory. 13.When you come to a hill or a
    bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear.
    Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and
    utilize the natural advantages of the ground. 14.When, in
    consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish
    to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until
    it subsides. 15.Country in which there are precipitous cliffs
    with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined
    places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be
    left with all possible speed and not approached. 16.While we
    keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach
    them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on
    his rear. 17.If in the neighborhood of your camp there should
    be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow
    basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they
    must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places
    where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be
    lurking. 18.When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet,
    he is relying on the natural strength of his position. 19.When
    he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for
    the other side to advance. 20.If his place of encampment is
    easy of access, he is tendering a bait. 21.Movement amongst the
    trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. The
    appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass
    means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. 22.The rising
    of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. Startled
    beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. 23.When there
    is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots
    advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area,
    it betokens the approach of infantry. When it branches out in
    different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to
    collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro
    signify that the army is encamping. 24.Humble words and
    increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to
    advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the
    attack are signs that he will retreat. 25.When the light
    chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it
    is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. 26.Peace
    proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
    27.When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into
    rank, it means that the critical moment has come. 28.When some
    are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. 29.When
    the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from
    want of food. 30.If those who are sent to draw water begin by
    drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. 31.If
    the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to
    secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. 32.If birds gather on
    any spot, it is unoccupied. Clamor by night betokens
    nervousness. 33.If there is disturbance in the camp, the
    general's authority is weak. If the banners and flags are
    shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it
    means that the men are weary. 34.When an army feeds its horses
    with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the men do
    not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that
    they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are
    determined to fight to the death. 35.The sight of men
    whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones
    points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. 36.Too
    frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his
    resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire
    distress. 37.To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright
    at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
    38.When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is
    a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. 39.If the enemy's
    troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time
    without either joining battle or taking themselves off again,
    the situation is one that demands great vigilance and
    circumspection. 40.If our troops are no more in number than the
    enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct
    attack can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all
    our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and
    obtain reinforcements. 41.He who exercises no forethought but
    makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
    42.If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to
    you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive,
    then will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have
    become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will
    still be unless. 43.Therefore soldiers must be treated in the
    first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means
    of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. 44.If in
    training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army
    will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
    45.If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists
    on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.

      X. TERRAIN

    1.Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,
    to wit:

    1.Accessible ground; 2.entangling ground; 3.temporizing
    ground; 4.narrow passes; 5.precipitous heights; 6.positions at
    a great distance from the enemy.

    2.Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is
    called accessible. 3.With regard to ground of this nature, be
    before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and
    carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you will be able to
    fight with advantage. 4.Ground which can be abandoned but is
    hard to re-occupy is called entangling. 5.From a position of
    this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and
    defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and
    you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster
    will ensue. 6.When the position is such that neither side will
    gain by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground.
    7.In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should
    offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir
    forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his
    turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver
    our attack with advantage. 8.With regard to narrow passes, if
    you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and
    await the advent of the enemy. 9.Should the army forestall you
    in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully
    garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. 10.With regard
    to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your
    adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and
    there wait for him to come up. 11.If the enemy has occupied
    them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to
    entice him away. 12.If you are situated at a great distance
    from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it
    is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be to your
    disadvantage. 13.These six are the principles connected with
    Earth. The general who has attained a responsible post must be
    careful to study them. 14.Now an army is exposed to six several
    calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults
    for which the general is responsible. These are:

    1.Flight; 2.insubordination; 3.collapse; 4.ruin;
    5.disorganization; 6.rout.

    15.Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled
    against another ten times its size, the result will be the
    flight of the former. 16.When the common soldiers are too
    strong and their officers too weak, the result is
    insubordination. When the officers are too strong and the
    common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse. 17.When the
    higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the
    enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of
    resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or
    no he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin. 18.When
    the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are
    not clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned
    to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly
    haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization. 19.When
    a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an
    inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak
    detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked
    soldiers in the front rank, the result must be rout. 20.These
    are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted
    by the general who has attained a responsible post. 21.The
    natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally;
    but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the
    forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties,
    dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.
    22.He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his
    knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows
    them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. 23.If
    fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight,
    even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in
    victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.
    24.The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats
    without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his
    country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of
    the kingdom. 25.Regard your soldiers as your children, and they
    will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as
    your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto
    death. 26.If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make
    your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your
    commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then
    your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are
    useless for any practical purpose. 27.If we know that our own
    men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the
    enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards
    victory. 28.If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but
    are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack,
    we have gone only halfway towards victory. 29.If we know that
    the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in
    a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the
    ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only
    halfway towards victory. 30.Hence the experienced soldier, once
    in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is
    never at a loss. 31.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
    know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you
    know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.