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Возможно, этим объясняется поток шпионских историй о перебежчиках, двойных агентах, успехах, опасных внедренных агентах, историй, которые появляются в средствах массовой информации в период оттепелей в "холодной войне". Это
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разведки "выходят на публику" в беспрецедентных масштабах. Все эти публикации появляются под контролем разведывательных служб. Если бы они не предоставляли исходный материал, ни один из секретов не мог бы стать достоянием общественности.
Подтверждением этой версии является сравнение числа опубликованных шпионских историй и состояния отношений Восток - Запад. Между 1977 и 1985 годами в "Вашингтон пост" было помещено 2258 материалов, посвященных шпионажу(53). Разбивка публикаций по месяцам показывает заметное увеличение частоты появления таких материалов, когда барометр международного климата указывал на прояснение в советско-американских отношениях.
Например, последовало резкое увеличение числа шпионских историй в период, когда Советский Союз и США двигались в 1985 году по направлению к Женевской встрече на высшем уровне. Видимо, будет неправильно придавать слишком большое значение столь малонаучному исследованию. Но в этой книге мы уже видели, насколько разведывательные службы искусны в деле манипулирования средствами массовой информации в те моменты, когда вот-вот может разразиться мир и когда возникает угроза их финансированию или даже существованию, как в случае с УСС в 1945 году. Вполне можно предположить, что разведывательные службы и органы безопасности с обеих сторон при приближении разрядки ощущают необходимость оправдать свое существование, изо всех сил привлекая внимание к грозному чудовищу. Таким образом, в 80-е годы мы имеем дело с разведывательными сообществами, достигшими беспрецедентных размеров и мощи. Они настолько огромны и так дороги, что мы можем только догадываться об их действительных размерах и стоимости. Однако в их мощи нет никаких сомнений. В Советском Союзе из их рядов выходят государственные лидеры. В США степень их влияния на президентские решения столь велика, что порой не ясно, кто кем руководит президент ЦРУ или ЦРУ президентом.
Разведывательное сообщество ненавидит находящееся у власти правительство, неважно от какой оно партии. Оно жонглирует нашими судьбами под лозунгом их защиты. Это стало возможно лишь в силу секретности, которой разведки себя окружают, секретности, разрушающей демократическое общество. Не составляет тайны тот факт. что, когда разведывательные ведомства растут, наши гражданские свободы сокращаются.
Возможно, что для существования разведывательного сооб
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щества было бы некоторое основание, если бы оно выполняло задачи, на которые претендует, своевременно предупреждало бы об угрозе национальной безопасности. Но, как мы видели, успехи разведки часто сильно преувеличивались, даже в военные годы. В мирное же время разведывательные службы заняты лишь тем, что сводят счеты одна с другой, отстаивают свои бюджеты и изобретают новые доводы для оправдания своего существования.
Возможно, это происходит потому, что разведывательные службы (когда они не полностью погружены в собственные фантазии) понимают, что открытые публикации, традиционные дипломатические и другие легальные контакты оказались в текущем столетии для обеих сторон наиболее ценными источниками разведывательной информации.
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ПОСЛЕСЛОВИЕ К РУССКОМУ ИЗДАНИЮ
Я написал эту книгу восемь лет назад, когда мир был охвачен "холодной войной". С тех пор многое изменилось. КГБ превратился в Службу внешней разведки России. ЦРУ заявляет, что оно посвящает большую часть своих усилий борьбе с контрабандой, наркотиками и террористами, а также обеспечению американских бизнесменов экономическими разведывательными данными, которые им помогают в конкурентной борьбе в международной торговле. Сикрет Интеллидженс Сервис наконец вышла из тени и признала свое существование. Госпожа Стелла Римингтон, генеральный директор британской контрразведки МИ-5, даже провела пресс-конференцию.
Но эти изменения в основном косметические. Огромные шпионские организации, раз возникнув, неохотно уступают свою власть и свой бюджет. Сверхдержавы по-прежнему шпионят друг за другом, как это показало недавнее дело сотрудника ЦРУ Олдрича Эймса, которому в 1994 году было предъявлено обвинение, что в 1985 году он был завербован КГБ.
Шпионы существовали так долго, что было бы наивно вообразить, что с ними покончено. Они будут приспосабливаться к новому миру, но станут продолжать свое дело.
Филлип Найтли
Март 1994 г.
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ЛИТЕРАТУРА, ИСТОЧНИКИ
Введение
(1) Thomas W. Braden, 'Kirn Philby of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service', Washington Post. 12 May 1968.
Глава 1
(1) PRO, CAB/16/8/ERE 9077.
(2) ibid., p. 3.
(3) PRO, WO/32/8873/ERE 9077.
(4) William Le Oueux, Things I Know about Kings, Celebrities and Crooks (London: Evelyn Nash & Grayson, 1923), p. 242.
(5) ibid., p. 251.
(6) William Le Queux, Spies of the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1909), p. xi.
(7) PRO. CAB/16/8/ERE 9077, Appendix I.
(8) PRO, CAB/16/8/ERE 9077, p. 10. Further quotations in this chapter come from this document, unless otherwise stated.
(9) PRO, CAB/16/8/ERE 9077, Secret Report and Proceedings.
(10) Slade Papers III, microfilm MRF 39/3, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
(11) Recounted by Nicholas P. Hiley, 'The Failure of British Espionage against Germany, 1907-1914', Historical Journal, vol. 26, no.4 (1976), pp. 867-89.
(12) The Times, 4 November 1911.
(13) The Times, 29 October 1914.
(14) Hiley, 'Failure of British Espionage', p. 887.
(15) Walther Nicolai, The German Secret Service (London: Stanley Paul, 1924), pp. 52-3.
(16) The statement was printed in The Times, 9 October 1914.
(17) Hiley, 'Failure of British Espionage', p. 888.
Глава 2
(1) Skardon in interview with author, 1967.
(2) Nigel West, MI6. British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 7.
(3) Alley in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(4) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part I. ВВС Radio 4, 5 March 1980.
(5) Nicolai, German Secret Service, p. 18.
(6) PRO, WO/106/45/ERE 9077, p. 15.
(7) Herbert von Bose, 'Verdun, Galizien, Somme, Isonzo... Oder Wo?', in Hans Henning Freiherr Grote (ed.), Vorsicht! Feind hort mit! (Berlin, Neufeld und Henius, 1930), pp. 73-4.
(8) R. J. Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 49.
(9) Fletcher Pratt, 'How Not to Run a Spy System', Harper's, September 1947, p. 243.
(10) William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), pp. 591-2.
(11) See, for example. Henry Landau, The Enemy Within (New York: Putnam's, 1937).
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(12) Nicolai, German Secret Service, p. 109.
(13) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 65.
(14) S. T. Felstead, German Spies at Bay (London: Hutchinson, 1920), p. 20.
(15) PRO, WO/32/4898/ERE 9077.
(16) ibid., Minute sheet 12D, 8 November 1920.
(17) ibid., Minute sheet 13, 12 November 1920.
(18) ibid., Petition from Greite in Parkhurst Prison, 12 September 1921.
(19) Felstead, German Spies, p. 135.
(20) W. H. H. Waters, Secret and Confidential (London: John Murray, 1926), p. 36.
(21) Ulrich Trumpener, 'War Premeditated?', Central European History, vol. 9, no. 1 (March 1976), p. 67.
(22) Army Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2 (July 1929), p. 287.
(23) See Maurice Paleologue, 'Un prelude a 1'invasion de Belgique', Revue des deux mondes, vol. 11 (October 1932).
(24) Nicolai, German Secret Service, p. 186.
(25) See Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence (London: Sphere, 1978), pp. 21-6.
(26) Sam Waagenaar, The Murder of Mata Hari (London: Barker, 1964), pp. 251-2
(27) ibid., p. 250.
(28) Letter from Major von Roepell to Major General Gempp, 24 November 1941, in ND collection. Military Archives, Freiburg, West Germany.
(29) World's Pictorial News, 25 April 1926, p. 3.
(30) Nicolai, German Secret Service, pp. 287-8.
(31) A. Swetschin, 'The Strategy', in Max Ronge (ed.), Kriegs und Industrie Spionage (Vienna: Amalthea, 1930), p. 86.
Глава 3
(1) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 1, BBC Radio 4, 5 March 1980.
(2) House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George MSS, F/9/2/16, 'Reduction of Estimates for Secret Services', 19 March 1920.
(3) Kerby in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(4) Lloyd George MSS, F/9/2/16, Churchill to Lloyd George, Bonar Law, First Lord of the Admiralty. Lord Curzon, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, 19 March 1920.
(5) Lloyd George MSS, F/9/2/16, 'Reduction of Estimates for Secret Services', p. 2(vii).
(6) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(7) Lloyd George MSS, F/33/2/3, Long to Lloyd George, 9 January 1919.
(8) Sidney Reilly, The Adventures of Sidney Reilly (London: Elkin Mathews & Marrot, 1931), pp. 28,44.
(9) ibid., p. 43.
(10) ibid. Mrs Reilly tells her story in the second half of Reilly's unfinished book.
(11) ibid., p. 238.
(12) Quoted by Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay and Hugo Young, The Zinoviev Letter (London: Neinemann, 1967], p. 194.
(13) Christopher Andrew, 'The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s'. Historical Journal, vol. 20, no. 3(1977). p. 705.
(14) Maugham's spell in Russia is best told in R. J. Jeffrey-Jones, American Espionage (New York: The Free Press, 1977), ch. 7.
(15) Paul Dukes, The Story of ST-25 (London: Cassell, 1938), pp. 32-3.
(16) ibid., p. 293.
(17) R. H. Bruce Lockhart, Memoirs of a Britich Agent (New York: Putnam's, 1932). p. 288.
(18) 'Russian Agent Planted on Sir R. Bruce Lockhart'. The Times, 14 March 1966.
(19) The Cheka plot is explained in Richard K. Debo, 'Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinski Plot?', Journal of Modern History, vol. 43, no. 3 (1971), pp. 413-39.
(20) Kenneth Young, The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart: Vol 1. 1915-1938 (London: Macmillan, 1973).
(21) Respectively: Dukes in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967; and George A. Hill. The Dreaded Hour (London: Cassell, 1936), p. 260.
(22) Andrew, 'Britich Secret Service', pp. 690-1.
(23) Lloyd George MSS, F/203/3/6, Folder 5, 'Memorandum on the Situation in Russia'.
(24) Bruce Page, David Leitch and Phillip Knightley, The Philhv Conspiracy (New York-Doubleday, 1968), p. 117.
(25) Lockhart, Memoirs, p. 341.
(26) Kirn Philby, My Silent War (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968), p. xv.
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Глава 4
(1) Sir David Petrie, Communism in India, 1924-1927 (Calcutta: Editions Indian, 1972), pp.174-5.
(2) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 118.
(3) Cecil in interview with author, 1980.
(4) Nicholson in interview with author, 1967.
(5) There are many versions of the Ellis story. This one comes from an interview with one of Ellis's senior officers. The author will forward letters to him.
(6) Gwynne Kean, letter to author, 4 March 1980.
(7) Interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(8) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(9) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2.
(10) Nicholson in interview with author, 1967.
(11) ibid.
12 John Whitwell, British Agent (London: Kimber, 1966), pp. 70-1.
(13) Christopher Andrew, 'Now Baldwin's Secret Service Lost the Soviet Code', Observer, 13 August 1978.
(14) Christopher Andrew, 'Governments and Secret Services: a Historical Perspective',
International Journal, vol. 34, no. 2(1979), p. 180.
(15) F. H. Hinsley el al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979), vol. 1, p. 56.
(16) Morton in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967. Morton said that his network controller was 'The Times man in Rome'. The Times staff records list Coote as its correspondent there during the relevant period.
(17) Walker in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(18) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 57-8.
(19) ibid., p. 83.
(20) Wesley K. Wark, 'British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933-1939', Historical Journal, vol. 25, no. 3(1982), p. 640.
(21) Wark, 'British Intelligence', pp. 636-8. Christie's informant is identified as Ritter in C Andrew and D. Dilks (eds). The Missing Dimension (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 123.
(22) Barton Whaley, 'Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919-1939: Deception and Misperception', Journal of Strategic Studies, part 5 (March 1982), pp. 3-39.
(23) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 49, 80.
(24) ibid., pp. 46, 76-7.
Глава 5
(1) Heinz Hohne, Canaris (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1979), p. 161.
(2) Gert Buchheit, Der Deutsche Geheimdienst. Geschichte der militarischen Abwehr (Munich: List, 1966), p. 175.
(3) Nigel West, M15. British Security Service Operations 1909-1945 (London: The Bodley Head, 1981), pp. 92-104.
(4) The de Rop-Winterbotham relationship is described by Winterbotham himself in Secret and Personal (London: Kimber, 1969).
(5) Ladislas Farago, The Game of the Foxes (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1972), p. 86.
(6) David Kahn, Hitler's Spies (New York: Macmillan, 1978), p. 63.
(7) Farago, Foxes, p. 36.
(8) Thomas H. Etzold, 'The (F)utility Factor: German Information Gathering in the United States, 1933-1941', Military Affairs, vol. 39, no. 2 (1975), p. 78.
(9) ibid., p. 79.
(10) ibid.
(11) ibid.
(12) ibid., p. 80.
(13) Manfred Jonas, 'Prophet without Honour: Hans Heinrich Dieckhoffs Reports from Washington', Mid-America, vol. 47 (July 1965), pp. 222-33.
(14) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 46.
(15) ibid., p. 61.
(16) Philby, My Silent War, p. xix.
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Глава 6
(1) R. J. Jeffreys-Jones, 'History on Trial: a Critique of the CIA and its Critics', p. 6. Paper delivered at the 9th Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Catholic University of America, Washington DC, 4-6 August 1983.
(2) Andrew, 'Governments and Secret Services', p. 181.
(3) Farago, Foxes, dustjacket.
(4) Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 112.
(5) Oldfield in interview with author, 13 July 1979.
(6) Malcolm Muggeridge. Chronicles of Wasted Time. II: The Infernal Grove (London: Collins, 1973), p. 149.
(7) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 91.
(8) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 121.
(9) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(10) West, M16. p. 109.
(11) De Courcey in letter to author, 16 May 1981.
(12) West, M16. p. 137.
(13) Interview with Peter Oilman, 23 March 1978, unpublished.
(14) PRO, CAB/66/9/WP(40)244, 4 July 1940, 'Imminence of a German Invasion of Great Britain'.
(15) JIC(40)376, 12 November 1940, quoted in Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 295.
(16) Private letter to author, 7 September 1967.
(17) West, M16, p. 109.
(18) Philby, My Silent War, p. 4.
(19) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 278.
(20) Michael Elliot-Bateman (ed.). The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, Vol. 1. Intelligence! Subversion! Resistance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970), p. 53.
(21) David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 209.
(22) Kerby in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(23) M. R. D. Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', in W. Laquer (ed.). The Second World War (London and Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage 1982), p. 251.
(24) See Werner Rings, Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939-1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982) for examples.
(25) David Stafford, 'The Detonator Concept: British Strategy, SOE and European Resistance after the Fall of France', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 10(1975), pp. 215 and 196 respectively.
(26) See, for example, R. Crossman and K. Martin, 100,000,000 Allies If We Choose. pamphlet, July 1940.
(27) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', p. 247.
(28) Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass (London: Cape, 1983), p. 37.
(29) Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (London and New York: Deutsch and Basic Books, 1983), p. 85.
(30) Milovan Djilas quoted in Stafford's book Britain and European Resistance, p. 210.
(31) Richard Usborne, quoted in Mark Wheeler, 'The SOE Phenomenon', in Laquer, Second World War, p. 195.
(32) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', p. 243.
(33) PRO, 32/1061 l/MA/08233, Home Defence Security Executive, 20 March 1941.
(34) Respectively: interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967; and quoted in Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 350.
(35) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has investigated the German story without any conclusive result.
(36) Jean Overton Fuller, The German Penetration of SOE (London: Kimber, 1975), pp. 175-6.
(37) William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: the Secret War 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 457.
(38) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', pp. 248-9.
(39) Louis de Jong, 'The Great Game" of Secret Agents', Encounter, January 1980, pp. 12-21; and West, M16, p. 180.
(40) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 137.
(41) ibid., p. 142.
(42) Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 75
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(43) Basil Davidson, 'Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War', New Statesman, 4 JULY 1980, p. 11.
(44) Private letter to Peter Calvocoressi.
(45) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 180.
(46) Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 24.
Глава 7
(1) There are many versions of these events. The best is to be found in Callum A. MacDonald, 'The Venio Affair', European Studies Review, vol. 8, no. 4 (October 1978), pp. 443-64.
(2) David Astor, 'Why the Revolt against Hitler was Ignored', Encounter, June 1969, p. 7.
(3) Telegram from D. G. Osborne (The Vatican) to London, 1 December 1939, in 'Papst Pius XII, die britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition in Winter 1939/40', Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 22, no. 3 (1974).
(4) Astor, 'Revolt against Hitler', p. 8.
(5) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 445.
(6) West, M16, p. 71.
(7) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 448.
(8) Christie Papers, CHRS 1/27-8, Churchill College, Cambridge.
(9) W. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs (London: Deutsch, 1956), p. 106.
(10) S. Payne Best, The Venio Incident (London: Hutchinson, 1950), p. 7.
(11) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 459.
(12) PRO, FO/371/C./7324/89/15, Churchill directive, 28 June 1940.
(13) C. Simpson and P. Knightley, 'The Secret List of Rudolph Hess', Sunday Times, 7 November 1982.
(14) Churchill's secretary. Sir John Colville, in interview with Colin Simpson and author, November 1982.
(15) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 100.
(16) West, M16, p. 112.
(17) ibid., pp. 186-7.
(18) ibid., p. 110.
(19) ibid., pp. 152-3.
(20) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 367.
(21) West, M16, pp. 84, 225.
(22) ibid., p. 44.
(23) ibid., pp. 50-2, 74.
(24) Louis de Jong, 'Britain and Dutch Resistance, 1940^ 1945', p. 21. Notifies voor het Geschied werk, no. 109 (undated), Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation.
(25) See Hans L. Trefousse, 'The Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1939-1945', Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 42, no. 1 (June 1955).
(26) Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary, British Troops, Austria. Liddell Hart Collection, 9/24/229, University of London, King's College Centre for Military Archives.
(27) West, M16, pp. 173, 184.
(28) ibid., pp. 200-1.
(29) Trefousse, 'Failure of German Intelligence', p. 100.
(30) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(31) The correspondence between Liddell and Johnson, and Johnson and the State Department is in the National Archives, Washington under: US Embassy, London, 1940-1941, RG 84, Box 4/820/02/C/1940.
(32) Farago, Foxes, pp. 472-3.
(33) The Times, 6 September 1944.
(34) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 30-1.
(35) David Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East (London: Kimber, 198G), p. 190.
(36) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 58.
(37) Mure, Master of Deception, p. 165.
(38) ibid., p. 37.
(39) Letter from Philby to author, 27 March 1978.
(40) Dusko Popov, Spy/Counter Spy (London: Panther, 1976), p. 223.
(41) 'German Naval Intelligence, Part B: Naval Intelligence and the Normandy Invasion', 15 October 1946, p. 44, US National Archives, Washington DC.
[445]
(42) See Gert Buchheit, Spionage in zwei Weltkriegen (Landshut: Politisches Archiv, 1975), p. 326; and O. Reile, 'Wer tauschte die deutsche militarische Fuhrung liber die Starke der in England fur die Invasion bereitgestellten Streitkrafte?' Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, no. 3 (1979), p. 83.
(43) Buchheit, Spionage, p. 326.
(44) 'German Naval Intelligence', cit. at n. 41, p. 68.
(45) Reile, 'Wer tauschte', p. 83.
(46) Mure, Master of Deception, p. 176.
(47) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 137, 187.
Глава 8
(1) Respectively: Ronald Lewin 'A Signal-Intelligence War', in Laquer, Second World War, p. 185; and Roger J. Spiller, 'Assessing Ultra', Military Review, vol. 59, no. 8 (August 1979), p. 14.
(2) Harold Deutsch, 'The Influence of Ultra on World War II', Parameters: Journal of the U. S. Army War College, vol. 8 (December 1978), p. 6.
(3) David Kahn, 'The International Conference on Ultra', Military Affairs vol. 43, no. 2 (April 1979), p. 98.
(4) Peter Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 36.
(5) Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 36.
(6) Agawa Hiroyuki, The Reluctant Admiral (Tokyo: Kadansha International, 1979), p. 347.
(7) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(8) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 3, BBC Radio 4, 27 January 1982.
(9) Spiller, 'Assessing Ultra', p. 19.
(10) D. Homer, 'Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area in World War II', Australian Outlook, vol. 32, no. 3 (1978), p. 316.
(11) Spiller, 'Assessing Ultra', p. 22; and Ralph Bennett, 'Ultra and Some Command Decisions', in Laquer, Second World War, pp. 223-4.
(12) Stephen E. Ambrose, "Elsenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 16 (1981), p. 158.
(13) 'Der Einfkuss alliierten Funkaufklarung auf den Verlauf des Zweiten Weltkrieges', Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 27, no. 3 (1979), pp. 362-3.
(14) Ambrose, 'Eisenhower', pp. 158-9.
(15) Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 108.
(16) 'Interim', British Army of the Rhine Intelligence Review, no. 19 (4 March 1946), in the Liddell Hart Papers under German Intelligence in the West, 1944-1945, File on Col M. University of London, King's College Centre for Military Archives.
(17) Gunther Blumentritt, 14 August 1942, Liddell Hart Papers, 9/24/229, Intelligence.
(18) J. Rohwer, and E. Jackel (eds). Die Funkaufklarung und ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1979), p. 111.
(19) Spiller, Assessing Ultra', p. 18.
(20) Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: the Enigma of Intelligence (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1985), p. 244.
(21) Aileen Clayton, The Enemy Is Listening (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 79-85.
(22) Philby, My Silent War, p. 38.
(23) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 178.
(24) Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 58.
(25) Bennett, 'Ultra and some Command Decisions', p. 232.
(26) Peter Calvocoressi, 'Ne Plus Ultra World War', The Times. 3 May 1984.
(27) Bennett, 'Ultra and some Command Decisions', p. 231.
(28) Spiller, 'Assessing Ultra', p. 20.
(29) Kahn 'International Conference on Ultra', p. 98.
(30) James Rusbridger, 'Secrets of Enigma", The Times, 17 May 1985.
(31) F. D. Shirreff, 'Some Experience with Special Signals', Mercury. The Magazine of the Royal Signals Amateur Radio Society (1981-2).
(32) David Kahn, 'Codebreaking in World Wars I and II', Historical Journal, vol. 23 no. 3 (1980), p. 624.
(33) Hodges, Alan Turing, p. 261.
(34) Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 85.
(35) Kahn, 'Codebreaking', p. 624.
(36) His obituary in The Times. 31 August 1971.
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(37) See James Rusbridger, 'The Sinking of the Automedon, the Capture of the Nankin, Encounter, May 1985.
(38) Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 94.
(39) Respectively: Nicholson in interview with author, 1967; Thomas O'Toole, 'World War II - Some Additional Postscripts Come to Light', International Herald Tribune (Paris), 14 September 1978; and interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(40) Waldemar Werther, as reported in Rohwer and Jackel, Funkaufklarung, p. 65.
(41) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 3, BBC Radio 4, 27 January 1982.
Глава 9
(1) John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1975), p. 89.
(2) ibid
(3) See M Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 406-10.
(4) Skardon in interview with Leitch, 1980.
(5) Robert Cecil, 'The Cambridge Comintern', in C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds). The Missing Dimension (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 181.
(6) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 181.
(7) Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels (London: Collins, 1977), pp. 172-5.
(8) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', pp. 181-2.
(9) Geoffrey McDermott in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(10) Letter from Liddell of Ml 5 to Johnson of American Embassy, 26 December 1940, US National Archives, Washington DC.
(11) Private letter to Page, Leitch and Knightley, 3 August 1967.
(12) Bruce Page, 'The Endless Quest for Supermole', New Statesman, 21 September 1979, p. 414.
(13) M. Sayle, 'Conversations with Philby', Sunday Times, 17 December 1967.
(14) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 51.
(15) Philby, My Silent War. p. xviii.
(16) Letter to Harold Nicholson, undated.
(17) Nigel Wade, 'Soviet Press Praises Philby', Sunday Telegraph, 10 August 1980.
(18) Sayle, 'Conversations with Philby', cit. at n. 13.
(19) Cesil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 19.
(20) Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy, p. 409.
(21) Letter from Philby to author, 18 February 1974.
(22) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 175.
(23) See Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1977).
(24) C. Johnson, Treason, p. 154.
(25) ibid., p. 154.
(26) Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 239.
(27) Heinrich Haape, quoted in Desmond Flower and James Reeves (eds), The war 1939-1945. vol. 1 (London: Panther, 1967). p. 339.
(28) C. Johnson, Treuson. p. 18.
(29) ibid., p. 159.
(30) ibid., p. 172.
(31) Reported by the Associated Press in the Japan Times, 17 March 1975.
(32) Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 54.
(33) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 435-6.
(34) Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 58.
(35) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 443-4.
(36) Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 75.
(37) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 480-2.
(38) Philby, My Silent War, pp. 44-5.
(39) Bentley in interview with Page. Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(40) Philby, My Silent War, p. 61.
(41) Evidence of Petrov to the Australian Royal Commission, 1955, quoted in Andrew Boyle, The Climate of Treason (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 216
(42) Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (London: Museum Press, 1949), p. 81.
(43) See, for example: Anthony Read and David Fisher Operation Lucy (London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1980); Chapman Pincher, Their Trade Is Treachery (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981); Richard Deacon, A History of the British Secret Service (New
[447]
York: Taplinger, 1970); and Constantine Fitzgibbon, Secret Intelligence in the 20th Century (London: Granada, 1978).
(44) Letter from Hinsley to author, 25 April 1984.
(45) Hinsley, Britich Intelligence, vol. 2, pp. 69-70.
(46) Respectively: Deacon, British Secret Service, p. 366; Read and Fisher, Operation Lucy, dustjacket; and Foote, Handbook for Spies, p. 82.
(47) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 2, p. 60.
(48) See Ruth Werner (pseudonym for Kuczynski). Sonjas Rapport (East Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1977); and A. Terry, 'The Housewife who Spied for Russia', Sunday Times, 27 January 1980.
(49) Cable, Foreign Office to Ambassador, Algiers, 6 April 1944, Eden Papers, SOE/44/17/192, Birmingham University.
(50) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 179.
(51) Kuczynski in interview with Anthony Terry, for author, 17 January 1980.
(52) ibid.
(53) Oldfield in interview with author, 13 July 1979.
(54) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 441.
Глава 10
(1) R. J. Jeffreys-Jones, Eagle against Empire. United States Opposition to European Imperialism 1898-1981 (Aix-en-Provence: European Association for American Studies, 1983), p. 61.
(2) Jeffrey M. Dorwart, 'The Roosevelt-Astor Espionage Ring', New York History (July 1981), p. 309.
(3) ibid., p. 317.
(4) ibid.
(5) B. Smith. Shadow Warriors, p. 63; and Dorwart 'Roosevelt-Astor Espionage', p. 321.
(6) R. J. Jeffreys-Jones, 'History on Trial: a Critique of the CIA and its Critics', p. 3. Paper delivered at the 9th Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Catholic University of America, Washington DC, 4-6 August 1983.
(7) New York Times. 1 December 1938.
(8) West, MI6, pp. 202-3.
(9) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 114; and Anthony Cave Brown. The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Books, 1982), p. 153.
(10) Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 237.
(11) West, MI6. p. 204.
(12) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 156.
(13) ibid., p. 168.
(14) ibid., p. 169; and B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 68-9.
(15) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 170.
(16) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 21.
(17) ibid., pp. 38-9.
(18) Peter and Leni Gillman, Collar the Lot! (London: Quartet, 1980), p. 85.
(19) ibid., p. 108.
(20) ibid., p. 77.
(21) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 22.
(22) Professor Margaret Gowing, British Atomic Energy Authority official historian, interview with author, 1984.
(23) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 100-5.
(24) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 182.
(25) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 104.
(26) Cave Brown, Last Hero, pp. 226, 233-4; and B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 117.
(27) Cave Brown, Last Hero, pp. 306-7.
(28) See Timothy P. Mulligan, 'According to Colonel Donovan: a Document from the Records of German Military Intelligence', The Historian, November 1983, pp. 78-86.
(29) Cave Brown, Last Hero. pp. 306-8.
(30) ibid., pp. 315-16.
(31) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 593.
(32) Weitz in interview with author, 14 September 1984.
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(33) Kirkpatrick in interview with David Leitch, on behalf of author, 1979.
(34) R. Harris Smith, OSS (Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 185.
(35) ibid., p. 9.
(36) Edmond Taylor, Awakening from History (Boston, Mass.: Gambit, 1969), pp. 350-1.
(37) Lyman Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 24.
(38) Malcolm Muggeridge, 'Book Review of a Very Limited Edition', Esquire, May 1966, p. 84.
(39) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 2, p. 53.
(40) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 90.
(41) Edmond Taylor, Richer by Asia (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1947) pp. 225-7.
(42) Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 252.
(43) Respectively: interview with Leitch, September 1979; and R. Smith, OSS, p. 34.
(44) Taylor, Richer by Asia, p. 233.
(45) R. Smith, OSS, pp. 289-90.
(46) Respectively: R. Smith, OSS, p. 286; Cave Brown, Last Hero. p. 625; ibid., p. 644; and Kerby in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(47) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 609.
(48) R. Smith, OSS, p. 27.
(49) Letter from Philby to author, 1978.
(50) Respectively: Michael Howard, 'The Black Record of the Anglo-Saxons'. Sunday Times, 26 January 1978; and R. Smith. OSS, p. 354.
(51) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 645-8.
(52) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 339-48; and Cave Brown, Last Hero. pp. 423-6.
(53) Respectively: Whitwell, British Agent, pp. 202-7; and R. Smith, OSS, p. 229.
(54) Weitz in interview with author, 14 September 1984.
(55) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 87-8.
(56) Cave Brown, Last Hero, pp. 641-2.
(57) Cave Brown (ed.). The Secret War Report of the OSS (New York: Berkley Medallion, 1976), p. 7.
(58) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 410.
(59) Thomas Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence, testifying before Congress. National Security Act Hearing, 27 June 1947 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 68.
(60) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 757.
(61) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 381-2.
(62) Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris Burning? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), p. 304.
Глава 11
(1) National Security Act Hearing (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 41.
(2) David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Ballantine, 1981), p. 39.
(3) Respectively: National Security Act Hearing, pp. 38, 55; Pratt, 'How Not to Run a Spy System', p. 242; and Trevor Barnes, 'The Secret Cold War. The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956, Part 1', Historical Journal, vol. 24, no. 2 (1981), pp. 400-4.
(4) Harry Howe Ransom, 'Secret Intelligence in the United States, 1947-1982: the ClA's Search for Legitimacy', in Andrew and Dilks, Missing Dimension, p. 206.
(5) National Security Act Hearing, p. 32.
(6) ibid., p. 46.
(7) ibid., p. 38.
(8) ibid., p. 35.
(9) Memo in the Leahy Papers, 25 February 1947, Box 20/132, US National Archives, Washington DC.
(10) National Security Act Hearing, pp. 28-9.
(11) ibid., pp. 22, 27, 29.
(12) ibid., pp. vi, 1.
(13) Respectively: Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 656; and Ransom, 'Secret Intelligence', p. 203.
(14) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 785.
[449]
(15) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 651.
(16) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 1', pp. 412-13.
(17) Michael J. Barrett, 'Honorable Espionage', Journal of Defence and Diplomacy (February 1984), p. 14.
(18) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', pp. 660, 663.
(19) Enver Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1982), p. 430.
(20) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 664.
(21) Harry Rositzke, The ClA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 188.
(22) See David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977).
(23) In a speech at Yale University, 3 February 1958, quoted in R. Hillsman, 'On Intelligence', Armed Forces and Society, vol. 8, no. 1 (Fall 1981), p. 136.
(24) Kirkpatrick in interview with David Leitch, on behalf of author, 1979.
(25) Letter from Philby to author, 27 March 1979.
(26) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 3, BBC Radio 4, 27 January 1982.
(27) R. W. Johnson, 'Making Things Happen', London Review of Books, 6-19 September 1984, p. 12.
(28) Tad Szulc, 'When the Russians Rocked the World', The Times. 29 August 1984.
(29) David Holloway, in letter to author, 2 August 1985.
(30) New York Times, 7 May 1950.
(31) Quoted in Robert Kimball, 'Criminals of the Century?'. Unsolved, vol. 2, no. 21 (1984).
(32) David Holloway, 'Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: the Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb, 1939-1945', Social Studies of Science, vol. 11 (1981), p. 169.
(33) ibid., p. 175.
(34) ibid., p. 179.
(35) ibid., p. 183.
(36) ibid., p. 186.
(37) Holloway in letter to author, 2 August 1985.
(38) Davidson in letter to author, 16 October 1967.
(39) Fuchs's confession to Dr Michael W. Perrin, atomic scientist, British Ministry of Supply, quoted in letter from Hoover to Souers, 2 March 1950. Harry S. Trurnai; Library, President's secretary's files.
(40) Holloway, 'Entering the Nuclear Arms Race', p. 194.
(41) Holloway in letter to author, 2 August 1985.
(42) Fuchs's confession to Dr. Perrin, cit. at n. 39.
(43) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 389.
(44) National Security Act Hearing, p. 29.
(45) Margaret Gowing, 'Niels Bohr and Nuclear Weapons' (manuscript of chapter for Massachusetts Institute of Technology), p. 10.
(46) Barnes. 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 654.
(47) H. A. DeWeerd, 'Strategic Surprise in the Korean War', Orbis (Fall 1962), pp. 439-40.
(48) ibid., p. 438.
(49) Louis Heren. 'Korea: the Blame that Rests on MacArthur', The Times. 3 January 1981.
(50) DeWeerd, 'Strategic Surprise', p. 449.
(51) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 652.
(52) ibid., p. 655.
(53) 'Should the U. S. Fight Secret Wars; a Forum', Harper's. September 1984, p. 44.
(54) Ransom, 'Secret Intelligence', p. 209.
(55) R. W. Johnson, 'Making Things Happen', p. 14.
Глава 12
(1) Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 98.
(2) P. Hennessy and G. Brownfeld, 'Britain's Cold War Security Purge: the Origins of Positive Vetting'. Historical Journal, vol. 25, no. 4 (1982), pp. 971-2.
(3) ibid., p. 973.
(4) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 4, BBC Radio 4. 3 February 1982.
(5) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 180; and Cecil in interview with author, 31 January 1984.
[450]
(6) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 172.
(7) Kirkpatrick in interview with author, 1967.
(8) Robert Amory in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(9) Retired SIS officer in interview with author, 26 June 1984.
(10) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 186. " ibid., p. 188.
(12) Philby, My Silent War, p. 129.
(13) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 3, BBC Radio 4, 27 January 1982.
(14) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 193.
(15) Michael Straight, After Long Silence (London: Collins, 1983), p. 251.
(16) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 195.
(17) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 291.
(18) Philby, My Silent War, p. 137.
(19) 29 September 1955, FBI Archives, Washington DC.
(20) Letter from Fishman to Sunday Times, unpublished, 13 February 1977.
(21) FBI Archives, Washington DC.
(22) Rosamond Lehman in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(23) Lord Egremont in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(24) ibid.
(25) FBI Archives, Washington DC.
(26) Geoffrey McDermott, former Foreign Office adviser to the head of SIS, in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(27) Respectively: 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 4, BBC Radio 4, 3 February 1982; and Wilbur Eveland, Guardian, 29 August 1980.
(28) Unsigned article. New Statesman, 7 July 1978.
(29) McDermott in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(30) Lord Egremont in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(31) Amory in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
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разведки "выходят на публику" в беспрецедентных масштабах. Все эти публикации появляются под контролем разведывательных служб. Если бы они не предоставляли исходный материал, ни один из секретов не мог бы стать достоянием общественности.
Подтверждением этой версии является сравнение числа опубликованных шпионских историй и состояния отношений Восток - Запад. Между 1977 и 1985 годами в "Вашингтон пост" было помещено 2258 материалов, посвященных шпионажу(53). Разбивка публикаций по месяцам показывает заметное увеличение частоты появления таких материалов, когда барометр международного климата указывал на прояснение в советско-американских отношениях.
Например, последовало резкое увеличение числа шпионских историй в период, когда Советский Союз и США двигались в 1985 году по направлению к Женевской встрече на высшем уровне. Видимо, будет неправильно придавать слишком большое значение столь малонаучному исследованию. Но в этой книге мы уже видели, насколько разведывательные службы искусны в деле манипулирования средствами массовой информации в те моменты, когда вот-вот может разразиться мир и когда возникает угроза их финансированию или даже существованию, как в случае с УСС в 1945 году. Вполне можно предположить, что разведывательные службы и органы безопасности с обеих сторон при приближении разрядки ощущают необходимость оправдать свое существование, изо всех сил привлекая внимание к грозному чудовищу. Таким образом, в 80-е годы мы имеем дело с разведывательными сообществами, достигшими беспрецедентных размеров и мощи. Они настолько огромны и так дороги, что мы можем только догадываться об их действительных размерах и стоимости. Однако в их мощи нет никаких сомнений. В Советском Союзе из их рядов выходят государственные лидеры. В США степень их влияния на президентские решения столь велика, что порой не ясно, кто кем руководит президент ЦРУ или ЦРУ президентом.
Разведывательное сообщество ненавидит находящееся у власти правительство, неважно от какой оно партии. Оно жонглирует нашими судьбами под лозунгом их защиты. Это стало возможно лишь в силу секретности, которой разведки себя окружают, секретности, разрушающей демократическое общество. Не составляет тайны тот факт. что, когда разведывательные ведомства растут, наши гражданские свободы сокращаются.
Возможно, что для существования разведывательного сооб
[438]
щества было бы некоторое основание, если бы оно выполняло задачи, на которые претендует, своевременно предупреждало бы об угрозе национальной безопасности. Но, как мы видели, успехи разведки часто сильно преувеличивались, даже в военные годы. В мирное же время разведывательные службы заняты лишь тем, что сводят счеты одна с другой, отстаивают свои бюджеты и изобретают новые доводы для оправдания своего существования.
Возможно, это происходит потому, что разведывательные службы (когда они не полностью погружены в собственные фантазии) понимают, что открытые публикации, традиционные дипломатические и другие легальные контакты оказались в текущем столетии для обеих сторон наиболее ценными источниками разведывательной информации.
[439]
ПОСЛЕСЛОВИЕ К РУССКОМУ ИЗДАНИЮ
Я написал эту книгу восемь лет назад, когда мир был охвачен "холодной войной". С тех пор многое изменилось. КГБ превратился в Службу внешней разведки России. ЦРУ заявляет, что оно посвящает большую часть своих усилий борьбе с контрабандой, наркотиками и террористами, а также обеспечению американских бизнесменов экономическими разведывательными данными, которые им помогают в конкурентной борьбе в международной торговле. Сикрет Интеллидженс Сервис наконец вышла из тени и признала свое существование. Госпожа Стелла Римингтон, генеральный директор британской контрразведки МИ-5, даже провела пресс-конференцию.
Но эти изменения в основном косметические. Огромные шпионские организации, раз возникнув, неохотно уступают свою власть и свой бюджет. Сверхдержавы по-прежнему шпионят друг за другом, как это показало недавнее дело сотрудника ЦРУ Олдрича Эймса, которому в 1994 году было предъявлено обвинение, что в 1985 году он был завербован КГБ.
Шпионы существовали так долго, что было бы наивно вообразить, что с ними покончено. Они будут приспосабливаться к новому миру, но станут продолжать свое дело.
Филлип Найтли
Март 1994 г.
[440]
ЛИТЕРАТУРА, ИСТОЧНИКИ
Введение
(1) Thomas W. Braden, 'Kirn Philby of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service', Washington Post. 12 May 1968.
Глава 1
(1) PRO, CAB/16/8/ERE 9077.
(2) ibid., p. 3.
(3) PRO, WO/32/8873/ERE 9077.
(4) William Le Oueux, Things I Know about Kings, Celebrities and Crooks (London: Evelyn Nash & Grayson, 1923), p. 242.
(5) ibid., p. 251.
(6) William Le Queux, Spies of the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1909), p. xi.
(7) PRO. CAB/16/8/ERE 9077, Appendix I.
(8) PRO, CAB/16/8/ERE 9077, p. 10. Further quotations in this chapter come from this document, unless otherwise stated.
(9) PRO, CAB/16/8/ERE 9077, Secret Report and Proceedings.
(10) Slade Papers III, microfilm MRF 39/3, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
(11) Recounted by Nicholas P. Hiley, 'The Failure of British Espionage against Germany, 1907-1914', Historical Journal, vol. 26, no.4 (1976), pp. 867-89.
(12) The Times, 4 November 1911.
(13) The Times, 29 October 1914.
(14) Hiley, 'Failure of British Espionage', p. 887.
(15) Walther Nicolai, The German Secret Service (London: Stanley Paul, 1924), pp. 52-3.
(16) The statement was printed in The Times, 9 October 1914.
(17) Hiley, 'Failure of British Espionage', p. 888.
Глава 2
(1) Skardon in interview with author, 1967.
(2) Nigel West, MI6. British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 7.
(3) Alley in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(4) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part I. ВВС Radio 4, 5 March 1980.
(5) Nicolai, German Secret Service, p. 18.
(6) PRO, WO/106/45/ERE 9077, p. 15.
(7) Herbert von Bose, 'Verdun, Galizien, Somme, Isonzo... Oder Wo?', in Hans Henning Freiherr Grote (ed.), Vorsicht! Feind hort mit! (Berlin, Neufeld und Henius, 1930), pp. 73-4.
(8) R. J. Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 49.
(9) Fletcher Pratt, 'How Not to Run a Spy System', Harper's, September 1947, p. 243.
(10) William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), pp. 591-2.
(11) See, for example. Henry Landau, The Enemy Within (New York: Putnam's, 1937).
[441]
(12) Nicolai, German Secret Service, p. 109.
(13) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 65.
(14) S. T. Felstead, German Spies at Bay (London: Hutchinson, 1920), p. 20.
(15) PRO, WO/32/4898/ERE 9077.
(16) ibid., Minute sheet 12D, 8 November 1920.
(17) ibid., Minute sheet 13, 12 November 1920.
(18) ibid., Petition from Greite in Parkhurst Prison, 12 September 1921.
(19) Felstead, German Spies, p. 135.
(20) W. H. H. Waters, Secret and Confidential (London: John Murray, 1926), p. 36.
(21) Ulrich Trumpener, 'War Premeditated?', Central European History, vol. 9, no. 1 (March 1976), p. 67.
(22) Army Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2 (July 1929), p. 287.
(23) See Maurice Paleologue, 'Un prelude a 1'invasion de Belgique', Revue des deux mondes, vol. 11 (October 1932).
(24) Nicolai, German Secret Service, p. 186.
(25) See Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence (London: Sphere, 1978), pp. 21-6.
(26) Sam Waagenaar, The Murder of Mata Hari (London: Barker, 1964), pp. 251-2
(27) ibid., p. 250.
(28) Letter from Major von Roepell to Major General Gempp, 24 November 1941, in ND collection. Military Archives, Freiburg, West Germany.
(29) World's Pictorial News, 25 April 1926, p. 3.
(30) Nicolai, German Secret Service, pp. 287-8.
(31) A. Swetschin, 'The Strategy', in Max Ronge (ed.), Kriegs und Industrie Spionage (Vienna: Amalthea, 1930), p. 86.
Глава 3
(1) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 1, BBC Radio 4, 5 March 1980.
(2) House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George MSS, F/9/2/16, 'Reduction of Estimates for Secret Services', 19 March 1920.
(3) Kerby in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(4) Lloyd George MSS, F/9/2/16, Churchill to Lloyd George, Bonar Law, First Lord of the Admiralty. Lord Curzon, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, 19 March 1920.
(5) Lloyd George MSS, F/9/2/16, 'Reduction of Estimates for Secret Services', p. 2(vii).
(6) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(7) Lloyd George MSS, F/33/2/3, Long to Lloyd George, 9 January 1919.
(8) Sidney Reilly, The Adventures of Sidney Reilly (London: Elkin Mathews & Marrot, 1931), pp. 28,44.
(9) ibid., p. 43.
(10) ibid. Mrs Reilly tells her story in the second half of Reilly's unfinished book.
(11) ibid., p. 238.
(12) Quoted by Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay and Hugo Young, The Zinoviev Letter (London: Neinemann, 1967], p. 194.
(13) Christopher Andrew, 'The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s'. Historical Journal, vol. 20, no. 3(1977). p. 705.
(14) Maugham's spell in Russia is best told in R. J. Jeffrey-Jones, American Espionage (New York: The Free Press, 1977), ch. 7.
(15) Paul Dukes, The Story of ST-25 (London: Cassell, 1938), pp. 32-3.
(16) ibid., p. 293.
(17) R. H. Bruce Lockhart, Memoirs of a Britich Agent (New York: Putnam's, 1932). p. 288.
(18) 'Russian Agent Planted on Sir R. Bruce Lockhart'. The Times, 14 March 1966.
(19) The Cheka plot is explained in Richard K. Debo, 'Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinski Plot?', Journal of Modern History, vol. 43, no. 3 (1971), pp. 413-39.
(20) Kenneth Young, The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart: Vol 1. 1915-1938 (London: Macmillan, 1973).
(21) Respectively: Dukes in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967; and George A. Hill. The Dreaded Hour (London: Cassell, 1936), p. 260.
(22) Andrew, 'Britich Secret Service', pp. 690-1.
(23) Lloyd George MSS, F/203/3/6, Folder 5, 'Memorandum on the Situation in Russia'.
(24) Bruce Page, David Leitch and Phillip Knightley, The Philhv Conspiracy (New York-Doubleday, 1968), p. 117.
(25) Lockhart, Memoirs, p. 341.
(26) Kirn Philby, My Silent War (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968), p. xv.
[442]
Глава 4
(1) Sir David Petrie, Communism in India, 1924-1927 (Calcutta: Editions Indian, 1972), pp.174-5.
(2) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 118.
(3) Cecil in interview with author, 1980.
(4) Nicholson in interview with author, 1967.
(5) There are many versions of the Ellis story. This one comes from an interview with one of Ellis's senior officers. The author will forward letters to him.
(6) Gwynne Kean, letter to author, 4 March 1980.
(7) Interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(8) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(9) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2.
(10) Nicholson in interview with author, 1967.
(11) ibid.
12 John Whitwell, British Agent (London: Kimber, 1966), pp. 70-1.
(13) Christopher Andrew, 'Now Baldwin's Secret Service Lost the Soviet Code', Observer, 13 August 1978.
(14) Christopher Andrew, 'Governments and Secret Services: a Historical Perspective',
International Journal, vol. 34, no. 2(1979), p. 180.
(15) F. H. Hinsley el al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979), vol. 1, p. 56.
(16) Morton in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967. Morton said that his network controller was 'The Times man in Rome'. The Times staff records list Coote as its correspondent there during the relevant period.
(17) Walker in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(18) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 57-8.
(19) ibid., p. 83.
(20) Wesley K. Wark, 'British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933-1939', Historical Journal, vol. 25, no. 3(1982), p. 640.
(21) Wark, 'British Intelligence', pp. 636-8. Christie's informant is identified as Ritter in C Andrew and D. Dilks (eds). The Missing Dimension (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 123.
(22) Barton Whaley, 'Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919-1939: Deception and Misperception', Journal of Strategic Studies, part 5 (March 1982), pp. 3-39.
(23) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 49, 80.
(24) ibid., pp. 46, 76-7.
Глава 5
(1) Heinz Hohne, Canaris (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1979), p. 161.
(2) Gert Buchheit, Der Deutsche Geheimdienst. Geschichte der militarischen Abwehr (Munich: List, 1966), p. 175.
(3) Nigel West, M15. British Security Service Operations 1909-1945 (London: The Bodley Head, 1981), pp. 92-104.
(4) The de Rop-Winterbotham relationship is described by Winterbotham himself in Secret and Personal (London: Kimber, 1969).
(5) Ladislas Farago, The Game of the Foxes (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1972), p. 86.
(6) David Kahn, Hitler's Spies (New York: Macmillan, 1978), p. 63.
(7) Farago, Foxes, p. 36.
(8) Thomas H. Etzold, 'The (F)utility Factor: German Information Gathering in the United States, 1933-1941', Military Affairs, vol. 39, no. 2 (1975), p. 78.
(9) ibid., p. 79.
(10) ibid.
(11) ibid.
(12) ibid., p. 80.
(13) Manfred Jonas, 'Prophet without Honour: Hans Heinrich Dieckhoffs Reports from Washington', Mid-America, vol. 47 (July 1965), pp. 222-33.
(14) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 46.
(15) ibid., p. 61.
(16) Philby, My Silent War, p. xix.
[443]
Глава 6
(1) R. J. Jeffreys-Jones, 'History on Trial: a Critique of the CIA and its Critics', p. 6. Paper delivered at the 9th Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Catholic University of America, Washington DC, 4-6 August 1983.
(2) Andrew, 'Governments and Secret Services', p. 181.
(3) Farago, Foxes, dustjacket.
(4) Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 112.
(5) Oldfield in interview with author, 13 July 1979.
(6) Malcolm Muggeridge. Chronicles of Wasted Time. II: The Infernal Grove (London: Collins, 1973), p. 149.
(7) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 91.
(8) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 121.
(9) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(10) West, M16. p. 109.
(11) De Courcey in letter to author, 16 May 1981.
(12) West, M16. p. 137.
(13) Interview with Peter Oilman, 23 March 1978, unpublished.
(14) PRO, CAB/66/9/WP(40)244, 4 July 1940, 'Imminence of a German Invasion of Great Britain'.
(15) JIC(40)376, 12 November 1940, quoted in Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 295.
(16) Private letter to author, 7 September 1967.
(17) West, M16, p. 109.
(18) Philby, My Silent War, p. 4.
(19) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 278.
(20) Michael Elliot-Bateman (ed.). The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, Vol. 1. Intelligence! Subversion! Resistance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970), p. 53.
(21) David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 209.
(22) Kerby in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(23) M. R. D. Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', in W. Laquer (ed.). The Second World War (London and Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage 1982), p. 251.
(24) See Werner Rings, Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939-1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982) for examples.
(25) David Stafford, 'The Detonator Concept: British Strategy, SOE and European Resistance after the Fall of France', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 10(1975), pp. 215 and 196 respectively.
(26) See, for example, R. Crossman and K. Martin, 100,000,000 Allies If We Choose. pamphlet, July 1940.
(27) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', p. 247.
(28) Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass (London: Cape, 1983), p. 37.
(29) Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (London and New York: Deutsch and Basic Books, 1983), p. 85.
(30) Milovan Djilas quoted in Stafford's book Britain and European Resistance, p. 210.
(31) Richard Usborne, quoted in Mark Wheeler, 'The SOE Phenomenon', in Laquer, Second World War, p. 195.
(32) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', p. 243.
(33) PRO, 32/1061 l/MA/08233, Home Defence Security Executive, 20 March 1941.
(34) Respectively: interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967; and quoted in Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 350.
(35) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has investigated the German story without any conclusive result.
(36) Jean Overton Fuller, The German Penetration of SOE (London: Kimber, 1975), pp. 175-6.
(37) William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: the Secret War 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 457.
(38) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', pp. 248-9.
(39) Louis de Jong, 'The Great Game" of Secret Agents', Encounter, January 1980, pp. 12-21; and West, M16, p. 180.
(40) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 137.
(41) ibid., p. 142.
(42) Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 75
[444]
(43) Basil Davidson, 'Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War', New Statesman, 4 JULY 1980, p. 11.
(44) Private letter to Peter Calvocoressi.
(45) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 180.
(46) Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 24.
Глава 7
(1) There are many versions of these events. The best is to be found in Callum A. MacDonald, 'The Venio Affair', European Studies Review, vol. 8, no. 4 (October 1978), pp. 443-64.
(2) David Astor, 'Why the Revolt against Hitler was Ignored', Encounter, June 1969, p. 7.
(3) Telegram from D. G. Osborne (The Vatican) to London, 1 December 1939, in 'Papst Pius XII, die britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition in Winter 1939/40', Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 22, no. 3 (1974).
(4) Astor, 'Revolt against Hitler', p. 8.
(5) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 445.
(6) West, M16, p. 71.
(7) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 448.
(8) Christie Papers, CHRS 1/27-8, Churchill College, Cambridge.
(9) W. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs (London: Deutsch, 1956), p. 106.
(10) S. Payne Best, The Venio Incident (London: Hutchinson, 1950), p. 7.
(11) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 459.
(12) PRO, FO/371/C./7324/89/15, Churchill directive, 28 June 1940.
(13) C. Simpson and P. Knightley, 'The Secret List of Rudolph Hess', Sunday Times, 7 November 1982.
(14) Churchill's secretary. Sir John Colville, in interview with Colin Simpson and author, November 1982.
(15) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 100.
(16) West, M16, p. 112.
(17) ibid., pp. 186-7.
(18) ibid., p. 110.
(19) ibid., pp. 152-3.
(20) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 367.
(21) West, M16, pp. 84, 225.
(22) ibid., p. 44.
(23) ibid., pp. 50-2, 74.
(24) Louis de Jong, 'Britain and Dutch Resistance, 1940^ 1945', p. 21. Notifies voor het Geschied werk, no. 109 (undated), Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation.
(25) See Hans L. Trefousse, 'The Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1939-1945', Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 42, no. 1 (June 1955).
(26) Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary, British Troops, Austria. Liddell Hart Collection, 9/24/229, University of London, King's College Centre for Military Archives.
(27) West, M16, pp. 173, 184.
(28) ibid., pp. 200-1.
(29) Trefousse, 'Failure of German Intelligence', p. 100.
(30) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(31) The correspondence between Liddell and Johnson, and Johnson and the State Department is in the National Archives, Washington under: US Embassy, London, 1940-1941, RG 84, Box 4/820/02/C/1940.
(32) Farago, Foxes, pp. 472-3.
(33) The Times, 6 September 1944.
(34) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 30-1.
(35) David Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East (London: Kimber, 198G), p. 190.
(36) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 58.
(37) Mure, Master of Deception, p. 165.
(38) ibid., p. 37.
(39) Letter from Philby to author, 27 March 1978.
(40) Dusko Popov, Spy/Counter Spy (London: Panther, 1976), p. 223.
(41) 'German Naval Intelligence, Part B: Naval Intelligence and the Normandy Invasion', 15 October 1946, p. 44, US National Archives, Washington DC.
[445]
(42) See Gert Buchheit, Spionage in zwei Weltkriegen (Landshut: Politisches Archiv, 1975), p. 326; and O. Reile, 'Wer tauschte die deutsche militarische Fuhrung liber die Starke der in England fur die Invasion bereitgestellten Streitkrafte?' Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, no. 3 (1979), p. 83.
(43) Buchheit, Spionage, p. 326.
(44) 'German Naval Intelligence', cit. at n. 41, p. 68.
(45) Reile, 'Wer tauschte', p. 83.
(46) Mure, Master of Deception, p. 176.
(47) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 137, 187.
Глава 8
(1) Respectively: Ronald Lewin 'A Signal-Intelligence War', in Laquer, Second World War, p. 185; and Roger J. Spiller, 'Assessing Ultra', Military Review, vol. 59, no. 8 (August 1979), p. 14.
(2) Harold Deutsch, 'The Influence of Ultra on World War II', Parameters: Journal of the U. S. Army War College, vol. 8 (December 1978), p. 6.
(3) David Kahn, 'The International Conference on Ultra', Military Affairs vol. 43, no. 2 (April 1979), p. 98.
(4) Peter Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 36.
(5) Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 36.
(6) Agawa Hiroyuki, The Reluctant Admiral (Tokyo: Kadansha International, 1979), p. 347.
(7) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(8) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 3, BBC Radio 4, 27 January 1982.
(9) Spiller, 'Assessing Ultra', p. 19.
(10) D. Homer, 'Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area in World War II', Australian Outlook, vol. 32, no. 3 (1978), p. 316.
(11) Spiller, 'Assessing Ultra', p. 22; and Ralph Bennett, 'Ultra and Some Command Decisions', in Laquer, Second World War, pp. 223-4.
(12) Stephen E. Ambrose, "Elsenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 16 (1981), p. 158.
(13) 'Der Einfkuss alliierten Funkaufklarung auf den Verlauf des Zweiten Weltkrieges', Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 27, no. 3 (1979), pp. 362-3.
(14) Ambrose, 'Eisenhower', pp. 158-9.
(15) Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 108.
(16) 'Interim', British Army of the Rhine Intelligence Review, no. 19 (4 March 1946), in the Liddell Hart Papers under German Intelligence in the West, 1944-1945, File on Col M. University of London, King's College Centre for Military Archives.
(17) Gunther Blumentritt, 14 August 1942, Liddell Hart Papers, 9/24/229, Intelligence.
(18) J. Rohwer, and E. Jackel (eds). Die Funkaufklarung und ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1979), p. 111.
(19) Spiller, Assessing Ultra', p. 18.
(20) Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: the Enigma of Intelligence (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1985), p. 244.
(21) Aileen Clayton, The Enemy Is Listening (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 79-85.
(22) Philby, My Silent War, p. 38.
(23) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 178.
(24) Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 58.
(25) Bennett, 'Ultra and some Command Decisions', p. 232.
(26) Peter Calvocoressi, 'Ne Plus Ultra World War', The Times. 3 May 1984.
(27) Bennett, 'Ultra and some Command Decisions', p. 231.
(28) Spiller, 'Assessing Ultra', p. 20.
(29) Kahn 'International Conference on Ultra', p. 98.
(30) James Rusbridger, 'Secrets of Enigma", The Times, 17 May 1985.
(31) F. D. Shirreff, 'Some Experience with Special Signals', Mercury. The Magazine of the Royal Signals Amateur Radio Society (1981-2).
(32) David Kahn, 'Codebreaking in World Wars I and II', Historical Journal, vol. 23 no. 3 (1980), p. 624.
(33) Hodges, Alan Turing, p. 261.
(34) Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 85.
(35) Kahn, 'Codebreaking', p. 624.
(36) His obituary in The Times. 31 August 1971.
[446]
(37) See James Rusbridger, 'The Sinking of the Automedon, the Capture of the Nankin, Encounter, May 1985.
(38) Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p. 94.
(39) Respectively: Nicholson in interview with author, 1967; Thomas O'Toole, 'World War II - Some Additional Postscripts Come to Light', International Herald Tribune (Paris), 14 September 1978; and interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(40) Waldemar Werther, as reported in Rohwer and Jackel, Funkaufklarung, p. 65.
(41) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 3, BBC Radio 4, 27 January 1982.
Глава 9
(1) John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1975), p. 89.
(2) ibid
(3) See M Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 406-10.
(4) Skardon in interview with Leitch, 1980.
(5) Robert Cecil, 'The Cambridge Comintern', in C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds). The Missing Dimension (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 181.
(6) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 181.
(7) Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels (London: Collins, 1977), pp. 172-5.
(8) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', pp. 181-2.
(9) Geoffrey McDermott in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(10) Letter from Liddell of Ml 5 to Johnson of American Embassy, 26 December 1940, US National Archives, Washington DC.
(11) Private letter to Page, Leitch and Knightley, 3 August 1967.
(12) Bruce Page, 'The Endless Quest for Supermole', New Statesman, 21 September 1979, p. 414.
(13) M. Sayle, 'Conversations with Philby', Sunday Times, 17 December 1967.
(14) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 51.
(15) Philby, My Silent War. p. xviii.
(16) Letter to Harold Nicholson, undated.
(17) Nigel Wade, 'Soviet Press Praises Philby', Sunday Telegraph, 10 August 1980.
(18) Sayle, 'Conversations with Philby', cit. at n. 13.
(19) Cesil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 19.
(20) Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy, p. 409.
(21) Letter from Philby to author, 18 February 1974.
(22) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 175.
(23) See Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1977).
(24) C. Johnson, Treason, p. 154.
(25) ibid., p. 154.
(26) Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 239.
(27) Heinrich Haape, quoted in Desmond Flower and James Reeves (eds), The war 1939-1945. vol. 1 (London: Panther, 1967). p. 339.
(28) C. Johnson, Treuson. p. 18.
(29) ibid., p. 159.
(30) ibid., p. 172.
(31) Reported by the Associated Press in the Japan Times, 17 March 1975.
(32) Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 54.
(33) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 435-6.
(34) Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 58.
(35) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 443-4.
(36) Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 75.
(37) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, pp. 480-2.
(38) Philby, My Silent War, pp. 44-5.
(39) Bentley in interview with Page. Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(40) Philby, My Silent War, p. 61.
(41) Evidence of Petrov to the Australian Royal Commission, 1955, quoted in Andrew Boyle, The Climate of Treason (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 216
(42) Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (London: Museum Press, 1949), p. 81.
(43) See, for example: Anthony Read and David Fisher Operation Lucy (London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1980); Chapman Pincher, Their Trade Is Treachery (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981); Richard Deacon, A History of the British Secret Service (New
[447]
York: Taplinger, 1970); and Constantine Fitzgibbon, Secret Intelligence in the 20th Century (London: Granada, 1978).
(44) Letter from Hinsley to author, 25 April 1984.
(45) Hinsley, Britich Intelligence, vol. 2, pp. 69-70.
(46) Respectively: Deacon, British Secret Service, p. 366; Read and Fisher, Operation Lucy, dustjacket; and Foote, Handbook for Spies, p. 82.
(47) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 2, p. 60.
(48) See Ruth Werner (pseudonym for Kuczynski). Sonjas Rapport (East Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1977); and A. Terry, 'The Housewife who Spied for Russia', Sunday Times, 27 January 1980.
(49) Cable, Foreign Office to Ambassador, Algiers, 6 April 1944, Eden Papers, SOE/44/17/192, Birmingham University.
(50) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 179.
(51) Kuczynski in interview with Anthony Terry, for author, 17 January 1980.
(52) ibid.
(53) Oldfield in interview with author, 13 July 1979.
(54) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 441.
Глава 10
(1) R. J. Jeffreys-Jones, Eagle against Empire. United States Opposition to European Imperialism 1898-1981 (Aix-en-Provence: European Association for American Studies, 1983), p. 61.
(2) Jeffrey M. Dorwart, 'The Roosevelt-Astor Espionage Ring', New York History (July 1981), p. 309.
(3) ibid., p. 317.
(4) ibid.
(5) B. Smith. Shadow Warriors, p. 63; and Dorwart 'Roosevelt-Astor Espionage', p. 321.
(6) R. J. Jeffreys-Jones, 'History on Trial: a Critique of the CIA and its Critics', p. 3. Paper delivered at the 9th Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Catholic University of America, Washington DC, 4-6 August 1983.
(7) New York Times. 1 December 1938.
(8) West, MI6, pp. 202-3.
(9) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 114; and Anthony Cave Brown. The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Books, 1982), p. 153.
(10) Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 237.
(11) West, MI6. p. 204.
(12) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 156.
(13) ibid., p. 168.
(14) ibid., p. 169; and B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 68-9.
(15) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 170.
(16) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 21.
(17) ibid., pp. 38-9.
(18) Peter and Leni Gillman, Collar the Lot! (London: Quartet, 1980), p. 85.
(19) ibid., p. 108.
(20) ibid., p. 77.
(21) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 22.
(22) Professor Margaret Gowing, British Atomic Energy Authority official historian, interview with author, 1984.
(23) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 100-5.
(24) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 182.
(25) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 104.
(26) Cave Brown, Last Hero, pp. 226, 233-4; and B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 117.
(27) Cave Brown, Last Hero, pp. 306-7.
(28) See Timothy P. Mulligan, 'According to Colonel Donovan: a Document from the Records of German Military Intelligence', The Historian, November 1983, pp. 78-86.
(29) Cave Brown, Last Hero. pp. 306-8.
(30) ibid., pp. 315-16.
(31) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 593.
(32) Weitz in interview with author, 14 September 1984.
[448]
(33) Kirkpatrick in interview with David Leitch, on behalf of author, 1979.
(34) R. Harris Smith, OSS (Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 185.
(35) ibid., p. 9.
(36) Edmond Taylor, Awakening from History (Boston, Mass.: Gambit, 1969), pp. 350-1.
(37) Lyman Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 24.
(38) Malcolm Muggeridge, 'Book Review of a Very Limited Edition', Esquire, May 1966, p. 84.
(39) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 2, p. 53.
(40) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 90.
(41) Edmond Taylor, Richer by Asia (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1947) pp. 225-7.
(42) Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 252.
(43) Respectively: interview with Leitch, September 1979; and R. Smith, OSS, p. 34.
(44) Taylor, Richer by Asia, p. 233.
(45) R. Smith, OSS, pp. 289-90.
(46) Respectively: R. Smith, OSS, p. 286; Cave Brown, Last Hero. p. 625; ibid., p. 644; and Kerby in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(47) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 609.
(48) R. Smith, OSS, p. 27.
(49) Letter from Philby to author, 1978.
(50) Respectively: Michael Howard, 'The Black Record of the Anglo-Saxons'. Sunday Times, 26 January 1978; and R. Smith. OSS, p. 354.
(51) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 645-8.
(52) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 339-48; and Cave Brown, Last Hero. pp. 423-6.
(53) Respectively: Whitwell, British Agent, pp. 202-7; and R. Smith, OSS, p. 229.
(54) Weitz in interview with author, 14 September 1984.
(55) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 87-8.
(56) Cave Brown, Last Hero, pp. 641-2.
(57) Cave Brown (ed.). The Secret War Report of the OSS (New York: Berkley Medallion, 1976), p. 7.
(58) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 410.
(59) Thomas Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence, testifying before Congress. National Security Act Hearing, 27 June 1947 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 68.
(60) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 757.
(61) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 381-2.
(62) Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris Burning? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), p. 304.
Глава 11
(1) National Security Act Hearing (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 41.
(2) David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Ballantine, 1981), p. 39.
(3) Respectively: National Security Act Hearing, pp. 38, 55; Pratt, 'How Not to Run a Spy System', p. 242; and Trevor Barnes, 'The Secret Cold War. The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956, Part 1', Historical Journal, vol. 24, no. 2 (1981), pp. 400-4.
(4) Harry Howe Ransom, 'Secret Intelligence in the United States, 1947-1982: the ClA's Search for Legitimacy', in Andrew and Dilks, Missing Dimension, p. 206.
(5) National Security Act Hearing, p. 32.
(6) ibid., p. 46.
(7) ibid., p. 38.
(8) ibid., p. 35.
(9) Memo in the Leahy Papers, 25 February 1947, Box 20/132, US National Archives, Washington DC.
(10) National Security Act Hearing, pp. 28-9.
(11) ibid., pp. 22, 27, 29.
(12) ibid., pp. vi, 1.
(13) Respectively: Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 656; and Ransom, 'Secret Intelligence', p. 203.
(14) Cave Brown, Last Hero, p. 785.
[449]
(15) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 651.
(16) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 1', pp. 412-13.
(17) Michael J. Barrett, 'Honorable Espionage', Journal of Defence and Diplomacy (February 1984), p. 14.
(18) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', pp. 660, 663.
(19) Enver Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1982), p. 430.
(20) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 664.
(21) Harry Rositzke, The ClA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 188.
(22) See David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977).
(23) In a speech at Yale University, 3 February 1958, quoted in R. Hillsman, 'On Intelligence', Armed Forces and Society, vol. 8, no. 1 (Fall 1981), p. 136.
(24) Kirkpatrick in interview with David Leitch, on behalf of author, 1979.
(25) Letter from Philby to author, 27 March 1979.
(26) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 3, BBC Radio 4, 27 January 1982.
(27) R. W. Johnson, 'Making Things Happen', London Review of Books, 6-19 September 1984, p. 12.
(28) Tad Szulc, 'When the Russians Rocked the World', The Times. 29 August 1984.
(29) David Holloway, in letter to author, 2 August 1985.
(30) New York Times, 7 May 1950.
(31) Quoted in Robert Kimball, 'Criminals of the Century?'. Unsolved, vol. 2, no. 21 (1984).
(32) David Holloway, 'Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: the Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb, 1939-1945', Social Studies of Science, vol. 11 (1981), p. 169.
(33) ibid., p. 175.
(34) ibid., p. 179.
(35) ibid., p. 183.
(36) ibid., p. 186.
(37) Holloway in letter to author, 2 August 1985.
(38) Davidson in letter to author, 16 October 1967.
(39) Fuchs's confession to Dr Michael W. Perrin, atomic scientist, British Ministry of Supply, quoted in letter from Hoover to Souers, 2 March 1950. Harry S. Trurnai; Library, President's secretary's files.
(40) Holloway, 'Entering the Nuclear Arms Race', p. 194.
(41) Holloway in letter to author, 2 August 1985.
(42) Fuchs's confession to Dr. Perrin, cit. at n. 39.
(43) B. Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 389.
(44) National Security Act Hearing, p. 29.
(45) Margaret Gowing, 'Niels Bohr and Nuclear Weapons' (manuscript of chapter for Massachusetts Institute of Technology), p. 10.
(46) Barnes. 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 654.
(47) H. A. DeWeerd, 'Strategic Surprise in the Korean War', Orbis (Fall 1962), pp. 439-40.
(48) ibid., p. 438.
(49) Louis Heren. 'Korea: the Blame that Rests on MacArthur', The Times. 3 January 1981.
(50) DeWeerd, 'Strategic Surprise', p. 449.
(51) Barnes, 'Secret Cold War. Part 2', p. 652.
(52) ibid., p. 655.
(53) 'Should the U. S. Fight Secret Wars; a Forum', Harper's. September 1984, p. 44.
(54) Ransom, 'Secret Intelligence', p. 209.
(55) R. W. Johnson, 'Making Things Happen', p. 14.
Глава 12
(1) Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 98.
(2) P. Hennessy and G. Brownfeld, 'Britain's Cold War Security Purge: the Origins of Positive Vetting'. Historical Journal, vol. 25, no. 4 (1982), pp. 971-2.
(3) ibid., p. 973.
(4) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 4, BBC Radio 4. 3 February 1982.
(5) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 180; and Cecil in interview with author, 31 January 1984.
[450]
(6) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 172.
(7) Kirkpatrick in interview with author, 1967.
(8) Robert Amory in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(9) Retired SIS officer in interview with author, 26 June 1984.
(10) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 186. " ibid., p. 188.
(12) Philby, My Silent War, p. 129.
(13) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 3, BBC Radio 4, 27 January 1982.
(14) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 193.
(15) Michael Straight, After Long Silence (London: Collins, 1983), p. 251.
(16) Cecil, 'Cambridge Comintern', p. 195.
(17) Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, p. 291.
(18) Philby, My Silent War, p. 137.
(19) 29 September 1955, FBI Archives, Washington DC.
(20) Letter from Fishman to Sunday Times, unpublished, 13 February 1977.
(21) FBI Archives, Washington DC.
(22) Rosamond Lehman in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(23) Lord Egremont in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(24) ibid.
(25) FBI Archives, Washington DC.
(26) Geoffrey McDermott, former Foreign Office adviser to the head of SIS, in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(27) Respectively: 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 4, BBC Radio 4, 3 February 1982; and Wilbur Eveland, Guardian, 29 August 1980.
(28) Unsigned article. New Statesman, 7 July 1978.
(29) McDermott in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(30) Lord Egremont in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(31) Amory in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.