greater spiritual freedom and learnt many truths about their history and the
outrages of Stalinism.
Now, looking back on the documents and facts of this period, it can be
seen that Gorbachev did not have a plan for global action. He had not
imagined that perestroika would cause such global transformations. The
General Secretary of the CPSU was motivated by the idea of strengthening
Soviet society and socialism, rather than overthrowing the culture and
system of a waning civilisation. This "provinciality" in his attitude to a
global power, such as the USSR was, is quite evident in his thousands of
speeches and articles of the time, however, it is also proof of the lack of
the global responsibility necessary for the leader of one of the two super
powers.[21]
Gorbachev had two options. The first of these was to give priority to
economic reforms (similar to Hungary and China) with simultaneous guarantees
of centralised power followed by the gradual implementation of political
reforms. The second option was to introduce political reforms followed by
economic reforms. If he had opted for the first option he would have had
further opportunities for global influence, but he did not and plunged the
USSR into a network of internal conflicts.
From the speeches made by Gorbachev between 1985 and 1986 it can be
seen that he did not underestimate economic reform and wanted to find a way
of implementing reform both in the economy and in politics. It is, however,
clear that Gorbachev and his allies were thinking on their feet and that
they did not have a clear action plan suitable for universal, global change.
The political campaigns began to take a hold but economic reforms tended to
falter in their tracks. The simultaneous implementation of economic and
political reforms in actual fact gave weight to the latter. As Gorbachev
announced the policy of Glasnost and began to reveal the truth about the
past, he put the authority of the party apparatus under threat and accepted
the enormous challenge of political reforms and the divisive inner-party
conflicts. The beginning of "perestroika" through the policy of "glasnost"
in essence meant the priority of political reform over economic reform. This
fact was of decisive significance for the fate of the USSR and Eastern
Europe and the whole world. If Gorbachev had delayed political reform and
had placed the accent on the economy, this would not have lead so rapidly to
the chaotic collapse of the Eastern European systems and the USSR. Such a
transition would not have lead to the explosion of nationalism and dozens of
local wars and conflicts. The Eastern European nations would not have become
a burden for the developed Western European nations and there would not have
been the need for billions of dollars in financial aid.
Gorbachev's choice was not the result of a deliberately thought-out
plan but rather the result of circumstances. However, having opted for a
model of change, sooner rather than later local conflicts and the collapse
of Eastern European structures were inevitable. Of the reasons for such a
denouement, one is of particular significance. The integrated nature of the
totalitarian system was totally reliant on the centralised nature of power.
In contrast to market economies where people are linked by an enormous
number of horizontal connections independent of the central power, in a
totalitarian economy social integration is maintained via central state
institutions. This applies not only to economic entities but also to ethnic
groups and the structures of information exchange and culture.
Rapid reforms to the system of political authority without economic
foundations within a totalitarian society by definition pose a risk of the
entire system collapsing in chaos. Imagine factories which are accustomed to
receiving materials allocated to them by the central planning institutions.
The destruction of this institution or change within the political or
administrative system allows the factories to sell to whom they want and to
ignore whom they want. The result of this is that at one fell swoop
thousands and millions of economic bonds are severed and the chaos becomes
unimaginable.
This was also the case in the area of international relations. Under
totalitarianism many national groups were able to co-exist peacefully within
the order imposed from above and any conflicts between them were
cosmetically concealed. However, these peoples peoples lacked sufficient
horizontal economic and cultural bonds as for example is the case with the
various nationalities inhabiting Switzerland. After the collapse of the
central power, nations which had until the previous day been good neighbours
began to divide up territories, power, money and in many cases opened up the
way for armed conflict with tanks and weapons.
Whether Gorbachev understood the scale of the emerging crisis is a
question of some doubt. What is clear, however, is that during this period
economic reforms made no progress, whereas political reforms began to give
rise to greater and greater conflicts. In January 1987, a little more than a
month after the release of Sakharov from internal exile, Mikhail Gorbachev
laid before the Central Committee of the CPSU a series of measures aimed at
political reform. These included secret ballots with multiple candidates and
the election of non-communists to senior state posts, participation of
employees in the election of directors at their place of work, the reduction
of state ownership in favour of cooperative ownership and so on. This was
not only a direct and decisive blow to the party apparatus and its vested
interests, but also to the power structure itself. After this plenum
feelings of opposition to perestroika began to make themselves felt. The
indignation of the party apparatus was total and reactions became more and
more overt. However, the inertia of change was too great to be stopped. In
1987 a process of political rehabilitation of intellectuals repressed by
Stalin began and the first timid steps were being made towards the opening
of private cooperative shops.
In the same year, which I consider the zenith of the perestroika, a
number of serious problems began to manifest themselves. Most significant of
these was the fact that "perestroika" had given practically no positive
economic results and had not alleviated the problems faced by ordinary
people. The successes which were being achieved in the medium range arms
negotiations were having less and less influence on the public opinion.
People were more concerned with the lack of goods in the shops. In October
1987 the first nationalist conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaidjan flared
up. This was the beginning of the general crisis in national relations
within the USSR. At the same time a number of diverse, but well organised,
opposition groups began to appear within the Soviet leadership. On the one
hand, both within the Central Committee of the CPSU and outside it the
opposition to Gorbachev's reforms was becoming more vocal and aimed at the
preservation of the status quo of single party power and the totalitarian
system. On the other hand, in October 1987, Boris Yeltsin made official
accusations against Gorbachev and Ligachev, marking the beginning of a
political movement aimed at more radical and liberal reforms.
From this moment on Gorbachev was obliged to strike a balance between
these two groups which limited his flexibility and making his action seems
more contradictory. The General Secretary was neither able to turn back,
which would have marked the end of his career and perestroika, nor was he
free enough to make sufficient intensive progress. Gorbachev had already
surpassed Khrushchev but was not safe from the same fate.
In November 1988, Estonia declared its independence and the right of
the Supreme Council of Estonia to veto laws passed by the Soviet parliament.
Mass independence movements began in Lithuania and Latvia. The ethnic
tension between Armenia and Azerbaidjan continued. In this situation, on the
7th of December 1988, Gorbachev announced to the UN that the Soviet army
would be reduced by half a million and the pull-out of Soviet troops from
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany began. The Soviet leader called for
a new world order. This was his biggest tactical mistake. He realised his
global responsibility too late. When Gorbachev finally understood his
decisive significance in international reform and in general, as well as the
fate of perestroika,he had already lost his power.
4. THE COLLAPSE OF PERESTROIKA
The collapse of perestroika in 1991 had been foreseen as early as the
end of 1988.
With the conflicts which ensued, it will be evaluated by modern
historians as a process filled with contradictions. On the other hand, it
opened the floodgates to new opportunities for progress and history in the
long-term will appreciate as the catalyst for the advent
of the new civilisation.
I
shall take a more detailed look at the changes which took place in
Eastern Europe not only because since I lived through them personally but
because I am convinced of the fact that the events of 1986--1991 will affect
our fate for many years to come. 1989 and 1990 were years of the gradual
"fiasco" of perestroika as a line of evolutionary change within the
totalitarian system. Its collapse took several forms. Firstly -- the
complete failure of economic reforms and, consequently, the reduced support
for perestroika on the part of the Soviet people. Secondly -- allowing the
local inter-ethnic conflicts to get out of hand and the consequent explosion
of ethnic self-confidence and demands. Thirdly -- the collapse of the
Eastern European political and military alliances and the severance of ties
between the Eastern European nations and Moscow.
As early as the beginning of January 1989 the majority of Soviet
republics began to pass a series of new laws establishing their own
languages as the official language of the republic. In March of the same
year in the first free elections for the Congress of the People's Deputies
the nationalist movements in the Baltic Republics won the absolute majority.
In May, Lithuania and Estonia and in July Latvia, in spite of Moscow's
displeasure, passed a law, declaring their independence. The question arose
of the fate of the USSR, its integrity and unity and the future of the
central leadership. This was, indeed, Gorbachev's most serious ordeal and
the precursor of the final collapse of perestroika. The opposition of the
neo-communists within the Soviet leadership was a powerful force in favour
of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union and hard-line policies.
The potential collapse of the Soviet Union was unacceptable for the
Moscow elite, mainly for ideological reasons. It is not to be underestimated
that for 70 years millions of people in the former USSR were absolutely
convinced of the need for its existence and of the idea and meaning of the
Soviet system. No less important is the fact that the collapse of the USSR
was de facto to signify the demise of all the higher leadership posts. In
1990 and 1991 such a possibility instilled feelings of insecurity in the
Soviet elite. Tens of thousands of senior civil servants, amongst them
leading figures in the Moscow government, were threatened with losing their
jobs.
There is another side to the question which has to be considered. The
majority of the world political elite considered the potential collapse of
the USSR as a complex and possibly dangerous issue. From my direct personal
conversations with senior politicians in the USA, France, Germany and
Austria and other countries and from indirect political analyses, I have the
impression that in 1990 and 1991 only the minority of them were in favour of
a collapse of the USSR. The world was concerned about the appearance of new
nuclear powers such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and the potential of
large-scale military conflict with the possible use of nuclear arms. The
insecurity of this super power was a matter of concern for all. This
insecurity could also be felt in Moscow. It coincided with increased
criticism of the economic and social policies of the CPSU. The leaders of
the other Eastern European states, members of the Warsaw Pact, were amongst
those who were becoming vocal in their criticism.
The most significant factor which was to sound the death knell for
perestroika was the explosion of ethnic and nationalist tension within the
USSR itself. IN January 1990, thousands of Azeris protested near to the
Soviet border with Iran. A few days later the Lithuanian communist party
ratified Lithuania's independence. On the 11th of January, Armenia exercised
its right to veto Soviet legislation, following the example of the Baltic
states. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaidjan over Nagorni Karabakh
continues to escalate. Protests and tension began to make themselves felt in
Moldova and Tadzhikistan. These were clearly not individual phenomena but
symptoms of the general collapse of the USSR.
On the 7th of February 1990, the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted
in essence the idea of a multi-party political system as the basis for the
creation of democratic socialism. In February and March during the local
government elections the established nomenclature lost many senior positions
in favour of independent and largely unknown new leaders. A little later,
V.Landsbergis was elected as the first non-communist president of a Soviet
republic. From this moment on the process of collapse began to accelerate.
Gorbachev had clearly begun to lose control of events. After 1989 the rate
of change was no longer being dictated by Gorbachev or his entourage. On the
other hand it must be appreciated that Gorbachev did not give in to the
temptations or the suggestions to halt the reform process with the help of
the army.[22]
By the middle of 1990 it was already evident that the three Baltic
republics would achieve full independence. The next great challenge came
from Kiev where the Ukraine, on the 16th February, also declared its
independence. In August another group of Soviet republics declared their
independence. Gorbachev was left the with the only alternative of proposing
a new union of independent republics. His suggestion to reorganise his
cabinet to include the leaders of all 15 republics showed that even as late
as November 1990 the central Soviet leadership was unaware of the real pace
of the reform processes and their real scale and power. In December
Kirgizia, the last remaining 15th republic declared its independence.
During the period (November--December 1990) the opposition against
Gorbachev had begun to increase and he was forced to make compromises. In
December 1990 he was forced to dismiss some of his most loyal allies and
supporters of the reform process. On the 2nd of December the Minister of the
Interior was replaced by Boris Pugo and on the 26th of December Gorbachev
put forward Genadiy Yanaev for the post of Vice-President of the Union. I do
not believe that it would be a contravention of political ethics I if were
to share my personal impressions from the meeting I had with Genadiy Yanaev
the day after he was elected to the post of the Vice-President of the USSR.
From my conversation with him it soon became clear that the election of
Yanaev was a return of those forces which desired the stabilisation of the
situation, the preservation of the USSR, more hard-line politics and a
desire to use the position of Gorbachev to achieve these aims.
In the same month, December 1990, the head of the KGB, V.Kriuchkov
began to become more vocal and to increase the authority of his position by
officially proclaiming the time-worn slogans of the danger posed by the CIA
and that the KGB was prepared to fight against any anti-communist forces. On
the other hand, one must not forget the exceptional foresight and shrewdness
of the foreign minister of the time, Edward Shevardnadze, who warned of the
imminent possibility of dictatorship. During the entire period of 1991
Gorbachev was forced to manoeuvre between these influences, hoping to
preserve the Soviet Union and to continue his line of paced reform within
the ideology of perestroika, albeit in an new form.
When I look back and analyse the events of those days, I find it
impossible not to believe that the conflict which took place at the end of
1990 was impossible for two major factors: on the one hand, the increased
rate of the disintegration of the Soviet state via the development of
democratic and completely independent movements in all the former Soviet
republics while on the other -- the threats to the interests of the ruling
elite and the increased activity of the majority of the Soviet leadership
aimed at the preservation of the status quo.
And so we arrive at the attempted coup of the 19th of August 1991. One
question begs to be answered: Did Gorbachev and other proponents of
perestroika know of the imminent coup and its scale? I do not believe so, at
least in terms of specifics. They could not have failed to have seen the
storm on the horizon or have felt the potential danger, but nothing more. On
the 16th of August A.Yakovliev warned that a coup was being prepared in
Russia, but this was more of a political conclusion than information based
on specific facts. A month later, on the 15[th] of September I
had a long conversation in Moscow with Yakovliev and Shevernadze. My
profound conviction from these talks is that they had both had a foreboding
of the events but had not believed that it could take place so quickly. I
feel that Gorbachev was of the same opinion. They had not believed for
example that the minister of defence, D. Yazov, could be involved in such a
plot. They had not believed that the entire council of ministers of the USSR
would be so willing to reject the new Treaty of Union to replace to the USSR
with a Confederation of Independent States. Of course, there were many
inexplicable occurrences during the course of the attempted coup, but that
is the way of politics. Large-scale change is often connected with many
inexplicable events when the momentary psychological or physical conditions
of an individual or group of individuals can be of decisive significance for
events.
The intention of the leaders of the coup was to carry replace Gorbachev
quietly, or at least to put him out of the way in reserve. Yanaev,
Kriuchkov, Pavlov[23] and others had evidently been in favour of
the maximum flexibility in the change of power with the eventual gradual
restoration of the Soviet regime. Gorbachev had to be convinced to withdraw
for reasons of illness or nervous exhaustion or to come into line with the
leaders of the coup and to "cure" himself of his illusions. There were clear
analogies with the coup of August 1991 and the removal of Khrushchev from
power in October 1964 -- a statement regarding the illness of the leader,
putting the troops on alert along with a declaration that they would not be
used as an elementary attempted to pacify the people and international
society.
There were, however, enormous differences between 1991 and 1964.
Underestimating these differences was one of the biggest mistakes the
leaders of the coup made. In August 1991 the Russian nation and in
particular the Russian intelligentsia were of a completely different state
of mind. Their thirst for and their experiences of freedom were stronger
than any more primitive feelings for preserving the status quo.
Notwithstanding economic difficulties, masses of the Soviet people had
experienced the taste of free life. Although perestroika in terms of
strategy and tactics was already bankrupt, it had lead to profound changes
in the way of thinking of wide ranging social groups. The 19th of August was
the litmus test which in reality showed what had been achieved by Gorbachev.
Perestroika had not only unleashed the will of the people but had also given
it the self-confidence not to heed what was said to them "from above".
Shortly after the attempted coup the rock group, "The Scorpions"
released their hit "The Winds of Change", dedicated to those who had
thwarted the coup. Indeed, this wind came from the heart of the reformed
Soviet society, from the new spirit cultivated by perestroika.
On the day after the coup, on the 20th of August, several hundred
thousand demonstrators protested against it in St.Petersburg, thousands
surrounded the White House. Huge demonstrations were organised in the larger
towns of Russia. Major sections of the Russian army refused to carry out the
orders of leaders of the coup or take any decisive actions. On the evening
of the 20th of August it was already becoming apparent that the
self-proclaimed "Committee of salvation" had lost control over the
situation. At that moment the leaders of the coup had two choices: either to
declare a bloody civil war with no predictable outcome or to sound the
retreat.
In the final outcome, the coup was thwarted by the decisive actions of
Boris Yeltsin and his supporters, but also by the millions of ordinary
Russian people who were unwilling to make compromises with their
consciences, the generals and officers whose thoughts and deeds were not
limited by party interests and remained loyal to their exalted mission. I
will never forget my telephone conversation at that time with Edward
Shevernadze. At the time of the conversation the outcome of the conflict was
far from clear. Despite this I felt in him not only his decisiveness to
engage in the struggle, but also a clear feeling of responsibility to avoid
the unthinkable -- to avoid a civil war or a large-scale thermo-nuclear war.
I feel tempted to write that not only in the USSR but in other countries as
well the driving forces of change were the standard bearers of the emergent
new civilisation. Many of them, perhaps still unconsciously, other, thinking
with the criteria of world progress, and yet others since they had just had
enough of thinking the way other people wanted them to think.
The 19th of August 1991 was the real date of the end of perestroika and
the start of new beginnings in the process of economic and political reforms
in the USSR. The collapse of the coup meant, in practice, the collapse of
the major forces which were holding up the reform process. It meant
something else as well: together with the ban on the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and the dismissal of the Council of Ministers, the arrest of
the conspirators the main it resulted in the removal of the main
institutions of power which until that moment had held the USSR together.
Making the most of this moment, in the days following the failed coup, the
former Soviet republics confirmed their announcements of independence. The
new union treaty of which the leaders of the coup had been so frightened and
which would have saved the Union was forgotten. The new directly elected
president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, began a series of direct contacts with
the leaders of the former Soviet republics and with only a few months
withdrew the prerogatives of the centralised Soviet ministries. This in
reality meant the collapse of the USSR and the passing of its basic rights
and obligations into the domain of the Russian republic.
After coming to terms with the huge public support for the actions of
Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned in 1991.[24] This was
the end of a significant period in the history of the nations of the former
USSR. As paradoxical as it may seem, this period also marked the beginning
of a new era in the development of the world. The collapse of one of the two
superpowers meant in practice the collapse of the bi-polar world and
together with this the structures which were typical of the Third
Civilisation.
5. THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE
The radical changes within Eastern Europe during the period between
1989 and 1990 were the first part of the universal political restructuring
of the world order.
These changes began as a huge emotional outpouring soon to be followed
by enormous problems and disappointments.
A
number of experts on the subject believe that the changes in the
Eastern Europe were the result of understandings reached by Gorbachev and
Reagan at their numerous meetings, in particular in Malta. My personal
opinion is that these processes could not have come about as the result of
any agreement. The changes were a result of the growth in self-confidence of
the Eastern European peoples as a consequence of perestroika, of the
confidence in the influence of the democratic movements and the feeling that
Gorbachev and his entourage were losing control over power.
The extent of the influence of the reforms which took place in the USSR
after 1985 on the countries in Eastern Europe was enormous. In Bulgaria, for
example, whose language is very close to Russian, the most popular
newspapers between 1986 and 1989 were not Bulgarian but Soviet. The spirit
of perestroika, the revelations of truths about the past, the constant
reminders that the Utopias of the totalitarian regimes were bankrupt lead to
enormous changes in people's attitudes and prepared the way for the
beginning of the explosion. Despite differences in scale and methods, all
the "socialist" countries of Eastern Europe began to give birth to new civil
movements and the growth in free expression and the desire for profound
reforms.
On the 6th of March 1989 the speaker of the Soviet foreign ministry,
Gerasimov, announced that the future of every Eastern European country lay
in its own hands. In this way he officially dismissed the Brezhnev doctrine
which guaranteed the control of Moscow over all its Eastern European
satellites. There is no doubt that Gorbachev had given prior notice of this
announcement to his Western partners. From this moment on, events unfolded
at an unbelievable pace.
In May 1989 the Hungarian government dominated by reformist communists
opened its border with Austria and allowed thousands of citizens from the
former German Democratic Republic to travel to West Germany. A little later
the Polish trade union "Solidarity" achieved a decisive victory in the
elections to the Senate and part of the lower chamber of the Polish Sejm.
Moscow accepted these events calmly, thus proving that it had indeed
accepted a new policy towards Eastern Europe. On the 7th of July at a summit
meeting of the Warsaw pact countries in Bucharest, Gorbachev declared that
all the members of the pact were at liberty to chose their own paths.
What was the objective of the Soviet leadership in relation to its
former allies?
Analysing the experience of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and a
number of other Eastern European countries of this period, I believe that
between the spring and summer of 1989 Gorbachev had begun to apply a policy
based on two main theses: first of all -- the rejection of the "Brezhnev
doctrine" on the limitation of sovereignty and allowing greater freedom to
the governments of the relevant countries; secondly -- the replacement of
the old leaderships with new, more pragmatic leaders and the preservation of
the Soviet zone of influence on the basis on new alliances and treaties.
This, however, involved the same theoretical and practical problem as in the
Soviet Union. On the one hand, Gorbachev wanted to give greater freedom and
to support the reform processes within the Eastern European communist
parties. On the other hand, he could or would not comprehend the scale of
the explosion, the fuse of which he had lighted himself. The reform
processes resembled an uncorked bottle of champagne rather than a
well-thought out scheme. After liberation of their spirits, the people would
no longer accept leaders imposed upon them from above and pouring out onto
the streets and squares they demonstrated new power and self-confidence.
After the summit meeting in Bucharest in July 1989 events unfolded like
a chain reaction. On the 7th of October Gorbachev directly influenced the
beginning of reforms in the DDR and on the 18th of October Erik Honneker was
replaced by Egon Krenz. A few days later the Berlin wall came down. On the
10th of November the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, was replaced
by Petar Mladenov, who was favoured by the Soviet leadership. At the end of
November and the beginning of December after mass unrest in Prague, a new
government was formed consisting mainly of non-communists and on the 29th of
December Vaclav Havel became the first non-communist president from more
that 40 years. During the last few days of December the Rumanian dictator
and his wife were killed after a military coup and a hastily improvised
trial.
From the point of view of the history of the Eastern European nations
these changes had enormous significance. They followed the logic of the
analogous changes which were taking place within the USSR, but rapidly
overtook them in terms of their speed and depth. Apart from the universal
elements of the crisis within the USSR there were the additional factors of
the struggle and aspirations of the smaller Eastern European nations for
complete sovereignty and independence. This also helps to explain the more
radical nature of the changes which took place within them.
From a global point of view the explosion in Eastern Europe was the
first phase of the larger geo-political changes and the creation of a new
world order. The changes in Moscow, Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Budapest and
Bucharest, together with the collapse of the USSR can be determined as the
beginning of the collapse of the Third Civilisation. The military and
political alliances of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were rendered pointless.
The political map of Europe had changed beyond recognition.
The democratic changes in Eastern Europe could have taken place in a
different way but they could not have been avoided. The changes were a
consequence of the crisis of the totalitarian regimes, their inability to
adapt to the large technological and political changes in the world and the
requirements of the new age. The administrative coercion of the one-party
system and the repression of private economic initiative were shown to be
historical mistakes.
Only history will decide what would have been best for the world --
either the "Chinese" model of reform by placing priority on economic reform,
or the "velvet revolutions" which in reality took place. I have to say
personally, that not only in Bulgaria but in most of the other Eastern
European countries very few people believed in the rapid demise of the USSR
before 1989. No-one could believe that a super power such as the USSR could
allow itself to reject its global privileges or that the leader of such a
super power would voluntarily "concede" his "conquests" without wanting
anything in return.
And now, looking back to the facts of 5--6 years ago, I can see for
myself yet again, that the changes in Eastern Europe were not thought out
beforehand, not were they carried out effectively from a regional or global
point of view. The West was carried away with the "ideological" ecstasy that
communism was on its way out. In the Eastern European countries themselves
the nature of the changes was motivated mainly by internal conflicts and
clashes. In some Eastern European countries restorationalists got the upper
hand, with aspirations to restore to themselves the pre-war rights they had
lost. Radical change from strong state regulation to radical liberalism had
its destructive consequences. It was clear that in this way the Eastern
European countries would undergo a long period of instability and a slow
adaptation to the European Community.
From a positive point of view, the most important consequences of the
changes in Eastern Europe were the destruction of internal obstructions to
world integration and the creation of the new structures of the global
world. At the same time the discovery of new virgin territory for world
globalisation was far from promising world harmony. Realisation was soon to
come in the West that the belief in the final victory of world capitalism
was wrong. In the East internal conflicts continued. New solutions had to be
found while the common crisis persisted...
6. RETURN TO A DIFFICULT FUTURE
Was the return to power of the former Eastern European socialist
parties a logical
stage in development? There is a common reason for this. It was a
confirmation
of the thesis that the political process is not a series of
happenstances but is rather
governed by a definite logical process.
A
fter the series of mainly "gentle" revolutions in Eastern Europe in
1989 and 1990 and the changes which took place later in the USSR, the period
between 1993 and 1995 was marked by a series of elections in which the
former communist parties (or their political successors) were returned to
power. In Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia the former
communists won categorical victories at the polls. In December this was
repeated in Russia by the communist party lead by G.Zuganov. In Rumania and
Yugoslavia the former communists never actually left power. This gave rise
to the question which is not uppermost in the minds of modern thinkers and
politicians: was this return to power of the ex-communist parties a logical
stage in development?
I have to admit that during the five or six years of the reform process
many of these parties did undergo profound changes. They accepted the values
of democracy and pluralism and changed their platforms. In contrast to the
newly-formed parties of anti-communists, democrats and liberals they had
well organised party structures and people faithful to them in all sectors
of economic power. Some of these parties together with the structures of the
former state security organisations had been preparing themselves for
pluralism and opposition politics as early as the period of perestroika.
Economic domination, the creation of their own "loyal" dissident and
political circles, the infiltration of trusted members into the newly-formed
anti-communist parties - all this was undoubtedly well planned and had a
strong influence on the political situation.
The most important reason for the return of the ex-communist parties to
power, in my opinion, can be found in the nature of the totalitarian system
and the logical stages in its change. What I referred to earlier as the
"mistake" of Gorbachev was also decisive here. The new democratic, radical
and liberal forces came to the forefront riding high on the wave of
political reform. E.Gaidar and A.Chubais in Russia, L.Balzerovic in Polish
and Y.Antal in Hungary all became symbols of the reform. All the reformers,
however, were faced with the same problem - while political changes could be
carried out radically and quickly, economic reform required time, trained
specialists and techniques specifically designed for the transition from
extreme centralism to a market economy. The "phased" discrepancies between
economic and political changes caused economic difficulties, serious
political clashes and crime.
The explosion of emotions and anti-communism of the autumn of 1989 and
during the period between 1990-1991 succeeded in alienating the former
administrative and economic elite from the new democrats. Their more or less
forced removal from ministries and state factories provided them with
significant opportunities in the private sector where they acted in close
cooperation with tens of thousands of well-trained experts from the former
state security organisations. The only way for the new democratic forces to
control the economic forces was to get them on their side, as happened in
the Czech republic. Elsewhere where pragmatism was replaced with virulent
anti-communism, the new political forces were unable to control the economic
sector sufficiently to carry out large-scale reforms. The economic forces,
banks, factories and the private sector, in general remained in the hands of
people trained by the former totalitarian regime.
The second important reason was the disappointment of the population.
One group of the population had benefitted from a series of social
privileges and guarantees under the totalitarian regime. By supporting the
reforms between 1989 and 1990 many of these people expected a rapid solution
to the problems which they were experiencing and not the chaos, crime and
fall in living standards and production which in reality ensued.
Unfortunately, as a result of the delays in economic reform during the
period of perestroika and the clashes with the harsh reality of the open
world economy these hopes remain unfulfilled. Bulgaria did not become a
Balkan Switzerland, as some of its leaders promised, nor did Rumania become
France. Quite the contrary, the populations of the Eastern European
countries had to come to terms with the unwelcome news that they produced
little, consumed much more and had to reverse this ratio by 180 percent.
For these reasons in 1992 almost all the Eastern European countries
experienced a profound change in social attitudes. The political elite who
had been in power from 1989-1990 were forced to realise in terror that their
sleepless nights, the titanic struggle and reforms were now considered by
many as mistaken. Of course, it should be added that many of the new
democrats did in fact make many mistakes. In the long run the radical nature
of the economic reforms in the period between 1989 and 1990 and the delay in
implementing economic reforms led to the political equilibrium being upset.
Sooner or later it had to be restored. A significant percentage of the
population in Eastern Europe had become impoverished and disappointed. They
preferred to vote for the former communist parties seeing in them hope for
the restoration of the social benefits which they had lost.
However, can the reformed communists live up to these expectations? The
answer is a conditional "no", or a partial "no". The condition is that they
undertake a flexible policy of reform aimed at the widest possible social
strata of society. Due to the legislative changes which have been
undertaken, any return to the past is unlikely, although to a certain extent
still possible, mainly in Russia. There still remains the difficult path of
peaceful reforms needed to achieve successful economic policies. For this
reason the return of the ex-communist parties is a return to a difficult
future. It will not halt the global processes of integration, nor will it
delay the processes of moving towards new, civilising social relations.
After the battle of Waterloo at the beginning of the 19th century, the
processes of restoration in France looked inexorable and many believed in
it. However, it was to be seen that once the seeds of revolutionary ideas
had been sown, it was to be very difficult to destroy them, the freedoms
that had been won could not be taken away. Such is the case with the return
of the ex-communist parties to power. They will either have to adapt to the
new civilising realities or they will thrown onto the scrapheap of history.
For the ex-communist parties of Hungary and Poland this will be easier,
their ideological reformation began a long time before they came back to
power. For the Bulgarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy in
Rumania this will be more difficult.
Whatever the outcome, the reflected processes of global transition in
Eastern Europe will not be smooth. As a reaction to the errors and the
collapse of perestroika politics went too far to the right and then turned
sharply to the left. The realities of life will put the former socialist
parties to the test. Some of them will rise to the challenge and some will
fall victim to the contradiction of their own ideological contradictions,
while still others will collapse under the pressure of vested interests.
Whether the New Civilisation will accept them is a matter that the future
will show us.
Chapter Three
COLLAPSE II: GLOBAL DISORDER
1. THE DANGER OF CHAOS
Ever change of epoch takes place in the context of conflict and
disorder.
The crisis in the East is just the first phase of the changes in the
present global political order. The second phase will take place in the West
and Far East...
T
he universal processes of globalisation and the collapse of the Eastern
European regimes have given rise to a whole series of unfamiliar phenomena.
Humanity has entered a new phase of development marked by the huge and
growing level of mutual interdependence between people, nations and
cultures. The global order based on the principles of bi-polarism of two
super powers and which had dominated since the Second World War has been
destroyed. To a large extent the way in which the Eastern European regimes
collapsed lead to this state of chaos firstly in their own countries and
later in international economic and political relations. I define chaos as a
universal crisis of the spiritual and value systems, the rejection of
certain standards of global intercourse and the instability of others, as a
period of relative disorder leading to change in the world order.
The first phase of this chaos began in 1989--1900 with the collapse of
the Eastern European regimes and the economic and military organisations in
this part of the world. The dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in
the space of a few months led to chaos in economic relations within Eastern
Europe. The mutual export of goods between the former members of these
organisations fell sharply. Almost all the countries in the region lost
their markets and the stability of their industrial structures was all but
destroyed. Later this was followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. A number of ethnic conflicts flared up, some of
which developed into full-scale wars. For the three years between 1990--1993
the region was in absolute chaos.
I believe that this first stage will be followed by a second, very
important stage of changes. This second stage, which has already begun is
affecting the larger Western powers and their mutual relations, with new
roles and positions being assumed by the Asian states and the acceptance of
new principles in international economic and cultural relations and with
formation of new institutions for the regulations of global processes etc..
Some of them will want to preserve the status quo and their position of
dominance, while others will want to prove old theories. However, there is
only one truth: the post-war global order has lost a number of its main
foundations. Humanity has entered a transitionary period from the bi-polar
model to a new, unfamiliar global structure. The universal crisis of the
post-war political model had caused and continues to cause the general
collapse of contacts and relations wwhich will be of great significance for
further development.
There are two interrelated factors which are of influence on the
processes which are taking place: globalisation as a fundamental and
continuous phenomenon and the crisis in Eastern Europe which was provoked by
globalisation and which at the same time has accelerated its pace. The
problem, however, is that no-one, or almost no-one was prepared for what
happened - neither the collapse of the iron curtain, nor the consequences of
the new drive towards globalisation and its side effects.
I want to speak of the dangers posed by chaos and general disorder
mainly because after the collapse of the Eastern European regimes not one of
the factors which caused the universal crisis of contemporary civilisation
has dissappeared entirely.The deformations of economic growth remain and
global ecological problems have yet to be solved. After the renewal of
nuclear tests, albeit tactical, by France in September 1995 no-one any
outrages of Stalinism.
Now, looking back on the documents and facts of this period, it can be
seen that Gorbachev did not have a plan for global action. He had not
imagined that perestroika would cause such global transformations. The
General Secretary of the CPSU was motivated by the idea of strengthening
Soviet society and socialism, rather than overthrowing the culture and
system of a waning civilisation. This "provinciality" in his attitude to a
global power, such as the USSR was, is quite evident in his thousands of
speeches and articles of the time, however, it is also proof of the lack of
the global responsibility necessary for the leader of one of the two super
powers.[21]
Gorbachev had two options. The first of these was to give priority to
economic reforms (similar to Hungary and China) with simultaneous guarantees
of centralised power followed by the gradual implementation of political
reforms. The second option was to introduce political reforms followed by
economic reforms. If he had opted for the first option he would have had
further opportunities for global influence, but he did not and plunged the
USSR into a network of internal conflicts.
From the speeches made by Gorbachev between 1985 and 1986 it can be
seen that he did not underestimate economic reform and wanted to find a way
of implementing reform both in the economy and in politics. It is, however,
clear that Gorbachev and his allies were thinking on their feet and that
they did not have a clear action plan suitable for universal, global change.
The political campaigns began to take a hold but economic reforms tended to
falter in their tracks. The simultaneous implementation of economic and
political reforms in actual fact gave weight to the latter. As Gorbachev
announced the policy of Glasnost and began to reveal the truth about the
past, he put the authority of the party apparatus under threat and accepted
the enormous challenge of political reforms and the divisive inner-party
conflicts. The beginning of "perestroika" through the policy of "glasnost"
in essence meant the priority of political reform over economic reform. This
fact was of decisive significance for the fate of the USSR and Eastern
Europe and the whole world. If Gorbachev had delayed political reform and
had placed the accent on the economy, this would not have lead so rapidly to
the chaotic collapse of the Eastern European systems and the USSR. Such a
transition would not have lead to the explosion of nationalism and dozens of
local wars and conflicts. The Eastern European nations would not have become
a burden for the developed Western European nations and there would not have
been the need for billions of dollars in financial aid.
Gorbachev's choice was not the result of a deliberately thought-out
plan but rather the result of circumstances. However, having opted for a
model of change, sooner rather than later local conflicts and the collapse
of Eastern European structures were inevitable. Of the reasons for such a
denouement, one is of particular significance. The integrated nature of the
totalitarian system was totally reliant on the centralised nature of power.
In contrast to market economies where people are linked by an enormous
number of horizontal connections independent of the central power, in a
totalitarian economy social integration is maintained via central state
institutions. This applies not only to economic entities but also to ethnic
groups and the structures of information exchange and culture.
Rapid reforms to the system of political authority without economic
foundations within a totalitarian society by definition pose a risk of the
entire system collapsing in chaos. Imagine factories which are accustomed to
receiving materials allocated to them by the central planning institutions.
The destruction of this institution or change within the political or
administrative system allows the factories to sell to whom they want and to
ignore whom they want. The result of this is that at one fell swoop
thousands and millions of economic bonds are severed and the chaos becomes
unimaginable.
This was also the case in the area of international relations. Under
totalitarianism many national groups were able to co-exist peacefully within
the order imposed from above and any conflicts between them were
cosmetically concealed. However, these peoples peoples lacked sufficient
horizontal economic and cultural bonds as for example is the case with the
various nationalities inhabiting Switzerland. After the collapse of the
central power, nations which had until the previous day been good neighbours
began to divide up territories, power, money and in many cases opened up the
way for armed conflict with tanks and weapons.
Whether Gorbachev understood the scale of the emerging crisis is a
question of some doubt. What is clear, however, is that during this period
economic reforms made no progress, whereas political reforms began to give
rise to greater and greater conflicts. In January 1987, a little more than a
month after the release of Sakharov from internal exile, Mikhail Gorbachev
laid before the Central Committee of the CPSU a series of measures aimed at
political reform. These included secret ballots with multiple candidates and
the election of non-communists to senior state posts, participation of
employees in the election of directors at their place of work, the reduction
of state ownership in favour of cooperative ownership and so on. This was
not only a direct and decisive blow to the party apparatus and its vested
interests, but also to the power structure itself. After this plenum
feelings of opposition to perestroika began to make themselves felt. The
indignation of the party apparatus was total and reactions became more and
more overt. However, the inertia of change was too great to be stopped. In
1987 a process of political rehabilitation of intellectuals repressed by
Stalin began and the first timid steps were being made towards the opening
of private cooperative shops.
In the same year, which I consider the zenith of the perestroika, a
number of serious problems began to manifest themselves. Most significant of
these was the fact that "perestroika" had given practically no positive
economic results and had not alleviated the problems faced by ordinary
people. The successes which were being achieved in the medium range arms
negotiations were having less and less influence on the public opinion.
People were more concerned with the lack of goods in the shops. In October
1987 the first nationalist conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaidjan flared
up. This was the beginning of the general crisis in national relations
within the USSR. At the same time a number of diverse, but well organised,
opposition groups began to appear within the Soviet leadership. On the one
hand, both within the Central Committee of the CPSU and outside it the
opposition to Gorbachev's reforms was becoming more vocal and aimed at the
preservation of the status quo of single party power and the totalitarian
system. On the other hand, in October 1987, Boris Yeltsin made official
accusations against Gorbachev and Ligachev, marking the beginning of a
political movement aimed at more radical and liberal reforms.
From this moment on Gorbachev was obliged to strike a balance between
these two groups which limited his flexibility and making his action seems
more contradictory. The General Secretary was neither able to turn back,
which would have marked the end of his career and perestroika, nor was he
free enough to make sufficient intensive progress. Gorbachev had already
surpassed Khrushchev but was not safe from the same fate.
In November 1988, Estonia declared its independence and the right of
the Supreme Council of Estonia to veto laws passed by the Soviet parliament.
Mass independence movements began in Lithuania and Latvia. The ethnic
tension between Armenia and Azerbaidjan continued. In this situation, on the
7th of December 1988, Gorbachev announced to the UN that the Soviet army
would be reduced by half a million and the pull-out of Soviet troops from
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany began. The Soviet leader called for
a new world order. This was his biggest tactical mistake. He realised his
global responsibility too late. When Gorbachev finally understood his
decisive significance in international reform and in general, as well as the
fate of perestroika,he had already lost his power.
4. THE COLLAPSE OF PERESTROIKA
The collapse of perestroika in 1991 had been foreseen as early as the
end of 1988.
With the conflicts which ensued, it will be evaluated by modern
historians as a process filled with contradictions. On the other hand, it
opened the floodgates to new opportunities for progress and history in the
long-term will appreciate as the catalyst for the advent
of the new civilisation.
I
shall take a more detailed look at the changes which took place in
Eastern Europe not only because since I lived through them personally but
because I am convinced of the fact that the events of 1986--1991 will affect
our fate for many years to come. 1989 and 1990 were years of the gradual
"fiasco" of perestroika as a line of evolutionary change within the
totalitarian system. Its collapse took several forms. Firstly -- the
complete failure of economic reforms and, consequently, the reduced support
for perestroika on the part of the Soviet people. Secondly -- allowing the
local inter-ethnic conflicts to get out of hand and the consequent explosion
of ethnic self-confidence and demands. Thirdly -- the collapse of the
Eastern European political and military alliances and the severance of ties
between the Eastern European nations and Moscow.
As early as the beginning of January 1989 the majority of Soviet
republics began to pass a series of new laws establishing their own
languages as the official language of the republic. In March of the same
year in the first free elections for the Congress of the People's Deputies
the nationalist movements in the Baltic Republics won the absolute majority.
In May, Lithuania and Estonia and in July Latvia, in spite of Moscow's
displeasure, passed a law, declaring their independence. The question arose
of the fate of the USSR, its integrity and unity and the future of the
central leadership. This was, indeed, Gorbachev's most serious ordeal and
the precursor of the final collapse of perestroika. The opposition of the
neo-communists within the Soviet leadership was a powerful force in favour
of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union and hard-line policies.
The potential collapse of the Soviet Union was unacceptable for the
Moscow elite, mainly for ideological reasons. It is not to be underestimated
that for 70 years millions of people in the former USSR were absolutely
convinced of the need for its existence and of the idea and meaning of the
Soviet system. No less important is the fact that the collapse of the USSR
was de facto to signify the demise of all the higher leadership posts. In
1990 and 1991 such a possibility instilled feelings of insecurity in the
Soviet elite. Tens of thousands of senior civil servants, amongst them
leading figures in the Moscow government, were threatened with losing their
jobs.
There is another side to the question which has to be considered. The
majority of the world political elite considered the potential collapse of
the USSR as a complex and possibly dangerous issue. From my direct personal
conversations with senior politicians in the USA, France, Germany and
Austria and other countries and from indirect political analyses, I have the
impression that in 1990 and 1991 only the minority of them were in favour of
a collapse of the USSR. The world was concerned about the appearance of new
nuclear powers such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and the potential of
large-scale military conflict with the possible use of nuclear arms. The
insecurity of this super power was a matter of concern for all. This
insecurity could also be felt in Moscow. It coincided with increased
criticism of the economic and social policies of the CPSU. The leaders of
the other Eastern European states, members of the Warsaw Pact, were amongst
those who were becoming vocal in their criticism.
The most significant factor which was to sound the death knell for
perestroika was the explosion of ethnic and nationalist tension within the
USSR itself. IN January 1990, thousands of Azeris protested near to the
Soviet border with Iran. A few days later the Lithuanian communist party
ratified Lithuania's independence. On the 11th of January, Armenia exercised
its right to veto Soviet legislation, following the example of the Baltic
states. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaidjan over Nagorni Karabakh
continues to escalate. Protests and tension began to make themselves felt in
Moldova and Tadzhikistan. These were clearly not individual phenomena but
symptoms of the general collapse of the USSR.
On the 7th of February 1990, the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted
in essence the idea of a multi-party political system as the basis for the
creation of democratic socialism. In February and March during the local
government elections the established nomenclature lost many senior positions
in favour of independent and largely unknown new leaders. A little later,
V.Landsbergis was elected as the first non-communist president of a Soviet
republic. From this moment on the process of collapse began to accelerate.
Gorbachev had clearly begun to lose control of events. After 1989 the rate
of change was no longer being dictated by Gorbachev or his entourage. On the
other hand it must be appreciated that Gorbachev did not give in to the
temptations or the suggestions to halt the reform process with the help of
the army.[22]
By the middle of 1990 it was already evident that the three Baltic
republics would achieve full independence. The next great challenge came
from Kiev where the Ukraine, on the 16th February, also declared its
independence. In August another group of Soviet republics declared their
independence. Gorbachev was left the with the only alternative of proposing
a new union of independent republics. His suggestion to reorganise his
cabinet to include the leaders of all 15 republics showed that even as late
as November 1990 the central Soviet leadership was unaware of the real pace
of the reform processes and their real scale and power. In December
Kirgizia, the last remaining 15th republic declared its independence.
During the period (November--December 1990) the opposition against
Gorbachev had begun to increase and he was forced to make compromises. In
December 1990 he was forced to dismiss some of his most loyal allies and
supporters of the reform process. On the 2nd of December the Minister of the
Interior was replaced by Boris Pugo and on the 26th of December Gorbachev
put forward Genadiy Yanaev for the post of Vice-President of the Union. I do
not believe that it would be a contravention of political ethics I if were
to share my personal impressions from the meeting I had with Genadiy Yanaev
the day after he was elected to the post of the Vice-President of the USSR.
From my conversation with him it soon became clear that the election of
Yanaev was a return of those forces which desired the stabilisation of the
situation, the preservation of the USSR, more hard-line politics and a
desire to use the position of Gorbachev to achieve these aims.
In the same month, December 1990, the head of the KGB, V.Kriuchkov
began to become more vocal and to increase the authority of his position by
officially proclaiming the time-worn slogans of the danger posed by the CIA
and that the KGB was prepared to fight against any anti-communist forces. On
the other hand, one must not forget the exceptional foresight and shrewdness
of the foreign minister of the time, Edward Shevardnadze, who warned of the
imminent possibility of dictatorship. During the entire period of 1991
Gorbachev was forced to manoeuvre between these influences, hoping to
preserve the Soviet Union and to continue his line of paced reform within
the ideology of perestroika, albeit in an new form.
When I look back and analyse the events of those days, I find it
impossible not to believe that the conflict which took place at the end of
1990 was impossible for two major factors: on the one hand, the increased
rate of the disintegration of the Soviet state via the development of
democratic and completely independent movements in all the former Soviet
republics while on the other -- the threats to the interests of the ruling
elite and the increased activity of the majority of the Soviet leadership
aimed at the preservation of the status quo.
And so we arrive at the attempted coup of the 19th of August 1991. One
question begs to be answered: Did Gorbachev and other proponents of
perestroika know of the imminent coup and its scale? I do not believe so, at
least in terms of specifics. They could not have failed to have seen the
storm on the horizon or have felt the potential danger, but nothing more. On
the 16th of August A.Yakovliev warned that a coup was being prepared in
Russia, but this was more of a political conclusion than information based
on specific facts. A month later, on the 15[th] of September I
had a long conversation in Moscow with Yakovliev and Shevernadze. My
profound conviction from these talks is that they had both had a foreboding
of the events but had not believed that it could take place so quickly. I
feel that Gorbachev was of the same opinion. They had not believed for
example that the minister of defence, D. Yazov, could be involved in such a
plot. They had not believed that the entire council of ministers of the USSR
would be so willing to reject the new Treaty of Union to replace to the USSR
with a Confederation of Independent States. Of course, there were many
inexplicable occurrences during the course of the attempted coup, but that
is the way of politics. Large-scale change is often connected with many
inexplicable events when the momentary psychological or physical conditions
of an individual or group of individuals can be of decisive significance for
events.
The intention of the leaders of the coup was to carry replace Gorbachev
quietly, or at least to put him out of the way in reserve. Yanaev,
Kriuchkov, Pavlov[23] and others had evidently been in favour of
the maximum flexibility in the change of power with the eventual gradual
restoration of the Soviet regime. Gorbachev had to be convinced to withdraw
for reasons of illness or nervous exhaustion or to come into line with the
leaders of the coup and to "cure" himself of his illusions. There were clear
analogies with the coup of August 1991 and the removal of Khrushchev from
power in October 1964 -- a statement regarding the illness of the leader,
putting the troops on alert along with a declaration that they would not be
used as an elementary attempted to pacify the people and international
society.
There were, however, enormous differences between 1991 and 1964.
Underestimating these differences was one of the biggest mistakes the
leaders of the coup made. In August 1991 the Russian nation and in
particular the Russian intelligentsia were of a completely different state
of mind. Their thirst for and their experiences of freedom were stronger
than any more primitive feelings for preserving the status quo.
Notwithstanding economic difficulties, masses of the Soviet people had
experienced the taste of free life. Although perestroika in terms of
strategy and tactics was already bankrupt, it had lead to profound changes
in the way of thinking of wide ranging social groups. The 19th of August was
the litmus test which in reality showed what had been achieved by Gorbachev.
Perestroika had not only unleashed the will of the people but had also given
it the self-confidence not to heed what was said to them "from above".
Shortly after the attempted coup the rock group, "The Scorpions"
released their hit "The Winds of Change", dedicated to those who had
thwarted the coup. Indeed, this wind came from the heart of the reformed
Soviet society, from the new spirit cultivated by perestroika.
On the day after the coup, on the 20th of August, several hundred
thousand demonstrators protested against it in St.Petersburg, thousands
surrounded the White House. Huge demonstrations were organised in the larger
towns of Russia. Major sections of the Russian army refused to carry out the
orders of leaders of the coup or take any decisive actions. On the evening
of the 20th of August it was already becoming apparent that the
self-proclaimed "Committee of salvation" had lost control over the
situation. At that moment the leaders of the coup had two choices: either to
declare a bloody civil war with no predictable outcome or to sound the
retreat.
In the final outcome, the coup was thwarted by the decisive actions of
Boris Yeltsin and his supporters, but also by the millions of ordinary
Russian people who were unwilling to make compromises with their
consciences, the generals and officers whose thoughts and deeds were not
limited by party interests and remained loyal to their exalted mission. I
will never forget my telephone conversation at that time with Edward
Shevernadze. At the time of the conversation the outcome of the conflict was
far from clear. Despite this I felt in him not only his decisiveness to
engage in the struggle, but also a clear feeling of responsibility to avoid
the unthinkable -- to avoid a civil war or a large-scale thermo-nuclear war.
I feel tempted to write that not only in the USSR but in other countries as
well the driving forces of change were the standard bearers of the emergent
new civilisation. Many of them, perhaps still unconsciously, other, thinking
with the criteria of world progress, and yet others since they had just had
enough of thinking the way other people wanted them to think.
The 19th of August 1991 was the real date of the end of perestroika and
the start of new beginnings in the process of economic and political reforms
in the USSR. The collapse of the coup meant, in practice, the collapse of
the major forces which were holding up the reform process. It meant
something else as well: together with the ban on the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and the dismissal of the Council of Ministers, the arrest of
the conspirators the main it resulted in the removal of the main
institutions of power which until that moment had held the USSR together.
Making the most of this moment, in the days following the failed coup, the
former Soviet republics confirmed their announcements of independence. The
new union treaty of which the leaders of the coup had been so frightened and
which would have saved the Union was forgotten. The new directly elected
president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, began a series of direct contacts with
the leaders of the former Soviet republics and with only a few months
withdrew the prerogatives of the centralised Soviet ministries. This in
reality meant the collapse of the USSR and the passing of its basic rights
and obligations into the domain of the Russian republic.
After coming to terms with the huge public support for the actions of
Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned in 1991.[24] This was
the end of a significant period in the history of the nations of the former
USSR. As paradoxical as it may seem, this period also marked the beginning
of a new era in the development of the world. The collapse of one of the two
superpowers meant in practice the collapse of the bi-polar world and
together with this the structures which were typical of the Third
Civilisation.
5. THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE
The radical changes within Eastern Europe during the period between
1989 and 1990 were the first part of the universal political restructuring
of the world order.
These changes began as a huge emotional outpouring soon to be followed
by enormous problems and disappointments.
A
number of experts on the subject believe that the changes in the
Eastern Europe were the result of understandings reached by Gorbachev and
Reagan at their numerous meetings, in particular in Malta. My personal
opinion is that these processes could not have come about as the result of
any agreement. The changes were a result of the growth in self-confidence of
the Eastern European peoples as a consequence of perestroika, of the
confidence in the influence of the democratic movements and the feeling that
Gorbachev and his entourage were losing control over power.
The extent of the influence of the reforms which took place in the USSR
after 1985 on the countries in Eastern Europe was enormous. In Bulgaria, for
example, whose language is very close to Russian, the most popular
newspapers between 1986 and 1989 were not Bulgarian but Soviet. The spirit
of perestroika, the revelations of truths about the past, the constant
reminders that the Utopias of the totalitarian regimes were bankrupt lead to
enormous changes in people's attitudes and prepared the way for the
beginning of the explosion. Despite differences in scale and methods, all
the "socialist" countries of Eastern Europe began to give birth to new civil
movements and the growth in free expression and the desire for profound
reforms.
On the 6th of March 1989 the speaker of the Soviet foreign ministry,
Gerasimov, announced that the future of every Eastern European country lay
in its own hands. In this way he officially dismissed the Brezhnev doctrine
which guaranteed the control of Moscow over all its Eastern European
satellites. There is no doubt that Gorbachev had given prior notice of this
announcement to his Western partners. From this moment on, events unfolded
at an unbelievable pace.
In May 1989 the Hungarian government dominated by reformist communists
opened its border with Austria and allowed thousands of citizens from the
former German Democratic Republic to travel to West Germany. A little later
the Polish trade union "Solidarity" achieved a decisive victory in the
elections to the Senate and part of the lower chamber of the Polish Sejm.
Moscow accepted these events calmly, thus proving that it had indeed
accepted a new policy towards Eastern Europe. On the 7th of July at a summit
meeting of the Warsaw pact countries in Bucharest, Gorbachev declared that
all the members of the pact were at liberty to chose their own paths.
What was the objective of the Soviet leadership in relation to its
former allies?
Analysing the experience of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and a
number of other Eastern European countries of this period, I believe that
between the spring and summer of 1989 Gorbachev had begun to apply a policy
based on two main theses: first of all -- the rejection of the "Brezhnev
doctrine" on the limitation of sovereignty and allowing greater freedom to
the governments of the relevant countries; secondly -- the replacement of
the old leaderships with new, more pragmatic leaders and the preservation of
the Soviet zone of influence on the basis on new alliances and treaties.
This, however, involved the same theoretical and practical problem as in the
Soviet Union. On the one hand, Gorbachev wanted to give greater freedom and
to support the reform processes within the Eastern European communist
parties. On the other hand, he could or would not comprehend the scale of
the explosion, the fuse of which he had lighted himself. The reform
processes resembled an uncorked bottle of champagne rather than a
well-thought out scheme. After liberation of their spirits, the people would
no longer accept leaders imposed upon them from above and pouring out onto
the streets and squares they demonstrated new power and self-confidence.
After the summit meeting in Bucharest in July 1989 events unfolded like
a chain reaction. On the 7th of October Gorbachev directly influenced the
beginning of reforms in the DDR and on the 18th of October Erik Honneker was
replaced by Egon Krenz. A few days later the Berlin wall came down. On the
10th of November the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, was replaced
by Petar Mladenov, who was favoured by the Soviet leadership. At the end of
November and the beginning of December after mass unrest in Prague, a new
government was formed consisting mainly of non-communists and on the 29th of
December Vaclav Havel became the first non-communist president from more
that 40 years. During the last few days of December the Rumanian dictator
and his wife were killed after a military coup and a hastily improvised
trial.
From the point of view of the history of the Eastern European nations
these changes had enormous significance. They followed the logic of the
analogous changes which were taking place within the USSR, but rapidly
overtook them in terms of their speed and depth. Apart from the universal
elements of the crisis within the USSR there were the additional factors of
the struggle and aspirations of the smaller Eastern European nations for
complete sovereignty and independence. This also helps to explain the more
radical nature of the changes which took place within them.
From a global point of view the explosion in Eastern Europe was the
first phase of the larger geo-political changes and the creation of a new
world order. The changes in Moscow, Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Budapest and
Bucharest, together with the collapse of the USSR can be determined as the
beginning of the collapse of the Third Civilisation. The military and
political alliances of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were rendered pointless.
The political map of Europe had changed beyond recognition.
The democratic changes in Eastern Europe could have taken place in a
different way but they could not have been avoided. The changes were a
consequence of the crisis of the totalitarian regimes, their inability to
adapt to the large technological and political changes in the world and the
requirements of the new age. The administrative coercion of the one-party
system and the repression of private economic initiative were shown to be
historical mistakes.
Only history will decide what would have been best for the world --
either the "Chinese" model of reform by placing priority on economic reform,
or the "velvet revolutions" which in reality took place. I have to say
personally, that not only in Bulgaria but in most of the other Eastern
European countries very few people believed in the rapid demise of the USSR
before 1989. No-one could believe that a super power such as the USSR could
allow itself to reject its global privileges or that the leader of such a
super power would voluntarily "concede" his "conquests" without wanting
anything in return.
And now, looking back to the facts of 5--6 years ago, I can see for
myself yet again, that the changes in Eastern Europe were not thought out
beforehand, not were they carried out effectively from a regional or global
point of view. The West was carried away with the "ideological" ecstasy that
communism was on its way out. In the Eastern European countries themselves
the nature of the changes was motivated mainly by internal conflicts and
clashes. In some Eastern European countries restorationalists got the upper
hand, with aspirations to restore to themselves the pre-war rights they had
lost. Radical change from strong state regulation to radical liberalism had
its destructive consequences. It was clear that in this way the Eastern
European countries would undergo a long period of instability and a slow
adaptation to the European Community.
From a positive point of view, the most important consequences of the
changes in Eastern Europe were the destruction of internal obstructions to
world integration and the creation of the new structures of the global
world. At the same time the discovery of new virgin territory for world
globalisation was far from promising world harmony. Realisation was soon to
come in the West that the belief in the final victory of world capitalism
was wrong. In the East internal conflicts continued. New solutions had to be
found while the common crisis persisted...
6. RETURN TO A DIFFICULT FUTURE
Was the return to power of the former Eastern European socialist
parties a logical
stage in development? There is a common reason for this. It was a
confirmation
of the thesis that the political process is not a series of
happenstances but is rather
governed by a definite logical process.
A
fter the series of mainly "gentle" revolutions in Eastern Europe in
1989 and 1990 and the changes which took place later in the USSR, the period
between 1993 and 1995 was marked by a series of elections in which the
former communist parties (or their political successors) were returned to
power. In Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia the former
communists won categorical victories at the polls. In December this was
repeated in Russia by the communist party lead by G.Zuganov. In Rumania and
Yugoslavia the former communists never actually left power. This gave rise
to the question which is not uppermost in the minds of modern thinkers and
politicians: was this return to power of the ex-communist parties a logical
stage in development?
I have to admit that during the five or six years of the reform process
many of these parties did undergo profound changes. They accepted the values
of democracy and pluralism and changed their platforms. In contrast to the
newly-formed parties of anti-communists, democrats and liberals they had
well organised party structures and people faithful to them in all sectors
of economic power. Some of these parties together with the structures of the
former state security organisations had been preparing themselves for
pluralism and opposition politics as early as the period of perestroika.
Economic domination, the creation of their own "loyal" dissident and
political circles, the infiltration of trusted members into the newly-formed
anti-communist parties - all this was undoubtedly well planned and had a
strong influence on the political situation.
The most important reason for the return of the ex-communist parties to
power, in my opinion, can be found in the nature of the totalitarian system
and the logical stages in its change. What I referred to earlier as the
"mistake" of Gorbachev was also decisive here. The new democratic, radical
and liberal forces came to the forefront riding high on the wave of
political reform. E.Gaidar and A.Chubais in Russia, L.Balzerovic in Polish
and Y.Antal in Hungary all became symbols of the reform. All the reformers,
however, were faced with the same problem - while political changes could be
carried out radically and quickly, economic reform required time, trained
specialists and techniques specifically designed for the transition from
extreme centralism to a market economy. The "phased" discrepancies between
economic and political changes caused economic difficulties, serious
political clashes and crime.
The explosion of emotions and anti-communism of the autumn of 1989 and
during the period between 1990-1991 succeeded in alienating the former
administrative and economic elite from the new democrats. Their more or less
forced removal from ministries and state factories provided them with
significant opportunities in the private sector where they acted in close
cooperation with tens of thousands of well-trained experts from the former
state security organisations. The only way for the new democratic forces to
control the economic forces was to get them on their side, as happened in
the Czech republic. Elsewhere where pragmatism was replaced with virulent
anti-communism, the new political forces were unable to control the economic
sector sufficiently to carry out large-scale reforms. The economic forces,
banks, factories and the private sector, in general remained in the hands of
people trained by the former totalitarian regime.
The second important reason was the disappointment of the population.
One group of the population had benefitted from a series of social
privileges and guarantees under the totalitarian regime. By supporting the
reforms between 1989 and 1990 many of these people expected a rapid solution
to the problems which they were experiencing and not the chaos, crime and
fall in living standards and production which in reality ensued.
Unfortunately, as a result of the delays in economic reform during the
period of perestroika and the clashes with the harsh reality of the open
world economy these hopes remain unfulfilled. Bulgaria did not become a
Balkan Switzerland, as some of its leaders promised, nor did Rumania become
France. Quite the contrary, the populations of the Eastern European
countries had to come to terms with the unwelcome news that they produced
little, consumed much more and had to reverse this ratio by 180 percent.
For these reasons in 1992 almost all the Eastern European countries
experienced a profound change in social attitudes. The political elite who
had been in power from 1989-1990 were forced to realise in terror that their
sleepless nights, the titanic struggle and reforms were now considered by
many as mistaken. Of course, it should be added that many of the new
democrats did in fact make many mistakes. In the long run the radical nature
of the economic reforms in the period between 1989 and 1990 and the delay in
implementing economic reforms led to the political equilibrium being upset.
Sooner or later it had to be restored. A significant percentage of the
population in Eastern Europe had become impoverished and disappointed. They
preferred to vote for the former communist parties seeing in them hope for
the restoration of the social benefits which they had lost.
However, can the reformed communists live up to these expectations? The
answer is a conditional "no", or a partial "no". The condition is that they
undertake a flexible policy of reform aimed at the widest possible social
strata of society. Due to the legislative changes which have been
undertaken, any return to the past is unlikely, although to a certain extent
still possible, mainly in Russia. There still remains the difficult path of
peaceful reforms needed to achieve successful economic policies. For this
reason the return of the ex-communist parties is a return to a difficult
future. It will not halt the global processes of integration, nor will it
delay the processes of moving towards new, civilising social relations.
After the battle of Waterloo at the beginning of the 19th century, the
processes of restoration in France looked inexorable and many believed in
it. However, it was to be seen that once the seeds of revolutionary ideas
had been sown, it was to be very difficult to destroy them, the freedoms
that had been won could not be taken away. Such is the case with the return
of the ex-communist parties to power. They will either have to adapt to the
new civilising realities or they will thrown onto the scrapheap of history.
For the ex-communist parties of Hungary and Poland this will be easier,
their ideological reformation began a long time before they came back to
power. For the Bulgarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy in
Rumania this will be more difficult.
Whatever the outcome, the reflected processes of global transition in
Eastern Europe will not be smooth. As a reaction to the errors and the
collapse of perestroika politics went too far to the right and then turned
sharply to the left. The realities of life will put the former socialist
parties to the test. Some of them will rise to the challenge and some will
fall victim to the contradiction of their own ideological contradictions,
while still others will collapse under the pressure of vested interests.
Whether the New Civilisation will accept them is a matter that the future
will show us.
Chapter Three
COLLAPSE II: GLOBAL DISORDER
1. THE DANGER OF CHAOS
Ever change of epoch takes place in the context of conflict and
disorder.
The crisis in the East is just the first phase of the changes in the
present global political order. The second phase will take place in the West
and Far East...
T
he universal processes of globalisation and the collapse of the Eastern
European regimes have given rise to a whole series of unfamiliar phenomena.
Humanity has entered a new phase of development marked by the huge and
growing level of mutual interdependence between people, nations and
cultures. The global order based on the principles of bi-polarism of two
super powers and which had dominated since the Second World War has been
destroyed. To a large extent the way in which the Eastern European regimes
collapsed lead to this state of chaos firstly in their own countries and
later in international economic and political relations. I define chaos as a
universal crisis of the spiritual and value systems, the rejection of
certain standards of global intercourse and the instability of others, as a
period of relative disorder leading to change in the world order.
The first phase of this chaos began in 1989--1900 with the collapse of
the Eastern European regimes and the economic and military organisations in
this part of the world. The dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in
the space of a few months led to chaos in economic relations within Eastern
Europe. The mutual export of goods between the former members of these
organisations fell sharply. Almost all the countries in the region lost
their markets and the stability of their industrial structures was all but
destroyed. Later this was followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. A number of ethnic conflicts flared up, some of
which developed into full-scale wars. For the three years between 1990--1993
the region was in absolute chaos.
I believe that this first stage will be followed by a second, very
important stage of changes. This second stage, which has already begun is
affecting the larger Western powers and their mutual relations, with new
roles and positions being assumed by the Asian states and the acceptance of
new principles in international economic and cultural relations and with
formation of new institutions for the regulations of global processes etc..
Some of them will want to preserve the status quo and their position of
dominance, while others will want to prove old theories. However, there is
only one truth: the post-war global order has lost a number of its main
foundations. Humanity has entered a transitionary period from the bi-polar
model to a new, unfamiliar global structure. The universal crisis of the
post-war political model had caused and continues to cause the general
collapse of contacts and relations wwhich will be of great significance for
further development.
There are two interrelated factors which are of influence on the
processes which are taking place: globalisation as a fundamental and
continuous phenomenon and the crisis in Eastern Europe which was provoked by
globalisation and which at the same time has accelerated its pace. The
problem, however, is that no-one, or almost no-one was prepared for what
happened - neither the collapse of the iron curtain, nor the consequences of
the new drive towards globalisation and its side effects.
I want to speak of the dangers posed by chaos and general disorder
mainly because after the collapse of the Eastern European regimes not one of
the factors which caused the universal crisis of contemporary civilisation
has dissappeared entirely.The deformations of economic growth remain and
global ecological problems have yet to be solved. After the renewal of
nuclear tests, albeit tactical, by France in September 1995 no-one any