production replaces a particular level of autonomy and in its turn gives way
to another. The slave owning state socialised the labour of thousands of
slaves and gradually within the very heart of the system new centres of
autonomy began to appear setting the preconditions for the appearances of
colonies and the early stages of feudalism. Capitalism destroyed the feudal
divisions but in its place a new type of autonomy appeared. However hard it
tried to suppress autonomy, the totalitarian regimes could not destroy the
autonomy of social groups and individual people were eventually to destroy
the monopoly of power.
Let us take the elementary example of the single division of labour.
The idea of the socialisation of labour is based on the fact that the
individual units of labour complement each other within the processes of the
creation of a final product. Craftsmen are divided from the agricultural
worker, the trader from the craftsman etc.. On the one hand they all are
dependent on each other but on the other (and this is particulary important)
they achieve greater professional autonomy and greater freedom of action.
Similar processes develop in relation to the forms of unified labour -
certain economic units are absorbed up by others while at the same time in
the process of capital accumulation yet others become more powerful and more
independent. At a certain stage in their development they divide into
individual autonomous structures. Large companies as General Motors for
example transfer a number of their activities to smaller independent
companies. Each larger production unit is then obliged to autonomise its
internal departments. Moreover, the more developed and bigger the unit is,
the greater the autonomy of its component parts. This process is confirmed
by the decentralisation of management in transnational corporations. In
general the growth of the whole cannot help but bring with it the growth of
its individual parts. The increased process of integration will at a certain
stage in its development lead to division and a certain level of
autonomisation.
Thus, the growth in socialisation does not lead to the death of
autonomisation but to its reproduction and change in its forms. The growth
in integration leads to another type of disintegration, globalisation and
another type of localisation etc.. Each human activity is a form of
accumulation. On the one hand the process of accumulation as both a material
and spiritual process leads simultaneously to two effects: firstly, it
concentrates the material and social forces in one area making them socially
and naturally more independent and autonomous, secondly, this accumulation
leads to millions of new types of manufacturing, economic and social links
between human communities, countries and continents.
If we take the level of autonomy of individual structural units, then
in certain cases their levels of autonomy increase, others decrease and
disappear while yet others appear and continue to develop. In general terms
the socialisation and autonomisation of structures are linked by a complex
series of relations which complement each other at the same time. The main
element is that during the development of the historical processes they
follow a common line of development and growth. Moreover, it is clear that
neither individualism nor collectivism can of their own accounts express the
richness of human interdependence. Separated from one another, these
categories create deformation. Pure individualism without any idea of the
community is antipathetical to the idea of the objective integrational
processes while forced collectivism kills diversity and initiative. By the
same logic, the state socialist collective societies limit individualism and
creativity and delay progress.
I am convinced that history will lead us to a combination of the
elements of the individual and the social: the integration of human
activities unify a series of autonomous production processes, countries and
peoples making the world more united and more mutually dependent. At the
same time there will be growth in the social role of the individual,
autonomous groups and ethnic communities. Material accumulation and the
growth in wealth available to civilisations makes man wealthier better
informed and consequently freer and more independent. The more humanity
develops the more this trend will continue. It will be more difficult to
"entrap" such a person within the monopolistic structures of managed
societies.
I, therefore, believe that in global terms it is possible to speak of
the disintegration of historical distances between the individual (private
relations) and the collective (public relations). History has indisputedly
shown that objective integrational processes are ineffective without some
form of administrative compulsion. The higher the level of civilisation
within society the greater the harmony between the individual and society.
3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND A MESSAGE TO A.TOFFLER
Since the 1960's the technological basis of world manufacturing has
changed out of all recognition. So much new technology has entered every day
life that social relations have also changed. One of the best modern
philosophers, A.Toffler, maintains that new technology leads to the
emassification of production. My belief is that the effect is somewhat
different.
I believe that it gives rise to the parallel processes of integration
and disintegration,
massification and demassification and that it is this dual effect which
has influenced the world in this extraordinary way.
T
he existence of a dialectic link between integration anddisintegration,
globalisation and localisation can be summed upin three basic conclusions.
The first conclusion is that these pairs of categories of historical
development are not antipathies but develop in parallel and are mutually
conditioned. This concept is equivalent to the rejection of utopian liberal
theories of absolute independence and the "purity" of private ownership.
However, this is also a rejection of the notions of a future society as a
world without individualism, internal autonomy, local characteristics and
without economic, political and cultural diversity.
The second conclusion is that socialisation, or integration is not the
same is nationalisation or centralisation. If this was a unilateral process
(the persistent unification of autonomous units) then this concentration
would lead to centralisation and would lead to the growth in
nationalisation. The view that autonomisation goes hand in hand with
socialisation means that socialisation is above all a "horizontal" process
based on man, the market and private property. Consequently centralisation
has certain permissible limits beyond which it is ineffective and provokes
reactionary processes. The theoretical conception of the state in the modern
world has changed significantly. It is clear that in modern conditions the
borders of the state have undergone considerable changes. The greater the
level of development on the one hand, the more civic society will be
absorbed up by the state - and vice versa.
My third conclusion[31] is that from an international point
of view, socialisation (integration) gives rise to new phenomena connected
firstly with globalisation and secondly with the appearance of increased
local autonomy and localisation. On the one hand, new communications unite
humanity, on the other hand they create national and ethnic self-confidence
leading to the struggle for the survival of nations and cultures as a
reaction to cultural imperialism.
Liberalism and Marxism-Leninism are unable to provide explanations for
the new realities. Liberal doctrines emphasise individualism, personal
freedom, while Marxism places the emphasis on class and collectivism. When
liberalism and Marxism appeared on the historical stage, their one
dimensional nature was to a certain extent entirely understandable. The
liberals defended the rights of free, private entrepreneurs while the
Marxists defended the working class and the poor. The level of
stratification within civilised societies was so clear and so developed that
such doctrines were inevitable. They were a historical necessity and their
mark in history.
It will be interesting to see whether these conclusions will be
confirmed by the modern technological revolution which is apparently taking
shape at the moment and which will continue to shape the face of the world
for some time to come.
In a number of his books the famous American philosopher and
futurologist, A.Toffler, concludes that new technologies lead to the
demassification of production. "At the present moment", he writes, "We are
passing from an economy of mass production and mass consumption to what I
would call "the demassed economy".[32]" In the opinion of the
great American futurologist, large scale mass production will be replaced by
individualised or small scale production. Identical components will be
assembled in more and more individualised end products.
I wanted to draw attention to this thesis not because it is original
but rather that it has lead to the revival of the illusion that liberalism
and free trade will triumph. The basic idea of Toffler is that the modern
technological revolution will return the demassification of production as
the leading form of economic relations which will in turn mean the collapse
of the large trans-nationals corporations or at least the reduction of their
role, the domination of the small and medium scale sector and the rebirth of
free competition. This thesis refutes my own, or to look at it from another
point of view, my theory refutes his. If what I believe is true, that
integration and disintegration and related categories are developing in
parallel, this means that demassification will not replace mass production.
It will simply lead to new types of mass production and new types of
demassed activities.
There is no doubt that new computer technology has created work for
hundreds of thousands of people in their homes. The computer revolution had
individualised a huge number of social activities and has elevated the role
of the intellect. However, these technologies have also created millions of
new, direct links which stimulate mass production. At the end of the 1970's
and 1980's many specialists believed that small and medium enterprises would
eventually become the keystone of world manufacturing. The basis for such a
presumption was the growth in their relative share of the market. "The
entire economy", writes Toffler, "is becoming demassed."[33] He
gives examples of the thousands of small and medium enterprises in Kiusu,
Southern Japan and in Quebec, Canada.
Only one thing is true in these statements: that with the advent of the
computer age and biotechnology and their practical and universal
applications a large number of small and medium independent companies have
been created. With the use of a computer it has become possible for many
activities to be carried out individually. The same reasons, however, have
provided stimuli for the large scale manufacturers. Over the past 10-15
years, the mass bankruptcies and collapses of trusts and companies which
many people expected, have not taken place. On the contrary, as can be seen
from the annual American rank listings in the magazine "Fortune", the
leading companies in the world have increased their sales and have
strengthened their positions in the world economy. Over the past ten years
they have increased their position in world trade, manufacturing and
particularly in the area of new technology.[34]
Without doubt the majority of them have changed their structures by
diversifying and delegating their activities to subsidiary companies and
internally autonomous systems. Nevertheless, mass production has not
disappeared. It has simply changed its form. One reason for this is
globalisation and the opening up of new markets for the leading world
companies. Another reason is the production of myriad new forms of
communication - mobile telephones, telephone exchanges, satellites, new
audio and video technology, cable systems etc.. This new technology has
reached unsuspected levels with made enormous profits for their owners. A
similar boom has been experienced by transport manufacturers and providers -
cars, aeroplanes, ships and helicopters etc.. People have begun to travel
more. Together with the construction of the necessary infrastructure,
transport and communications will be the most dynamic growth sectors over
the next 10-20 years.
Who can produce such goods? The small or the medium companies, the
"demassed" producer? On the contrary. This is only within the power of the
large companies, capable of allocating large amounts of money for science,
research and development and personnel training. The globalisation of the
world economy has allowed these companies to maximalise their profits and to
spread their experience and influence to many countries in the world. Even
in the cases, when a large company subcontracts to thousands and tens of
thousands smaller companies, their labour is united in a single end product.
It is difficult to accept the statement that the mass production line
will disappear and that the world is entering into a period of industrial
manufacturing and individualised products. Indeed, modern machinery -
computers, cars, planes, trains, ships requires the use of non-standard and
individualised creativity. However, they all use more and more standard
products - microchips, microcircuits, electronic and mechanical elements
whose manufacturing requires unified labour and unified means of production.
The greatest developments in the last 20 years have not lead to the
demassification of production but have autonomised and socialised it. In
other words, from an organisational point of view, these manufacturing
processes have become more autonomous but in social terms they have linked
many more people within new national and international communities. Even
when they are juridically independent, small and medium scale enterprises
have become incorporated into larger companies via a system of industrial
cooperation. While the technology of the Third Civilisation lead to mass
production and large open workshops, new technology has produced a
completely different type of mass production. The integrating effect comes
from the use of goods or services, from the repeated application of
identical manufacturing or financial operations over the entire world.
Let us take for example the fast-food chain of "MacDonalds" or
"Kentucky Fried Chicken" or the American software company "Microsoft", these
are symbols of success. The majority of their products are produced
individually or by a small groups of highly qualified specialists. There is
hardly a more individualised profession in the world than the creation of
software programmes. On the other hand, look at the enormous "mass" effect.
For the past ten years the profits of Microsoft have increased annually by
62%. In the USA alone more than 50 million people use Microsoft products.
Today the company has sales offices in 31 countries around the world and is
essentially a global company.[35]
New technology allows for more autonomy for the individual worker
requiring more individualism and intellect. At the same time, labour becomes
more socialised, more integrated into a more general and large scale
national and, frequently, global society. To this extent, more and more
people are becoming dependent on the labour of the individual person and
company but at the same time the level of national and social labour
integration is also developing rapidly.
Whatever example we look at - the manufacture of modern transport,
communications, packaging, commerce, banking, the effect is the same. The
modernisation of these branches requires the parallel growth of
individualism and socialisation. My general conclusion is that the modern
technological revolution has demonstrated the parallel action of both these
processes: autonomisation and integration (socialisation). One of these
processes leads to the demassification of certain types of human activity
and their individualisation, while the other links the manufacturers of
different countries within new types of relations, making them more
"massive" and more international.
Demassification appears through the growth in the role of individual
creative activity, regional and ethnic economic communities, the growth in
the number of small and medium companies and the application of individually
produced and consumed products and services etc.. Massification takes place
through new communication and transport infrastructures, mass consumption of
standardised products, the interdependence of common energy and ecosystems,
through the use of common resources, banks, funds and stock exchanges, the
mutual interaction of currencies, fashion and culture.
My message to A.Toffler is not intended to show that modernity does not
provide us with a limitless number of examples of demassification, but to
show that this phenomenon is only a part of the process. It is not isolated
from the globalisation and massification of world production, or the mass
participation of millions of new producers in mutual economic and ecological
dependence. Massification and demassification, globalisation and
localisation, integration and disintegration are paired concepts. Their
modern interdependence is one of the most important pre-conditions for us to
recognise the character of the emerging new civilisation and its political
and economic structures.
4. A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO S.HUNTINGTON
If Toffler believes that the new era will lead to the demassification
of production, then another American - Samuel Huntington, has predicted that
the new era will cause conflicts between civilisations. Are the pogroms of
Sarajevo or the wars in the
Caucuses proof of his conclusion?
T
he processes of integration and autonomisation are taking place on an
international scale. Moreover, international and internal integration are
indivisibly linked processes. The major question is what is the nature of
the world which we are about to enter? Will it be dominated by Western
Cultures, divided into new cultural communities or something else? What will
triumph? Integration or autonomisation, modernisation or specific national
values?
In response to these problems, S.Huntington in 1993, laid the
foundations for a new, rather pretentious line of discussion. In his
opinion, the "major foundations of conflict in the modern world are not in
the main ideological or economic." They are based on culture and
civilisation. "The clash of civilisations", in the opinion of Huntington,"
will be the last phase in the development of world
conflicts"[36]. Although these ideas are controversial and many
writers have rejected them, they should not be ignored completely. In 1995
the East-West Research Group organised a discussion on the theme, "Europe in
the 21st Century" at which the former Prime Minister of Poland, Yan
Belietski defended just such a thesis. Many politicians, intellectuals and
journalists throughout the world have similar views.
S.Huntington believes that the conflicts of the future will result from
the divisions between Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy, Western culture,
Confucianism, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American and a number of other
cultures. In Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece there a number of leaders
who are determined to struggle for the authority of Orthodoxy. Europe is
divided between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The East-West border of the
united Europe separates Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Poland and the three Baltic states from the Orthodox nations.
Similar borders divide Islam and Christianity and Confucianism and Hinduism
etc..
If we recall the theoretical approach which was mentioned earlier, then
we shall have to reject the view of Huntington and his followers. In general
terms, modern academic research after the end of the cold war has been
dominated by two common approaches, each of which either absolutises
integration or autonomy and separatism.
1. Immediately after the collapse of the communist regime, it was
generally accepted that Western culture had triumphed. Western, or to be
more precise, American culture, in the opinion of the editor of the Wall
Street Journal, R.L.Bartley, for better or worse is spreading over the
entire world.[37] The integration of the world, in the opinion of
many researchers is based on Western culture. They believe that it will
assume dominance of the world and provide as proof the popularity of
football in Japan, Madonna and Michael Jackson in Thailand and the fact that
the crowned heads of state from the East are being educated in Harvard and
Berkley.
2. The second point of view belongs to S.Huntington himself.
Integration in his opinion is of no value when faced with the boom of
civilisations. The disappearance of the violence of the bi-polar model led
to a revival of primal cultural identity. Cultural differences and cultural
autonomy instead of ideology became the basis for conflicts. Thus,
Huntington provides explanations for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the USSR
and predicts a similar future for the rest of the world.
By following the logic of the entire book and of my basic theoretical
approach, I believe that both these views are extreme and belong to types of
thought which were typical of the period between the 17th and 20th
centuries. In my opinion neither Western Culture will be able to dominate
the world categorically, nor will the world become divided into a number of
indigenous cultural civilisations. There is little doubt that after the
collapse of the Berlin wall the old ideologies lost much of their former
significance. Here Huntington is right, although this will hardly revive the
threat of new cold wars, a return to the former state is not entirely
impossible and the world agenda will have new geo-political structures.
Directly after the removal of ideological interdependency, and taking
the lid off long-suppressed accumulated national energy, the explosion was
inevitable. In certain cases this was a manifestation of crushed national
pride, in others this was a struggle for cultural survival, while in yet
other cases this was simply the search for a spiritual foundation for
something to replace totalitarian ideology. How, for example, could the
communists have remained influential after 1989, except by exploiting
nationalism and the struggle against Western influence? Was it not
completely natural for the Tadzhiks, Armenians, Azeris or the Slovaks and
Slovenes to engage in emotional expressions of their long-suppressed
national identities? To this extent all the conflicts along the borders of
the former Eastern Bloc were reactions against the limitations, insults and
repression of cultural identity. It is also the same with the insoluble
problems of ethnic and religious self-identification in Northern Ireland,
Kurdistan (Turkey and Iraq) and Quebec as well as many other places in the
world. Nevertheless, Huntington is not correct in his view that modern
ethnic conflicts are the seeds of large-scale conflicts between
civilisations. He absolutises autonomy and ignores the global processes of
integration. The parallel action of integrational and autonomising processes
mean that such conflicts are rather a feature of immaturity and backwardness
rather than of the future. If we accept the thesis of S.Huntington, then we
have to accept that during the entire 21st century we will continue to find
ourselves in a situation of transition between old and new civilisations, in
a state of chaos and disorder. I tend to believe that the enormous bodies of
governments and peoples will choose progress, new technology and open market
societies to seek confirmation of their cultural identity. On the other
hand, what will happen with the transnational corporations, global
electronic media and world financial markets? The dividing lines between the
civilisations predicted by Huntington mean the collapse, no more and no
less, of the world economy, the establishment of new walls in place of
international highways, barriers to communications, the flow of transport,
goods and millions of people. This was possible in the 19th and 20th century
but it is absurd for the future.
I believe that the conflicts in Bosnia, Nagorni Karabakh, Georgia and
Tadzhikistan are temporary and will fade with the integration of these
countries into the world economy. In a similar way, the pretensions and
extremism of the catholics and the French-speaking minority in Quebec will
also fade. Their origins are not in the collapse of the totalitarian regimes
but in the reduction of the role of the nation state and in their struggle
for identity. When I say that cultural contradictions will "fade", I do not
mean that they will disappear. When I reject the "autonomist", Huntington, I
also reject the "Western integrationalist", R.Bartley. The world will
neither disintegrate into separate civilisations, since this would be to
deny 6000 years of integration, nor will it be dominated by mass American
culture which would be to reject the self-perpetuating nature of cultural
autonomy. If immediately after the collapse of the Berlin wall American
cultural influence did indeed grow in leaps and bounds, then, I believe,
this process will soon be compensated by the cultural progress of Japan,
Europe, Russia and other countries. American culture itself has been
subjected to the serious influence of Latin American, African, Asian and
European cultural products and has become pluralistic rather than purely
American. The cultural identity of each people and ethnic group can be
defended in two ways in the modern world: the first of these is via
isolation from the world -- the second is via the processes of modernisation
and the "forced" promotion of cultural identity. The experience of countries
which have isolated themselves from the world is lamentable. In modern
conditions this is impermissible. The only positive experience which remains
is that of those nations who are the standard bearers of progress.
I believe that the future will be defined by three parallel processes
directly linked to the mutual relationship between integration and autonomy.
The first of these is the globalisation of world culture the
constituent elements of which will be defined not by a single or group of
larger nations but by a more universal process.
The second is self-identification and the rebirth of a large number,
about 50--60, of local cultures which will become part of the process of
global change. They will find their niches and will complement global
cultural intergration.
The third process is perhaps most important -- that of the hitherto
unseen intensive processes of cultural mixing between revitalised national
cultures and global culture as a whole.
Some of these concepts will be examined in greater detail at a later
stage and I will provide further evidence. What, however, remains of the
newly reborn "civilisations" of Huntington? Nothing. They will be subjected
to the same structural changes (integrational and autonomising) to which
them entire modern civilisation has been subjected. Some of these will
flourish in global relations, others will complement the existing global
culture.
Is it really possible to compare two Islamic countries such as Morocco
or Iran and would they possible cooperate in the event of a future cultural
conflict? Hardly. I am also convinced that the Eastern Orthodox countries
will become integrated into Europe rather than form their own independent
cultural and political community. All the civilisations described by
Huntington are in actual fact cultural and religious communities involved in
common integrational processes. Integration is no stronger than autonomy but
is no weaker either. It is stronger, however, than isolationism and
confrontational cultures and religions. Of the cultural characteristics of
Huntington's civilisations the only thing which will remain will be that
which can adapt itself to the global processes of integration. It will be an
addition and continuation of a new global culture which I predict will be
the spiritual conduit of the new civilisation.
5. THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS
Liberalism is based on private property. Marxism rejects its
significance and absolutises collectivism and integration based on state
coercion.
The main conclusions of these great teachings have not stood up to the
test of time and there is now a need for a new ideological and theoretical
synthesis.
M
arxism-Leninism, Maoism, Trotskiyism, albeit in different ways
emphasised the abolition of private ownership and coercive nationalism. The
experiment was unsuccessful and retrospectively is seen in negative terms.
On the other hand, however, liberalism supported private property but
underestimated the role of socialisation and integration. Despite its
attempts to triumph over the corpse of Marxism, the liberal idea is unable
to provide adequate explinations for the modern era. For almost two
centuries, humanity has vacillated between these two approaches to social
thought. Neither Marxism, however, nor Liberalism were sufficiently
convincing. Marxism-Leninism aimed to give social guarantees to all but
destroyed and limited in the process all freedom of private initiative and
progress. Liberalism and capitalism were based on the absolutism of
"private" ownership which did not bring harmony or equilibrium but divided
the world into the eternally poor and the eternally rich.
No-one today denies the need for the protection of human rights or the
right of all to organise private production: Neither the Chinese communists
who have lead the reform process in China guaranting long-term economic
growth, nor the Russian communists now in senior management positions in
private banks and companies. No-one would dispute the need for the
opening-up of societies and free competition between companies from
different countries. Who, on the other hand, would oppose the idea of the
social state, the struggles of the poor and the deprived for a better life
or the battles of the enviromentalists to halt the production of
environmental pollutants?
When 120 years ago the representatives of the classical bourgeoisie and
Marxist political economics first crossed swords, the English cotton mill
workers and Silesian miners were working 16 hours a day while their
employers lived in resplendent luxury. The profound social gaps, the
inter-imperialist wars and conflicts not only divided people but also the
theoreticians and politicians who defended their interests. What were the
reasons for the divisions between liberal and conservative doctrines and the
social democrat and communists? Above all this was the question of private
ownership, the exploitation of hired labour, the origin of value and market
equilibrium etc.. The gap between ideological views was widened further by
the ambitions of leaders and politicians and reaching its height during the
fifty years of the 20th century when political radicalism appeared on a
hitherto unknown scale. Communism and fascism became the extreme forms of
class opposition and world wars - the bloody result of radicalism and
totalitarianism.
After the Second World War, perhaps, frightened by the extent of the
destruction, politicians began to search for ways to mitigate extremism.
Despite the cold war, a process of gradual and sometimes contradictory
rapprochement began to take place. Khrushchev accepted the principle of
peaceful co-existence and began to speak of the replacement of the
dictatorship of the proletariate with the national-democratic state. In 1948
Tito and in 1968 Kadar in Hungary breathed life into the processes of
"socialist" private property while retaining the single-party system. All
the Eastern European countries began to search for the possibilities of
change. In the West, first of all L.Erchard and then a number of other
leaders accepted the idea of the social state and guaranteed significant
benefits for their workers and employers. The anti-monopoly legislation in
the USA and Western Europe allowed millions of small and medium producers to
prosper. One of the most effective areas of new legislation was that which
allowed for the participation of workers in the management and ownership of
the factories in which they worked. The West began to speak of "peoples'
capitalism" and the East spoke of "socialist self-management": ideas which
were much more close to each other than the class and political foundations
from which they originated. This gradual rapprochement came not only from
the insight of a number of politicians and researchers but above all the
changes in the technological base of production and the mutual influence of
the two blocs. Of course, as I mentioned a little earlier the adaptation to
the new realities was much stronger and effective in the West than in the
East where it was more cosmetic and superficial. The slow rapprochement of
ideological concepts was also an expression of the common crisis engulfing
the world and which was a crisis of the values and ideas which had dominated
over the past two centuries.
If one looks at the evolution of the parties within the Socialist
International, one loses all concept of the traditional left. The Italian
party of the Democratic Left (the former Communist Party of Italy) declared
itself in 1995 in favour of a movement towards liberalism. The Japanese
Socialist Party made a similar declaration. The Spanish and French
Socialists underwent a similar ideological evolution as did the British
Labour Party. Similarly the wave of new programmes and declarations made by
the conservative and liberal politicians calling for more social guarantees
and assistance for the poor is also deceptive. It is no secret that during
the last 20 or 30 years both the left and the right have begun to resemble
one another. In 1995 Jacques Chirac lead his presidential campaign with
promises of social involvement while at the same time the leader of the
British Labour Party, Tony Blair, called for a rejection of the ideas of
nationalisation. After a painful rapprochement of the basic ideas over the
past 30 years and "great compromises", there is a clear need today for a new
theoretical synthesis.
With the large-scale economic and geopolitical changes of recent years
the world has entered a new era which offers not only new ideological
concepts but a new synthesis of academic thought. When I speak of synthesis,
I mean the mechanical fusion of existing doctrines which has been already in
progress over the past 2 or 3 decades, leading to a new basis from which new
doctrines on the social and political development of the world will be born.
The synthesis which will produce new political ideas does not require
the rejection or the justification of either the qualities of liberal or
socialist ideas. Human rights, private property, the civic society, market
economics - these are the undisputed achievements of liberalism. Social
harmony and justice, solidarity, the dialectics of development, the
aspirations for social balance on the other hand are rooted in the different
variations of Marxism. These are all forms of our modern existence which are
of major significance for the future of mankind. This should also include
the more specific issues of social benefits, for example.
Such an ideological synthesis, however, should in no way mean the
unification of socialist and liberal ideas. In my opinion it is incorrect to
speak of social-liberal theory, or of some mechanical unification of parts
of Marxism and other parts of liberalism. The synthesis I am speaking of
does not come from the unification of political and academic views but from
the objective processes which affect humanity as a whole. They relate to new
realities which are formed on the basis of new social phenomena and
processes.
Above all, this raises to the question of the character of the present
transition, the crisis of the Third Civilisation and its historical fate.
There is no doubt that modern mankind is faced with an entirely new set of
problems essentially different from those of the doctrines of the 19th and
20th centuries. The entire basis upon which we have to formulate our views,
notions and ideas has changed. The new world economic order, global
ecological problems, the intermingling of cultures, changes in the role and
the position of the nation state, new social and professional groups,
require another type of thinking and other types of ideological connections
and systems. In what way will the globalisation of the world take place -
via new forms of imperialism or via a new world order? What will this order
be? Neither liberalism nor Marxism, nor any other theory can provide an
exhaustive answer to these questions. Firstly, because these theories were
constructed on the social problems of the 19th century and secondly, because
all theories which have attempted to explain the world over the past 300
years began their life based on the culture of individual nation states and
individual classes.
The new theoretical synthesis of which I am speaking will have a global
character. It will have be based not only on those liberal and social ideas
of the 19th and 20th centuries which have stood the test of time but also on
those which have come from other ideological influences. It is no longer
possible to ignore the achievements of Japan, South Korea or Thailand in the
organisation of labour. We cannot ignore the historical legacy and economic
and philosophical achievements of these countries as well as a number of
countries in Asia and Latin America.
Thus, this new theoretical synthesis cannot be purely social-liberal
nor purely Marxist or Euro-Atlantic. It will be global, multicultural and
will appear gradually in the coming decades. Today, a number of avant-garde
researchers are looking for projections of this synthesis. Some of them
involuntarily fall under its influence while others have simply realised
that all the traditional notions of man and society are inadequate and
outdated. Any interpretation of contemporary life requires new methodology,
concepts and categories.
The new theoretical synthesis is far from being a formulation of a
unified global theory for the future of the world and much less is it a
single doctrine of a social model which will lead to the "glowing future of
communism" or the even more "glowing future of the capitalist future". This
is to look back to the situation of the 17th-19th century when the advent of
the modern age and the renaissance of the human spirit raised about 25-30
cardinal questions and stimulated the development of social theory.
At that time a number of generalisations were made, firstly at a
philosophical level and then on an economic and political level which led to
a principle change in the evaluation of history and world development. After
Kant, Hegel, Hobbs and Smith came Marx, Sei, Mill, Bernstein, Lenin,
Trotskiy, Von Mizes, Stalin and many others. Despite their arguments and
mutual refutation they were all theories from the era of the Third
Civilisation. They followed the laws of the emerging processes of
industrialisation and the domination of the world by a small number of
states. The theoretical synthesis of this period was limited to "the
domestic problems of individual countries and regions" which were then
related to the common geo-political regions. The problems of freedom and
private property, exploitation and the rights of the proletariate, value and
market price were resolved in the context of groups, national or class
interests. Today such an approach would resolve nothing. For the first time
it is clear that without a global view, without a global approach, the
questions of the modern era will remain unanswered.
The next few years will see the gradual formation of a new theoretical
foundation as a result of the world entering a new period of its
development. This synthesis is closely linked with the new problems which
the world is facing today and attempts to find new solutions for existing
and emerging problems. When I mention the global approach, I mean problems
such as global warming and the condition of the oceans and the seas etc.. I
also mean the way in which global life is organised, the general principles
of its formation at a moment when no single country or people can be
isolated from on another.
The new theoretical synthesis will pose the question of the world
economic order in a new way and will re-examine the concept of "private
ownership" and its place in the system of human relations. It will also
raise the question of an entirely new notion of the limits of the nation
state and its relationship with local and global power structures and new
approaches to the problem of the rights of man and the protection of his
privacy. In other words, the new theoretical synthesis will at one and the
same time raise new problems and new views. This will not mean severing
links with the past, nor separation from the theoretical legacy of the 19th
and 20th centuries. However, this will mean the renewal and restructuring of
systems of academic categories and the laws which provide explanations to
the further processes of human development.
A number of new theories will appear out of these new theories. There
will be those who will want to protect different national, regional and
cultural interests. There will no doubt be those who will want to defend the
interests of the new world elites and those parts of the world population
which are in crisis. It would be wonderful if the new theoretical synthesis
could lead to the establishment of general principles of human development
while at the same time avoiding mass ideologisation.
At the end of the 18th century the French bourgeois revolution thrust
Europe along the path of liberalism. At the end of the 19th century free
competition was replaced by militant imperialism and opposed by socialism.
At the end of the 20th century we are witnessing the end of an entirely new
era and the aspirations of humanity to take a decisive step in the direction
of something new and better. We are living in a time of new movements
towards a renewal which requires new theories. New ideas are born at times
of crisis and change such as the industrial revolution in England at the
beginning of the 19th century, or immediately after the First World War.
Each social and world crisis stimulates the birth of new ideas.
During the plague in the Middle Ages there was an increased interest in
music. Perhaps this was an attempt to prove the triumph of life over death.
Today at a time of cataclysm and economic chaos, of cruel pragmatism and the
murderous processes of consumerism, new ideas might be the equivalent of
spiritual rebirth. These ideas will not appear out of the blue and from one
single source. It is important, however, that they are able to interpret the
new realities, to predict the risks and the dangers with which we are faced
and to continue the traditions of renewal of the human spirit.
Let us then look at the dimensions of the new theoretical synthesis and
apply it in an examination of the most important contemporary phenomena.
Chapter Five
THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
1. WHY A NEW CIVILISATION?
to another. The slave owning state socialised the labour of thousands of
slaves and gradually within the very heart of the system new centres of
autonomy began to appear setting the preconditions for the appearances of
colonies and the early stages of feudalism. Capitalism destroyed the feudal
divisions but in its place a new type of autonomy appeared. However hard it
tried to suppress autonomy, the totalitarian regimes could not destroy the
autonomy of social groups and individual people were eventually to destroy
the monopoly of power.
Let us take the elementary example of the single division of labour.
The idea of the socialisation of labour is based on the fact that the
individual units of labour complement each other within the processes of the
creation of a final product. Craftsmen are divided from the agricultural
worker, the trader from the craftsman etc.. On the one hand they all are
dependent on each other but on the other (and this is particulary important)
they achieve greater professional autonomy and greater freedom of action.
Similar processes develop in relation to the forms of unified labour -
certain economic units are absorbed up by others while at the same time in
the process of capital accumulation yet others become more powerful and more
independent. At a certain stage in their development they divide into
individual autonomous structures. Large companies as General Motors for
example transfer a number of their activities to smaller independent
companies. Each larger production unit is then obliged to autonomise its
internal departments. Moreover, the more developed and bigger the unit is,
the greater the autonomy of its component parts. This process is confirmed
by the decentralisation of management in transnational corporations. In
general the growth of the whole cannot help but bring with it the growth of
its individual parts. The increased process of integration will at a certain
stage in its development lead to division and a certain level of
autonomisation.
Thus, the growth in socialisation does not lead to the death of
autonomisation but to its reproduction and change in its forms. The growth
in integration leads to another type of disintegration, globalisation and
another type of localisation etc.. Each human activity is a form of
accumulation. On the one hand the process of accumulation as both a material
and spiritual process leads simultaneously to two effects: firstly, it
concentrates the material and social forces in one area making them socially
and naturally more independent and autonomous, secondly, this accumulation
leads to millions of new types of manufacturing, economic and social links
between human communities, countries and continents.
If we take the level of autonomy of individual structural units, then
in certain cases their levels of autonomy increase, others decrease and
disappear while yet others appear and continue to develop. In general terms
the socialisation and autonomisation of structures are linked by a complex
series of relations which complement each other at the same time. The main
element is that during the development of the historical processes they
follow a common line of development and growth. Moreover, it is clear that
neither individualism nor collectivism can of their own accounts express the
richness of human interdependence. Separated from one another, these
categories create deformation. Pure individualism without any idea of the
community is antipathetical to the idea of the objective integrational
processes while forced collectivism kills diversity and initiative. By the
same logic, the state socialist collective societies limit individualism and
creativity and delay progress.
I am convinced that history will lead us to a combination of the
elements of the individual and the social: the integration of human
activities unify a series of autonomous production processes, countries and
peoples making the world more united and more mutually dependent. At the
same time there will be growth in the social role of the individual,
autonomous groups and ethnic communities. Material accumulation and the
growth in wealth available to civilisations makes man wealthier better
informed and consequently freer and more independent. The more humanity
develops the more this trend will continue. It will be more difficult to
"entrap" such a person within the monopolistic structures of managed
societies.
I, therefore, believe that in global terms it is possible to speak of
the disintegration of historical distances between the individual (private
relations) and the collective (public relations). History has indisputedly
shown that objective integrational processes are ineffective without some
form of administrative compulsion. The higher the level of civilisation
within society the greater the harmony between the individual and society.
3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND A MESSAGE TO A.TOFFLER
Since the 1960's the technological basis of world manufacturing has
changed out of all recognition. So much new technology has entered every day
life that social relations have also changed. One of the best modern
philosophers, A.Toffler, maintains that new technology leads to the
emassification of production. My belief is that the effect is somewhat
different.
I believe that it gives rise to the parallel processes of integration
and disintegration,
massification and demassification and that it is this dual effect which
has influenced the world in this extraordinary way.
T
he existence of a dialectic link between integration anddisintegration,
globalisation and localisation can be summed upin three basic conclusions.
The first conclusion is that these pairs of categories of historical
development are not antipathies but develop in parallel and are mutually
conditioned. This concept is equivalent to the rejection of utopian liberal
theories of absolute independence and the "purity" of private ownership.
However, this is also a rejection of the notions of a future society as a
world without individualism, internal autonomy, local characteristics and
without economic, political and cultural diversity.
The second conclusion is that socialisation, or integration is not the
same is nationalisation or centralisation. If this was a unilateral process
(the persistent unification of autonomous units) then this concentration
would lead to centralisation and would lead to the growth in
nationalisation. The view that autonomisation goes hand in hand with
socialisation means that socialisation is above all a "horizontal" process
based on man, the market and private property. Consequently centralisation
has certain permissible limits beyond which it is ineffective and provokes
reactionary processes. The theoretical conception of the state in the modern
world has changed significantly. It is clear that in modern conditions the
borders of the state have undergone considerable changes. The greater the
level of development on the one hand, the more civic society will be
absorbed up by the state - and vice versa.
My third conclusion[31] is that from an international point
of view, socialisation (integration) gives rise to new phenomena connected
firstly with globalisation and secondly with the appearance of increased
local autonomy and localisation. On the one hand, new communications unite
humanity, on the other hand they create national and ethnic self-confidence
leading to the struggle for the survival of nations and cultures as a
reaction to cultural imperialism.
Liberalism and Marxism-Leninism are unable to provide explanations for
the new realities. Liberal doctrines emphasise individualism, personal
freedom, while Marxism places the emphasis on class and collectivism. When
liberalism and Marxism appeared on the historical stage, their one
dimensional nature was to a certain extent entirely understandable. The
liberals defended the rights of free, private entrepreneurs while the
Marxists defended the working class and the poor. The level of
stratification within civilised societies was so clear and so developed that
such doctrines were inevitable. They were a historical necessity and their
mark in history.
It will be interesting to see whether these conclusions will be
confirmed by the modern technological revolution which is apparently taking
shape at the moment and which will continue to shape the face of the world
for some time to come.
In a number of his books the famous American philosopher and
futurologist, A.Toffler, concludes that new technologies lead to the
demassification of production. "At the present moment", he writes, "We are
passing from an economy of mass production and mass consumption to what I
would call "the demassed economy".[32]" In the opinion of the
great American futurologist, large scale mass production will be replaced by
individualised or small scale production. Identical components will be
assembled in more and more individualised end products.
I wanted to draw attention to this thesis not because it is original
but rather that it has lead to the revival of the illusion that liberalism
and free trade will triumph. The basic idea of Toffler is that the modern
technological revolution will return the demassification of production as
the leading form of economic relations which will in turn mean the collapse
of the large trans-nationals corporations or at least the reduction of their
role, the domination of the small and medium scale sector and the rebirth of
free competition. This thesis refutes my own, or to look at it from another
point of view, my theory refutes his. If what I believe is true, that
integration and disintegration and related categories are developing in
parallel, this means that demassification will not replace mass production.
It will simply lead to new types of mass production and new types of
demassed activities.
There is no doubt that new computer technology has created work for
hundreds of thousands of people in their homes. The computer revolution had
individualised a huge number of social activities and has elevated the role
of the intellect. However, these technologies have also created millions of
new, direct links which stimulate mass production. At the end of the 1970's
and 1980's many specialists believed that small and medium enterprises would
eventually become the keystone of world manufacturing. The basis for such a
presumption was the growth in their relative share of the market. "The
entire economy", writes Toffler, "is becoming demassed."[33] He
gives examples of the thousands of small and medium enterprises in Kiusu,
Southern Japan and in Quebec, Canada.
Only one thing is true in these statements: that with the advent of the
computer age and biotechnology and their practical and universal
applications a large number of small and medium independent companies have
been created. With the use of a computer it has become possible for many
activities to be carried out individually. The same reasons, however, have
provided stimuli for the large scale manufacturers. Over the past 10-15
years, the mass bankruptcies and collapses of trusts and companies which
many people expected, have not taken place. On the contrary, as can be seen
from the annual American rank listings in the magazine "Fortune", the
leading companies in the world have increased their sales and have
strengthened their positions in the world economy. Over the past ten years
they have increased their position in world trade, manufacturing and
particularly in the area of new technology.[34]
Without doubt the majority of them have changed their structures by
diversifying and delegating their activities to subsidiary companies and
internally autonomous systems. Nevertheless, mass production has not
disappeared. It has simply changed its form. One reason for this is
globalisation and the opening up of new markets for the leading world
companies. Another reason is the production of myriad new forms of
communication - mobile telephones, telephone exchanges, satellites, new
audio and video technology, cable systems etc.. This new technology has
reached unsuspected levels with made enormous profits for their owners. A
similar boom has been experienced by transport manufacturers and providers -
cars, aeroplanes, ships and helicopters etc.. People have begun to travel
more. Together with the construction of the necessary infrastructure,
transport and communications will be the most dynamic growth sectors over
the next 10-20 years.
Who can produce such goods? The small or the medium companies, the
"demassed" producer? On the contrary. This is only within the power of the
large companies, capable of allocating large amounts of money for science,
research and development and personnel training. The globalisation of the
world economy has allowed these companies to maximalise their profits and to
spread their experience and influence to many countries in the world. Even
in the cases, when a large company subcontracts to thousands and tens of
thousands smaller companies, their labour is united in a single end product.
It is difficult to accept the statement that the mass production line
will disappear and that the world is entering into a period of industrial
manufacturing and individualised products. Indeed, modern machinery -
computers, cars, planes, trains, ships requires the use of non-standard and
individualised creativity. However, they all use more and more standard
products - microchips, microcircuits, electronic and mechanical elements
whose manufacturing requires unified labour and unified means of production.
The greatest developments in the last 20 years have not lead to the
demassification of production but have autonomised and socialised it. In
other words, from an organisational point of view, these manufacturing
processes have become more autonomous but in social terms they have linked
many more people within new national and international communities. Even
when they are juridically independent, small and medium scale enterprises
have become incorporated into larger companies via a system of industrial
cooperation. While the technology of the Third Civilisation lead to mass
production and large open workshops, new technology has produced a
completely different type of mass production. The integrating effect comes
from the use of goods or services, from the repeated application of
identical manufacturing or financial operations over the entire world.
Let us take for example the fast-food chain of "MacDonalds" or
"Kentucky Fried Chicken" or the American software company "Microsoft", these
are symbols of success. The majority of their products are produced
individually or by a small groups of highly qualified specialists. There is
hardly a more individualised profession in the world than the creation of
software programmes. On the other hand, look at the enormous "mass" effect.
For the past ten years the profits of Microsoft have increased annually by
62%. In the USA alone more than 50 million people use Microsoft products.
Today the company has sales offices in 31 countries around the world and is
essentially a global company.[35]
New technology allows for more autonomy for the individual worker
requiring more individualism and intellect. At the same time, labour becomes
more socialised, more integrated into a more general and large scale
national and, frequently, global society. To this extent, more and more
people are becoming dependent on the labour of the individual person and
company but at the same time the level of national and social labour
integration is also developing rapidly.
Whatever example we look at - the manufacture of modern transport,
communications, packaging, commerce, banking, the effect is the same. The
modernisation of these branches requires the parallel growth of
individualism and socialisation. My general conclusion is that the modern
technological revolution has demonstrated the parallel action of both these
processes: autonomisation and integration (socialisation). One of these
processes leads to the demassification of certain types of human activity
and their individualisation, while the other links the manufacturers of
different countries within new types of relations, making them more
"massive" and more international.
Demassification appears through the growth in the role of individual
creative activity, regional and ethnic economic communities, the growth in
the number of small and medium companies and the application of individually
produced and consumed products and services etc.. Massification takes place
through new communication and transport infrastructures, mass consumption of
standardised products, the interdependence of common energy and ecosystems,
through the use of common resources, banks, funds and stock exchanges, the
mutual interaction of currencies, fashion and culture.
My message to A.Toffler is not intended to show that modernity does not
provide us with a limitless number of examples of demassification, but to
show that this phenomenon is only a part of the process. It is not isolated
from the globalisation and massification of world production, or the mass
participation of millions of new producers in mutual economic and ecological
dependence. Massification and demassification, globalisation and
localisation, integration and disintegration are paired concepts. Their
modern interdependence is one of the most important pre-conditions for us to
recognise the character of the emerging new civilisation and its political
and economic structures.
4. A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO S.HUNTINGTON
If Toffler believes that the new era will lead to the demassification
of production, then another American - Samuel Huntington, has predicted that
the new era will cause conflicts between civilisations. Are the pogroms of
Sarajevo or the wars in the
Caucuses proof of his conclusion?
T
he processes of integration and autonomisation are taking place on an
international scale. Moreover, international and internal integration are
indivisibly linked processes. The major question is what is the nature of
the world which we are about to enter? Will it be dominated by Western
Cultures, divided into new cultural communities or something else? What will
triumph? Integration or autonomisation, modernisation or specific national
values?
In response to these problems, S.Huntington in 1993, laid the
foundations for a new, rather pretentious line of discussion. In his
opinion, the "major foundations of conflict in the modern world are not in
the main ideological or economic." They are based on culture and
civilisation. "The clash of civilisations", in the opinion of Huntington,"
will be the last phase in the development of world
conflicts"[36]. Although these ideas are controversial and many
writers have rejected them, they should not be ignored completely. In 1995
the East-West Research Group organised a discussion on the theme, "Europe in
the 21st Century" at which the former Prime Minister of Poland, Yan
Belietski defended just such a thesis. Many politicians, intellectuals and
journalists throughout the world have similar views.
S.Huntington believes that the conflicts of the future will result from
the divisions between Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy, Western culture,
Confucianism, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American and a number of other
cultures. In Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece there a number of leaders
who are determined to struggle for the authority of Orthodoxy. Europe is
divided between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The East-West border of the
united Europe separates Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Poland and the three Baltic states from the Orthodox nations.
Similar borders divide Islam and Christianity and Confucianism and Hinduism
etc..
If we recall the theoretical approach which was mentioned earlier, then
we shall have to reject the view of Huntington and his followers. In general
terms, modern academic research after the end of the cold war has been
dominated by two common approaches, each of which either absolutises
integration or autonomy and separatism.
1. Immediately after the collapse of the communist regime, it was
generally accepted that Western culture had triumphed. Western, or to be
more precise, American culture, in the opinion of the editor of the Wall
Street Journal, R.L.Bartley, for better or worse is spreading over the
entire world.[37] The integration of the world, in the opinion of
many researchers is based on Western culture. They believe that it will
assume dominance of the world and provide as proof the popularity of
football in Japan, Madonna and Michael Jackson in Thailand and the fact that
the crowned heads of state from the East are being educated in Harvard and
Berkley.
2. The second point of view belongs to S.Huntington himself.
Integration in his opinion is of no value when faced with the boom of
civilisations. The disappearance of the violence of the bi-polar model led
to a revival of primal cultural identity. Cultural differences and cultural
autonomy instead of ideology became the basis for conflicts. Thus,
Huntington provides explanations for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the USSR
and predicts a similar future for the rest of the world.
By following the logic of the entire book and of my basic theoretical
approach, I believe that both these views are extreme and belong to types of
thought which were typical of the period between the 17th and 20th
centuries. In my opinion neither Western Culture will be able to dominate
the world categorically, nor will the world become divided into a number of
indigenous cultural civilisations. There is little doubt that after the
collapse of the Berlin wall the old ideologies lost much of their former
significance. Here Huntington is right, although this will hardly revive the
threat of new cold wars, a return to the former state is not entirely
impossible and the world agenda will have new geo-political structures.
Directly after the removal of ideological interdependency, and taking
the lid off long-suppressed accumulated national energy, the explosion was
inevitable. In certain cases this was a manifestation of crushed national
pride, in others this was a struggle for cultural survival, while in yet
other cases this was simply the search for a spiritual foundation for
something to replace totalitarian ideology. How, for example, could the
communists have remained influential after 1989, except by exploiting
nationalism and the struggle against Western influence? Was it not
completely natural for the Tadzhiks, Armenians, Azeris or the Slovaks and
Slovenes to engage in emotional expressions of their long-suppressed
national identities? To this extent all the conflicts along the borders of
the former Eastern Bloc were reactions against the limitations, insults and
repression of cultural identity. It is also the same with the insoluble
problems of ethnic and religious self-identification in Northern Ireland,
Kurdistan (Turkey and Iraq) and Quebec as well as many other places in the
world. Nevertheless, Huntington is not correct in his view that modern
ethnic conflicts are the seeds of large-scale conflicts between
civilisations. He absolutises autonomy and ignores the global processes of
integration. The parallel action of integrational and autonomising processes
mean that such conflicts are rather a feature of immaturity and backwardness
rather than of the future. If we accept the thesis of S.Huntington, then we
have to accept that during the entire 21st century we will continue to find
ourselves in a situation of transition between old and new civilisations, in
a state of chaos and disorder. I tend to believe that the enormous bodies of
governments and peoples will choose progress, new technology and open market
societies to seek confirmation of their cultural identity. On the other
hand, what will happen with the transnational corporations, global
electronic media and world financial markets? The dividing lines between the
civilisations predicted by Huntington mean the collapse, no more and no
less, of the world economy, the establishment of new walls in place of
international highways, barriers to communications, the flow of transport,
goods and millions of people. This was possible in the 19th and 20th century
but it is absurd for the future.
I believe that the conflicts in Bosnia, Nagorni Karabakh, Georgia and
Tadzhikistan are temporary and will fade with the integration of these
countries into the world economy. In a similar way, the pretensions and
extremism of the catholics and the French-speaking minority in Quebec will
also fade. Their origins are not in the collapse of the totalitarian regimes
but in the reduction of the role of the nation state and in their struggle
for identity. When I say that cultural contradictions will "fade", I do not
mean that they will disappear. When I reject the "autonomist", Huntington, I
also reject the "Western integrationalist", R.Bartley. The world will
neither disintegrate into separate civilisations, since this would be to
deny 6000 years of integration, nor will it be dominated by mass American
culture which would be to reject the self-perpetuating nature of cultural
autonomy. If immediately after the collapse of the Berlin wall American
cultural influence did indeed grow in leaps and bounds, then, I believe,
this process will soon be compensated by the cultural progress of Japan,
Europe, Russia and other countries. American culture itself has been
subjected to the serious influence of Latin American, African, Asian and
European cultural products and has become pluralistic rather than purely
American. The cultural identity of each people and ethnic group can be
defended in two ways in the modern world: the first of these is via
isolation from the world -- the second is via the processes of modernisation
and the "forced" promotion of cultural identity. The experience of countries
which have isolated themselves from the world is lamentable. In modern
conditions this is impermissible. The only positive experience which remains
is that of those nations who are the standard bearers of progress.
I believe that the future will be defined by three parallel processes
directly linked to the mutual relationship between integration and autonomy.
The first of these is the globalisation of world culture the
constituent elements of which will be defined not by a single or group of
larger nations but by a more universal process.
The second is self-identification and the rebirth of a large number,
about 50--60, of local cultures which will become part of the process of
global change. They will find their niches and will complement global
cultural intergration.
The third process is perhaps most important -- that of the hitherto
unseen intensive processes of cultural mixing between revitalised national
cultures and global culture as a whole.
Some of these concepts will be examined in greater detail at a later
stage and I will provide further evidence. What, however, remains of the
newly reborn "civilisations" of Huntington? Nothing. They will be subjected
to the same structural changes (integrational and autonomising) to which
them entire modern civilisation has been subjected. Some of these will
flourish in global relations, others will complement the existing global
culture.
Is it really possible to compare two Islamic countries such as Morocco
or Iran and would they possible cooperate in the event of a future cultural
conflict? Hardly. I am also convinced that the Eastern Orthodox countries
will become integrated into Europe rather than form their own independent
cultural and political community. All the civilisations described by
Huntington are in actual fact cultural and religious communities involved in
common integrational processes. Integration is no stronger than autonomy but
is no weaker either. It is stronger, however, than isolationism and
confrontational cultures and religions. Of the cultural characteristics of
Huntington's civilisations the only thing which will remain will be that
which can adapt itself to the global processes of integration. It will be an
addition and continuation of a new global culture which I predict will be
the spiritual conduit of the new civilisation.
5. THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS
Liberalism is based on private property. Marxism rejects its
significance and absolutises collectivism and integration based on state
coercion.
The main conclusions of these great teachings have not stood up to the
test of time and there is now a need for a new ideological and theoretical
synthesis.
M
arxism-Leninism, Maoism, Trotskiyism, albeit in different ways
emphasised the abolition of private ownership and coercive nationalism. The
experiment was unsuccessful and retrospectively is seen in negative terms.
On the other hand, however, liberalism supported private property but
underestimated the role of socialisation and integration. Despite its
attempts to triumph over the corpse of Marxism, the liberal idea is unable
to provide adequate explinations for the modern era. For almost two
centuries, humanity has vacillated between these two approaches to social
thought. Neither Marxism, however, nor Liberalism were sufficiently
convincing. Marxism-Leninism aimed to give social guarantees to all but
destroyed and limited in the process all freedom of private initiative and
progress. Liberalism and capitalism were based on the absolutism of
"private" ownership which did not bring harmony or equilibrium but divided
the world into the eternally poor and the eternally rich.
No-one today denies the need for the protection of human rights or the
right of all to organise private production: Neither the Chinese communists
who have lead the reform process in China guaranting long-term economic
growth, nor the Russian communists now in senior management positions in
private banks and companies. No-one would dispute the need for the
opening-up of societies and free competition between companies from
different countries. Who, on the other hand, would oppose the idea of the
social state, the struggles of the poor and the deprived for a better life
or the battles of the enviromentalists to halt the production of
environmental pollutants?
When 120 years ago the representatives of the classical bourgeoisie and
Marxist political economics first crossed swords, the English cotton mill
workers and Silesian miners were working 16 hours a day while their
employers lived in resplendent luxury. The profound social gaps, the
inter-imperialist wars and conflicts not only divided people but also the
theoreticians and politicians who defended their interests. What were the
reasons for the divisions between liberal and conservative doctrines and the
social democrat and communists? Above all this was the question of private
ownership, the exploitation of hired labour, the origin of value and market
equilibrium etc.. The gap between ideological views was widened further by
the ambitions of leaders and politicians and reaching its height during the
fifty years of the 20th century when political radicalism appeared on a
hitherto unknown scale. Communism and fascism became the extreme forms of
class opposition and world wars - the bloody result of radicalism and
totalitarianism.
After the Second World War, perhaps, frightened by the extent of the
destruction, politicians began to search for ways to mitigate extremism.
Despite the cold war, a process of gradual and sometimes contradictory
rapprochement began to take place. Khrushchev accepted the principle of
peaceful co-existence and began to speak of the replacement of the
dictatorship of the proletariate with the national-democratic state. In 1948
Tito and in 1968 Kadar in Hungary breathed life into the processes of
"socialist" private property while retaining the single-party system. All
the Eastern European countries began to search for the possibilities of
change. In the West, first of all L.Erchard and then a number of other
leaders accepted the idea of the social state and guaranteed significant
benefits for their workers and employers. The anti-monopoly legislation in
the USA and Western Europe allowed millions of small and medium producers to
prosper. One of the most effective areas of new legislation was that which
allowed for the participation of workers in the management and ownership of
the factories in which they worked. The West began to speak of "peoples'
capitalism" and the East spoke of "socialist self-management": ideas which
were much more close to each other than the class and political foundations
from which they originated. This gradual rapprochement came not only from
the insight of a number of politicians and researchers but above all the
changes in the technological base of production and the mutual influence of
the two blocs. Of course, as I mentioned a little earlier the adaptation to
the new realities was much stronger and effective in the West than in the
East where it was more cosmetic and superficial. The slow rapprochement of
ideological concepts was also an expression of the common crisis engulfing
the world and which was a crisis of the values and ideas which had dominated
over the past two centuries.
If one looks at the evolution of the parties within the Socialist
International, one loses all concept of the traditional left. The Italian
party of the Democratic Left (the former Communist Party of Italy) declared
itself in 1995 in favour of a movement towards liberalism. The Japanese
Socialist Party made a similar declaration. The Spanish and French
Socialists underwent a similar ideological evolution as did the British
Labour Party. Similarly the wave of new programmes and declarations made by
the conservative and liberal politicians calling for more social guarantees
and assistance for the poor is also deceptive. It is no secret that during
the last 20 or 30 years both the left and the right have begun to resemble
one another. In 1995 Jacques Chirac lead his presidential campaign with
promises of social involvement while at the same time the leader of the
British Labour Party, Tony Blair, called for a rejection of the ideas of
nationalisation. After a painful rapprochement of the basic ideas over the
past 30 years and "great compromises", there is a clear need today for a new
theoretical synthesis.
With the large-scale economic and geopolitical changes of recent years
the world has entered a new era which offers not only new ideological
concepts but a new synthesis of academic thought. When I speak of synthesis,
I mean the mechanical fusion of existing doctrines which has been already in
progress over the past 2 or 3 decades, leading to a new basis from which new
doctrines on the social and political development of the world will be born.
The synthesis which will produce new political ideas does not require
the rejection or the justification of either the qualities of liberal or
socialist ideas. Human rights, private property, the civic society, market
economics - these are the undisputed achievements of liberalism. Social
harmony and justice, solidarity, the dialectics of development, the
aspirations for social balance on the other hand are rooted in the different
variations of Marxism. These are all forms of our modern existence which are
of major significance for the future of mankind. This should also include
the more specific issues of social benefits, for example.
Such an ideological synthesis, however, should in no way mean the
unification of socialist and liberal ideas. In my opinion it is incorrect to
speak of social-liberal theory, or of some mechanical unification of parts
of Marxism and other parts of liberalism. The synthesis I am speaking of
does not come from the unification of political and academic views but from
the objective processes which affect humanity as a whole. They relate to new
realities which are formed on the basis of new social phenomena and
processes.
Above all, this raises to the question of the character of the present
transition, the crisis of the Third Civilisation and its historical fate.
There is no doubt that modern mankind is faced with an entirely new set of
problems essentially different from those of the doctrines of the 19th and
20th centuries. The entire basis upon which we have to formulate our views,
notions and ideas has changed. The new world economic order, global
ecological problems, the intermingling of cultures, changes in the role and
the position of the nation state, new social and professional groups,
require another type of thinking and other types of ideological connections
and systems. In what way will the globalisation of the world take place -
via new forms of imperialism or via a new world order? What will this order
be? Neither liberalism nor Marxism, nor any other theory can provide an
exhaustive answer to these questions. Firstly, because these theories were
constructed on the social problems of the 19th century and secondly, because
all theories which have attempted to explain the world over the past 300
years began their life based on the culture of individual nation states and
individual classes.
The new theoretical synthesis of which I am speaking will have a global
character. It will have be based not only on those liberal and social ideas
of the 19th and 20th centuries which have stood the test of time but also on
those which have come from other ideological influences. It is no longer
possible to ignore the achievements of Japan, South Korea or Thailand in the
organisation of labour. We cannot ignore the historical legacy and economic
and philosophical achievements of these countries as well as a number of
countries in Asia and Latin America.
Thus, this new theoretical synthesis cannot be purely social-liberal
nor purely Marxist or Euro-Atlantic. It will be global, multicultural and
will appear gradually in the coming decades. Today, a number of avant-garde
researchers are looking for projections of this synthesis. Some of them
involuntarily fall under its influence while others have simply realised
that all the traditional notions of man and society are inadequate and
outdated. Any interpretation of contemporary life requires new methodology,
concepts and categories.
The new theoretical synthesis is far from being a formulation of a
unified global theory for the future of the world and much less is it a
single doctrine of a social model which will lead to the "glowing future of
communism" or the even more "glowing future of the capitalist future". This
is to look back to the situation of the 17th-19th century when the advent of
the modern age and the renaissance of the human spirit raised about 25-30
cardinal questions and stimulated the development of social theory.
At that time a number of generalisations were made, firstly at a
philosophical level and then on an economic and political level which led to
a principle change in the evaluation of history and world development. After
Kant, Hegel, Hobbs and Smith came Marx, Sei, Mill, Bernstein, Lenin,
Trotskiy, Von Mizes, Stalin and many others. Despite their arguments and
mutual refutation they were all theories from the era of the Third
Civilisation. They followed the laws of the emerging processes of
industrialisation and the domination of the world by a small number of
states. The theoretical synthesis of this period was limited to "the
domestic problems of individual countries and regions" which were then
related to the common geo-political regions. The problems of freedom and
private property, exploitation and the rights of the proletariate, value and
market price were resolved in the context of groups, national or class
interests. Today such an approach would resolve nothing. For the first time
it is clear that without a global view, without a global approach, the
questions of the modern era will remain unanswered.
The next few years will see the gradual formation of a new theoretical
foundation as a result of the world entering a new period of its
development. This synthesis is closely linked with the new problems which
the world is facing today and attempts to find new solutions for existing
and emerging problems. When I mention the global approach, I mean problems
such as global warming and the condition of the oceans and the seas etc.. I
also mean the way in which global life is organised, the general principles
of its formation at a moment when no single country or people can be
isolated from on another.
The new theoretical synthesis will pose the question of the world
economic order in a new way and will re-examine the concept of "private
ownership" and its place in the system of human relations. It will also
raise the question of an entirely new notion of the limits of the nation
state and its relationship with local and global power structures and new
approaches to the problem of the rights of man and the protection of his
privacy. In other words, the new theoretical synthesis will at one and the
same time raise new problems and new views. This will not mean severing
links with the past, nor separation from the theoretical legacy of the 19th
and 20th centuries. However, this will mean the renewal and restructuring of
systems of academic categories and the laws which provide explanations to
the further processes of human development.
A number of new theories will appear out of these new theories. There
will be those who will want to protect different national, regional and
cultural interests. There will no doubt be those who will want to defend the
interests of the new world elites and those parts of the world population
which are in crisis. It would be wonderful if the new theoretical synthesis
could lead to the establishment of general principles of human development
while at the same time avoiding mass ideologisation.
At the end of the 18th century the French bourgeois revolution thrust
Europe along the path of liberalism. At the end of the 19th century free
competition was replaced by militant imperialism and opposed by socialism.
At the end of the 20th century we are witnessing the end of an entirely new
era and the aspirations of humanity to take a decisive step in the direction
of something new and better. We are living in a time of new movements
towards a renewal which requires new theories. New ideas are born at times
of crisis and change such as the industrial revolution in England at the
beginning of the 19th century, or immediately after the First World War.
Each social and world crisis stimulates the birth of new ideas.
During the plague in the Middle Ages there was an increased interest in
music. Perhaps this was an attempt to prove the triumph of life over death.
Today at a time of cataclysm and economic chaos, of cruel pragmatism and the
murderous processes of consumerism, new ideas might be the equivalent of
spiritual rebirth. These ideas will not appear out of the blue and from one
single source. It is important, however, that they are able to interpret the
new realities, to predict the risks and the dangers with which we are faced
and to continue the traditions of renewal of the human spirit.
Let us then look at the dimensions of the new theoretical synthesis and
apply it in an examination of the most important contemporary phenomena.
Chapter Five
THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
1. WHY A NEW CIVILISATION?