number of exits. You can take the most direct route to thelight or enter a
side tunnel with a dead-end and fluster around in the dark, turn around and
return to where you started from.
T
his book is not meant to be either optimistic or pessimistic. It does
not make categorical forecasts but outlines the possibilities. For the world
in which we are living, this approach is particularly important. Our world
is in a state of transition between two epochs and is instable.The question
is which direction will modern humanity take? Summing up the conclusions to
this chapter, I believe that the dangers which I have mentioned can be
grouped into three pessimistic scenarios.
I refer to the first of them as the scenario of "long-term
indeterminacy", or perhaps the scenario of "continuing chaos". This would be
an extended 20 or 30 year period (perhaps even longer) of geo-political
instability and attempts to expand the positions of the great political
powers. France and Germany would want to establish for themselves a leading
role in Europe, independent of the USA and Russia. The Euro-Atlantic
partnership, the keystone of world politics in the last 50 years might be
threatened. Russia, threatened with the possibilities of becoming isolated
as a result of the expansion of NATO might look to the East to form
alliances. Very soon China might begin to have global ambitions and Japan
will turn its economic power into political ambitions. Given this scenario
the transitional companies will be compelled to play a greater "national
patriotic" role rather than the role of a globalising force.
Perhaps, you do not believe that this is possible. Take a look at
Bosnia, crippled children, dead and wounded civilians and raped women. Why
did the USA support the Muslims, Germany the Croats and Russia the Serbs?
Why at the end of the 20th century can we not put a stop to a senseless
letting of blood. Was it differences between three ethnic groups in this
long-suffering country which lead to the differences between the great
powers or was it the other way around?
There will be a constant series of conflicts on the periphery of the
entire post-Soviet system, in the border regions between Islam and
Christianity and in the regions of great poverty. Let us hope that they will
not be as bloody. The greatest danger in this scenario is the wave of
national, regional, cultural and religious egoism which it contains. The
"period of long-term indeterminacy" will not end before the advent of the
21st century.
This period might also be called a time of "chaotic policentralism".
Where there will not be a single super power. There will be no clear
international political or financial order. We will be witness to a slow,
contradictory and conflicting accumulation of aspirations, roles and egoisms
and of the grudging recognition of the rights of others. In the 1970's and
1980's a number of American politicians declared almost half of the planet a
zone of vital American interests. Today this is being done by a number of
Russian, Greek, Turkish, French and even Japanese politicians. The problem
is that in the majority of cases these zones coincide or overlap. The
Balkans is a typical example of an area which Europeans, Americans and
Russians consider an important region for their interests.
Chaotic policentralism is a state in which there are many centres of
power, but the poles of power change as a result of conflict. This disorder
existed at the beginning of the Second Civilisation albeit in different
historical conditions. Unfortunately, global thinking is at such a low level
that the danger of conflict cannot be avoided. This scenario will be
dominated by local conflicts. International crime will flourish and there
will be an increase in the wealth of a small group of international rulers.
My second pessimistic scenario could be called "Back to the bi-polar
world". In actual fact we are still partially in it. Psychologically a large
number of politicians, senior figures in the armies and security forces,
retired officers and a number of others still live in the bi-polar world.
Older people whose whole lives have been connected with the struggle against
the class enemy (communism or American imperialism) dream of a return to the
period of strong-arm politics. There are those in the East who consider
Gorbachev a traitor or an agent of the CIA and dream of the restoration of
the Warsaw Pact and the super power status of Russia. In the West there are
others who advocate the idea of a single world super power in the USA and
the transformation of NATO into a dominant world military force and the
casting out of Russia and China into the back-yard of international
relations.
It would be very easy for these people and their ideas to become
dominant in world politics: for example, the conflict in Bosnia and the
bombing of Serbian targets in September 1995; or the results of the
parliamentary elections in Russia in the same year and the presidential
elections in 1996. Despite perestroika and other great changes and despite
changes of attitude towards Russia, the trust which exists between
politicians in the East and West is still extremely fragile.
It is quite possible that the "bi-polar" model of the world could be
restored as a consequence of the conflicts for the fate of Eastern Europe.
On the one hand, Russia wants to preserve its influence in this region, not
to be isolated from Europe and to have guarantees for its future. On the
other hand, in the West there is an increase in the influence of those who
desire the expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia. The Eastern European
countries themselves, with the only possible exception of the socialist
government in Bulgaria, want to enter NATO and to guarantee its security and
existence within Europe. In this event, every incautious step, each hasty
move without considering the global consequences could turn the clock back
centuries and extend the life of the Third Civilisation artificially.
It is a complete illusion to consider Russia a weak country, engrossed
in its own problems. An influential American state department official told
me in 1994 that "now Russia is weak, this is best time to teach it where it
belongs". I replied that such an idea was imprudent and belonged to the
vocabulary of cold-war talk. Russia possesses a huge military might and huge
resources. And such a suggestion would be sufficient for confrontation to
reassert itself. Whether it is caused by nationalist forces within Russia or
naive politicians in Western Europe, isolation of Russia, in my opinion,
does not have any long-term prospects and hides great dangers.
The question of "whither Eastern Europe?": whether it should enter the
structures of NATO or not, hides a potential danger for the restoration of
the bi-polar world. However, this will not resolve the matter of the
proportionality of world forces. I believe that if Russia is alienated from
the European processes and in particular from mainstream world politics, it
will seek its revenge in Eastern Europe, the Balkans in particular, and in
Asia. The new Eastern bloc may include Russia, its former Asian republics
and China which very soon will be in a position to increase its world
political role.
The fact that a new bi-polar world will be based on a new combination
of states will not alter its inadequacies. Such a scenario would only slow
down the processes of world integration, exacerbate the universal crisis of
the Third Civilisation and cause unhappiness for hundreds of millions of
people. It would also result in a new spiral of armaments, new ecological
dramas and new even greater poverty for Africans and Asians.
The third pessimistic scenario is the "revolution scenario". This is
the least likely of the three, but should not be ignored. It is a revolution
of the poor, socially deprived nations and states, who have gained access to
powerful strategic weapons and nuclear weapons.
Another variation on this scenario is that put forward by the American
researcher Samuel Huntington, that the 21st century will be a century of
wars between civilisations. I shall later reject his theory since I believe
that he is mistaken about the common future of mankind. However, as a
scenario for the transition from one civilisation to another, as a temporary
or local delay to the processes of global reform over a period of about 20
or 30 years, this is entirely possible.
In each of these three "pessimistic" scenarios I can see the
possibility of an increase in terrorism and individual or group uprisings of
isolated and deprived peoples. The danger is that these uprisings might find
support and unifying influences within Islam, fundamentalist regimes or new
utopian doctrines. There is also the real possibility that these three
scenarios might appear in combination. None of them can contribute anything
positive to mankind. One should not forget that it was the idiotic ambitions
of dictators and global messiahs in the 20th century which killed hundreds
of millions of lives. There is a way of avoiding these pessimistic solutions
but it cannot be achieved by conventional means. The traditional solutions
with which we are familiar from recent decades will not help.
The big question is whether we are going back to the Third civilisation
of forward to a new civilisation? Back to the restoration of old
contradictions or forwards to their resolution and the formation of new
global structures. It will in no way be easy to change the stereotypes of
thought and to break the mould of the bi-polar world, protective nationalism
and all the theories and doctrines which supported and continue to support
the waning Third human civilisation. If the new communication systems and
world corporations are the bridge to new forms of imperialism, this will
undoubtedly create a new wave of protective nationalism and regional egoism
based on ethnic or economic factors. This will consequently lead to the
danger of new conflicts and struggles typical of the 20th century - the
century of violent, uncomprehended and savage globalisation, the century of
imperialism and world wars.
Section two
The Fourth Civilisation
Chapter Four
THEORY IN THE TIME OF CRISIS
1. FOREWARNING OF THE END OF TWO THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
Every change of epoch is a change of views of the world. The Third
civilisation not only gave birth to but was also served by theories which
are rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Today it is clear to all of us
that the changes which are taking place in the world can not be explained by
traditional doctrines. The crisis is evident...
T
he 19th and 20th centuries were a time of intellectual supremacy of
certain theoretical concepts and their numerous variations and
metamorphoses. One of them conquered the minds of the activists of the
French revolution, became enshrined in the American constitution and filled
the hearts of several generations of world intellectuals. The 19th century
was the century of liberalism. Its ideas still form the dream of the free
and the wealthy. The second was the theoretical system of Marxism which
appeared as the defender of the deprived and the poor and was a chance of
hope for those who had no property or education.
Or course, the 19th and the 20th centuries did not belong solely to
these two doctrines. The 19th century in varying countries and at varying
times was dominated by restorationism, enlightened absolutism, conservatism
or just reactionary monarchism. On the border between the two centuries a
period of belligerent nationalism and imperialism broke out. The period
between the two world wars saw the strong development of radical ideologies
- communism and fascism and a whole range of statist and semi-statist
doctrines. After the Second World War ideas of the social state (L.Erchard)
and the mixed economy (P.Samuelson) and the national democratic state
(Khrushchev) became popular.
At the same time Marxism as the ideological basis of communism, state
socialism and liberalism as the banner of individual freedoms and capitalism
became the two most powerful driving forces in the world and survived right
up to the present day. Even the "softening" of their ideological systems as
a result of "democratic socialism" and "state capitalism" or their
"hardening" in the forms of communism or fascism did not reduce their
significance as the fundamental ideologies of the Third Civilisation.
Perhaps, I should mention here why I have not included another
important ideological movement - that of conservatism. The conservatives
have always made a cult out of their loyalty to the traditional structures
of life. The conservative values of "hierarchy, order, authority and
loyalty" have not stood up to the test of time and new realities. Communism
and fascism appear to have been conclusively rejected. Monarchism is only
viable as a cultural tradition. Radical and revolutionary theories have lost
their power. Of the old political doctrines, only liberalism and Marxism in
its totalitarian version managed to retain any of their power, at least
until the end of the 1980's.
To what extent, however, can they benefit from the transition between
epochs? Do they answer the needs of the new global realities? Is it
sufficient to say, that liberalism has become a dominant and eternal global
theory, or that Marxism has been reborn in the form of democratic socialism?
Let us look at the first of these. The ideas of liberalism have a long
history going back to the awakening of civil societies, private ownership
and the rights of man. This is its huge historical significance. Hobbs,
Spinosa and Locke in different ways contributed to the creation of liberal
ideas. The geniuses of the Enlightenment gave it a more systematic form and
value system. However, the driving force behind the development of
liberalism was Adam Smith. He saw the state and state control as the main
obstacles to the development of the society in which we live. He was in
favour of the free movement of the work force, the abolition of semi-feudal
remnants and the regulation of industry and foreign trade. He was in favour
of the complete removal of all limitations on trade with land and goods.
A.Smith, D.Riccardo and A.Ferguson as well as all their followers advocated
the limitation of the role of the state to the functions of a "night
watchman" whose job it is to safeguard the freedom of the owners of property
and the means of production. "Anarchy plus a constable, freedom with
security" was the ambition of the first major liberals. At the end of the
18th century and the 19th century, liberalism was already playing a
progressive anti-feudal role, destroying the feudal remnants and opening the
way to civil rights.
For the liberals freedom alone was the basis of social stability.
Following the traditions of A.Smith and considering himself a devout
follower, Jean Battiste Sei idealised the system of free enterprise in the
conviction that the market alone was sufficient to form balance. According
to Sei's well-known law the crises of over-production are temporary and
economic balance is equivalent to the existence of free market relations.
All classical economic doctrines were developed on the basis of such
fundamental conclusions. A century after the appearance of the economic
views of Adam Smith (1776), the basis of the liberal idea - the very idea of
free competition - was consigned to the graveyard. At the end of the 19th
century with the appearance of large monopolies and the worsening crisis of
capitalism, liberal doctrines began to lose their prestige and influence.
Two world wars in the 20th century and the success of more radical and
totalitarian regimes further limited their influence.
Of course, during the first half of the 20th century, liberal ideas
were still exerting influence on many thinkers and politicians. Some of them
followed in the footsteps of William Jevens explaining all phenomena on the
basis of the laws of subjective logic. Others by default became elementary
apologists of the dominant bourgeois views and yet others became advocates
of the views of Menger and Von Viser. All of them, however, were obliged to
recognise that ideas of the automatic self-regulating and stabilising nature
of the free market were mistaken. The world wars, colonial conflicts,
imperialistic conflicts and totalitarianism dealt heavy body blows to the
ideas of liberalism which lost much of its influence for a long time.
Limited, reduced in influence and almost underground, the tradition of
liberal thought continued into the 20th century. This was mainly due to the
hard work of two "long-distance runners" of theoretical liberalism: Ludwig
von Mizes and Friedrich von Haiek. Von Mizes in his "Human Activities"
offers a series of ideas which contribute to the consolidation of the idea
of individualism and individual freedoms. For Mizes the freedom of choice is
at the basis of social development. He believes that economic theory and
structure are entirely subjective. Every expansion of the structure of the
state was regarded by Mizes and Hajek as an anomaly. In the opinion of Mizes
the protection of the rights of hired labour limits freedom and in the
long-term - the natural development of society. He was very critical of
communism and in his work "Socialism" he brilliantly predicted many of the
imperfections of the "socialist experiment".
In the 19th century Liberalism was a strongly progressive science. It
destroyed the foundations of absolutism and opened the way to civil and
political freedoms. It was the theoretical crown of laurels of the modern
age and an expression of the Third Civilisation. Liberalism was the hope of
the ordinary citizen, the bourgeois, the craftsman, the small and medium
scale land owner. It was the ideology of the struggle against the
"unjustified privileges" of the aristocrats and monarchs, the ideology of
those who guarantee the power of the bourgeois above the other members of
society. There is no doubt that in the 19th century one particular rule was
valid - the more widespread the ideas of liberalism, the greater the
authority of the bourgeois class.
Liberalism was a victim of its own success and gave birth to its own
antipathy - Marxism. Someone had to defend the interests of hired labour.
Someone had to bring attention to the plight of a new repressed class with
its own role and problems in society. The freedom of some had turned into
the lack of freedom of others. This was the law of the Third Civilisation,
of the level of progress that had been reached at that moment in the
development of mankind. The collapse of the feudal societies had given birth
to the bourgeoisie and the proletariate and the ideological doctrines which
corresponded to their interests.
Marxism developed as a new wave of intellectual thought but soon turned
into a class doctrine. It was based on the idea of the value manufacturing
output and the capitalist accumulation of wealth which arises from it. Marx
was an undisputed theoretician and thinker. He not only developed the ideas
of Smith but turned them in a completely new direction. While J.B. Sei and
John Stuart Mill absolutised the idea of free enterprise and "Laissez Faire"
economics, Marx took things in a new direction. He looked for the
contradictions inherent in the free market and "proved" that sooner or later
they would lead to monopolism, class conflicts and the objective
transformation of private ownership into public ownership. While Sei and his
followers promoted the capitalism of the 19th century and considered it as
an eternal and balanced system, Marx, on the other hand, described its vices
and called for the replacement of this society with a more just system.
At the root of the theory of the value of labour, he emphasised that
one part of society unjustly exploited the other part in contradiction with
the natural rights of man. The struggle for added value, in the opinion of
Marx, was at the root of class division between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariate. Here Marx is in his role as a theoretician and political
revolutionary. He undoubtedly believed that at some time during the process
of capitalist accumulation, the "Laissez Faire" formula would collapse since
competition would lead to centralisation, monopolisation and eventually,
political and class conflicts. Marx, and later Lenin, frequently reiterated
that monopolisation was a logical consequence of competition. These
conclusions by Marx were indisputedy true of the 19th century and a
significant part of the 20th.
In Chapter 23 of the first volume of "Das Kapital", Marx comes to his
most significant theoretical conclusion. For years to come it was to serve
the interests of Lenin and later Stalin as the keystone of "state
socialism". He believed that the processes of natural accumulation of
industrial capital would not only lead to high levels of concentration but
also objective and inevitable centralisation which would kill the ideas of
"Laissez Faire" and would set preconditions for the transfer of private
ownership to the state. "In a given area", writes Marx, "centralisation will
attain its extreme limit when all the capital invested in it merge into a
single capital. In a given society, this limit will be attained only when
the entire social capital is united in the hands of a single, individual
capitalist or a single group of capitalists."[27] This leads to
the basis thesis which was to be further developed by Lenin - historical
development and progress gradually lead to the increase in the level of
socialisation, in the concentration and centralisation of production.
This conclusion and the conclusion on the historical role of the
working class and its rights to added value (logically - to the sum of
social wealth) are the keystones of Marxist theory. The main conclusion was
that private ownership would be destroyed in order to concede its place to
public ownership. Later on the followers of Marx were to become divided over
this issue. Kaustski considered that the priority of Marxist thought was
that the capitalist society would reform itself and that parliamentary
democracy would stimulate such a process. At the other extreme Lenin and his
followers, motivated by the dramatic situation in semi-feudal Russia were to
raise the flag of the revolutionary struggle for the rights of the poor in
the belief that before capitalism could be transformed into anything else,
inter-imperialistic conflicts would lead to its death and the inevitable
world victory of the proletariate.
This was the main reason why the Marxist tradition divided at the
beginning of the 20th century into two major movements - social democracy
and communism. In both cases, however, they share the same political
doctrines and common theoretical views. Both communism and world social
democracy in the 20th century placed the emphasis on the protection of the
rights of the workers and the socially weak strata of the population and at
the same time the strong regulatory role of the state. Under communism the
role was taken to absurd extreme via the total nationalisation of
production. In social-democracy the role of the state was reduced to its
"natural" dimensions defined by the need for it to protect the interests of
the socially weak.
In 1989-1991 with the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian
structures Marxism suffered a terrible blow. Of course, it is hardly
possible to identify Eastern European totalitarianism with Marxism, Marxism
with Stalinism, Maoism or Potism. Marx was complex and occasionally even
contradictory but his name will remain forever in the annals of the history
of economic and social disciplines. His conclusions canbe disputed, and only
some of them are valid for the period in which he lived. Others arouse our
admiration even today. Amongst the latter, I would cite his philosophical
ideas of dialecticism and analyses of market prices and competition. Toffler
is correct when he says that to ignore the writings of Marx today is
tantamount to being semi-literate. In my book, I do not reject Marx as a
thinker, but I do reject the practical implementation of his ideas and their
politicisation and transformation into dogma.
The globalisation of the world, the universal crisis of the two bloc
system and the appearance of new technology struck Marxist political
practice a blow to the heart. The total nationalisation of society was in
fact in divergence with the realities of world development. The idea that
capitalist accumulation would lead to a unified, centralised society, to a
single system of production for all workers and to a global proletarian
state were mistaken. The first reason for this was because the consolidation
of the proletarian state as a rule was achieved via violence and secondly,
because such views lead to the repression of individual rights and freedoms
and the limitation of human creativity.
The Marxist intellectual tradition lost its influence to new
technologies and social developments in the 1970's and 1980's which were at
odds with the structures of state property. The West had begun to overcome
class contradictions and they had reached entirely new levels of social
development. Modern generations are now witnessing the disappearance of the
traditional working class, the appearance of new social groups and new
social structures. In actual fact both the politically charged "intellectual
discoveries" of Karl Marx - the theory of added value and the universal law
on capitalist accumulation - have been overtaken by history. Neither his
views on expropriation by expropriators, nor the struggles of the world
proletariate correspond to what is happening in the world at the moment.
This does not mean that the Marxist intellectual tradition has to be
forgotten or rejected. It has played an essential role in the development of
the world during a long period of its development. Marx correctly predicted
that the period of free competition would not last long and that it would
lead to imperialism and the increase in inter-imperialist conflicts. Marxism
became a powerful gravitational force for many people during the second half
of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th since it offered a true
reflection of the tragic position of workers during this period and defended
their interests. "State socialism" as it was called was the transitional
type of social progress combined with exalted utopian views and violent
methods for attaining them. On the other hand state socialism guaranteed
social security (work, wages and a basic standard of living) for millions of
people. There is no other reasonable way to describe the popularity of these
teachings and its influence throughout a large part of the world's
populations in the 19th and 20th century.
The Western European social democratic version of Marxism played a role
as a balancing force, a bridge between the different classes. In Eastern
Europe, Asia and Africa it was a series of generally unsuccessful
experiments. The total nationalisation of Stalin in the 1930's, reformed by
Khrushchev and supported by Brezhnev, the "great leap forward" of Mao Tse
Tung at the end of the 1950's and the senseless purges of Pol Pot were all
justified under the banner of Marxist ideas and the struggle for a global
communist future.
The historical fate of Marxism reveals one important truth. When a
teaching imposes itself mechanically on different cultures and traditions or
when it used simply as a banner, it automatically turns into dogma. Every
attempt at reform in the 1970's and 1980's in Eastern Europe was justified
with quotes from Marx and Lenin and supporting quotations from the works of
the great leaders could always be found even in the most contradictory
situation. This was absurd. We were obliged at every turn to refer to the
classic works. Marxism lost its authority and was turned into an compulsory
state religion.
At first glance with the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in
Eastern Europe liberalism seemed to remain the only gravitational force for
the development of mankind, with no recognition of gratitude to Marx or
Lenin. The semi-statism of the world's social democrats is in crisis,
neo-Keynesianism is under pressure from market expansion in the open world
and modern communications seem to be whispering, "less state intervention,
more freedom". The followers of Mizes and Von Hajek hastily declared after
the death of Marxism that there is nothing left but liberalism. This
illusory triumph found its fullest expression in the work of F.Fukoyama,
"The End of History". In the style of Sei's eternal doctrines of the
"eternal" market balancing force, Fukoyama declared the intransigent
superiority of liberal ideas and subsequently the end of history. He seems
to believe that the market, individualism and the private entrepreneur are
the only quantifiable categories.
For Hegel and now Fukoyama, the "end of history" is the fear of the
unfathomable great future, something which needs to be defined now, despite
the fact that by rights it belongs to future generations. Hegel's
long-dreamed-of modern world will appear at the end of history in the same
way as Fukoyama asserts that the most perfect system is liberal democracy
and that it will bring with it the "last man" and the "end of history".
What I cannot accept in these concepts is that history and its
philosophy have a perceivable end and that social schemes and doctrines can
be written in stone for eternity. I prefer to believe that history is
cyclical and that its follows the laws of the great natural systems of the
universe. We still know too little, to be able to give an adequate answer to
this question. We know so little about our own planet and about the galaxies
which surround it and especially the connection between this and the history
of mankind. Despite the poverty of human knowledge it is clear that there is
no proof of the inevitable end of mankind and earthly nature.
The explanation seems to suggest that the end of history will be
accompanied by the universal domination of liberalism. The modern world is
colourful and diverse enough to support the belief that a traditional
ideology can transform itself in a dominant philosophy. Even the elementary
claims that after the collapse of Eastern European totalitarianism and "a
short, sharp shock" liberal doctrines would win the hearts and minds of
Russians, Bulgarians, Poles or Slovaks were hasty. This did not take place
and because of the inherited economic and cultural realities clearly will
not. However, are the Eastern countries of Japan, South Korea or China
symbols of liberal democracies? Will the countries of Latin America, Asia
and Africa be able to develop in this way? The trends prevalent at the
moment in Western Europe and the USA give no grounds for such "liberal"
optimism. Modern liberal doctrines do not correspond to the most significant
modern processes of globalisation, socialisation or the opening-up of
countries and the mutual interaction of different cultures. The very nature
of private property has changed. It is more socialised and integrated than
at any other time. Humanity is faced with completely new problems which fall
outside the domain of liberalism.
Today's global world is disproportionately developed and traditional
liberalism will hardly be able to change this. If we apply its traditional
ideology universally, the world economy will mutate even further. The
wealthy countries will become even more wealthy and the poor even poorer.
The God of wealth for some will be at the same time the God of poverty for
others, leading to a renewal of liberalism and a revitalisation of some new
form of Marxism and defender of the socially weak.
Today practically no-one has any doubts that classical liberal thought
is part of the glorious past. There is, however, another hypothesis that
after the collapse of totalitarian socialism liberalism will be born again.
Some modern liberals assert that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher with
their typically liberal policies brought about the collapse of
communism.[28] Others consider that neo-liberalism is but a
rationalist deviation in the era of violence, typical of this century.
"However, if there is any kind of hope for the future of freedom", wrote
John Grey in 1986, " then it is hidden in the fact that towards the end of
century of political insanity, we are becoming witnesses of a return to the
wisdom of the great theorists of liberalism."[29]
With respect for these views, I would, all the same, like to express my
view that history never repeats itself. We must accept the market, human
rights, individual freedom and so on, but will this alone solve the problems
of the modern world or provide a solution to the challenges with which we
are faced? On their own these liberal doctrines are inadequate for the
processes of globalisation. They will as a matter of course lead to the
development of a number of social conflicts for a relatively long time to
come. They will lead to a deformation of world development and a
consolidation of the division of humanity into the rich and the poor. This
will create a new reaction in the poorer countries and the appearance of new
utopias and local wars. A century ago liberalism very rapidly changed from a
doctrine of spiritual freedom into a doctrine of the rich. Today it is
hardly able to return freedom to the poor, or the freedom taken away by the
electronic media. In the context of the global world liberal doctrines are
rather a refuge for those who want to expand their historical advantages and
the historical lead they have over the others and to dominate the world.
The greatest danger in the context of the global world is that
liberalism will be transformed into a bridge for the domination of cultures
leading to the disappearance of national traditions and entire peoples. In
combination with globalisation market liberalism might easily mutate into
cultural elitism. If we follow the ideological concept of liberalism in the
context of the global world we will be faced with the dangers mentioned in
the previous chapter - chaos and disorder, nationalist and ethnic crises,
the reactions of the poor and all the manifestations of the universal crisis
of the Third Civilisation. Both historically and currently the idea of
liberalism is different from the present state of the world. The worst thing
is that with such ideas we will primitivise world development and we will
turn globalisation into a bridge for the mechanical imposition of one
culture onto another. In practice this means the Americanisation of Russia,
the Germanisation of the Czech Republic and Hungary and China and India
simultaneously to imitate the United States and the United Kingdom and so
on. Least of all we want to resemble ourselves. The world can only lose out
and become ashamed of itself.
Of course, it would be absurd and superfluous to ignore the strengths
of liberal theories. Freedom, human rights, private initiative and property
are things which we have inherited through the centuries and which we will
take with us into the future. The problem is, however, that in the modern
world this is far from enough. Neither liberalism nor Marxism-Leninism can
explain the modern processes of world integration, the reduction of the role
of national states, the appearance and the principles of the global world,
mutual interaction of cultures in the context of internationalisation.
These two doctrines appeared during the industrial era, in the
conditions of strong class division and inequality. They served the needs of
the Third Civilisation with their inherent structures - nations and nation
states. Their basic laws and categories were connected to the problems faced
by mankind during the 19th and 20th century. Today, however, all this has
changed as a result of modern technological processes, as a result of modern
social structures and the evolution of ownership.
Marx's working class does not exist, there is no class hegemony,
proletarian revolutions are senseless. At the same time the ideal private
owner in the conditions of the intermingling of millions of private
activities and the increase in the dependence of each individual does not
exist. Just like the new technologies did not find their place within the
shell of state bureaucratic "socialist" governments, in the same way the
socialisation of private property and the globalisation of the world have
destroyed the basic values of liberalism.
It is true that each of these doctrines can adapt and take on board new
ideas. However, this would be a perpetration ofviolence against history and
academic morals. Such attempts are being carried out at the moment stemming
from the political ambitions and inherited from the past but as a rule they
serve only to delay the reform process. Their hypocrycy will be quickly
perceived. In the early period of my academic research I also allowed myself
to indulge in such illusions attempting to imagine the ideas of sweeping
reform in Eastern Europe as the revitalisation of socialism. At that time
this was about as far as we were allowed to go. Today, when we are
relatively free it would much more honest to confess that the time of
ready-made ideas has long since passed. New generations have the right to
their own ideas and the logical progress of history does not mean the
acceptance of old cliches. Neither Marxism-Leninism can be successfully
adapted to individualism, the market or private enterprise, nor can
liberalism accept within its own systems the international and internal
associations created by new communications. It is equally absurd to believe
that ideological doctrines can be based on a priori class status - theories
about capitalists, theories about workers and peasants. This approach was
suitable in the 19th and 20th centuries when the integration of society was
at a much lower level and social stratification was much more acute and
significant.
I expect political liberals and "socialist" movements to begin to adapt
to the new realities. It is sometimes amusing that those who call themselves
socialist may carry out anti-socialist politics in support of the major
monopolies. There may even be liberals and conservatives who preach politics
in the name of the people and social economic ideas. The comedy of make-up
and disguise will continue for another 10-15 years and maybe more. We will
hear more and more frequently that the changes have only served to confirm
the ideas of Karl Marx and L.Von Mizes. This is, however, to insult these
two great thinkers.
This is why I cannot announce the end of Marxism or liberalism, but can
only give forewarning that the end will come - about that there can be no
doubt. History teaches us that new eras give rise to new ideas. We are now
entering such an era.
2 A RETURN TO THE ROOTS OR THE MAIN THESIS
The theory and the practice of liberalism stresses the absolutism of
the individual and private property and hence the monopoly of power of the
strong over the weak. Marxism-Leninism created the total monopoly of the
state by absolutising socialisation and state ownership. I have come to the
conclusion that neither socialisation not autonomisation can be achieved
individually or absolutely...
I
n 1982 when I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I wanted to find an
answer to the question, "Does state socialism justifiably exist?" Why were
its ideas dominant at that time in a number of countries including Bulgaria?
According to Lenin, "State socialism is based on the socialisation of
capitalist production."[30] By the world "socialisation" Marx,
Engels and Lenin meant the development of the social character of autonomous
social processes. In their opinion humanity was progressing logically from
individual to larger mass forms of production, passing through the stages of
primitive labour to slave owning and feudal manufacturing processes, the
development of the factory eventually to reach the large scale monopolies.
Subsequently Marxism-Leninism states that the next step in socialisation
after monopolies is the creation of social ownership or property controlled
by the state itself.
At first glance, this might appear logical: in the stages of its
progress, humanity passes from primitive individual production to enormous
factories and eventually state control within the framework of the entire
society. Marx and Lenin frequently come back to this emphasising that
private property is too limiting for the new productive forces and that it
gives rise to wars and violence subsequently conceding its position to state
control. There is no difference in principle here between Marx, Lenin,
Stalin, Trotski or Mao Tse Tung. They all saw socialisation as a global
process, the basis and pre-condition for the establishment of a world
communist society, of a "single factory for all workers and peasants"
(Lenin). Taking this as the basis and putting to one side (briefly) the
Marxist thesis of the decay of the state, the pioneer politicians of state
socialism unified life and put up barriers to motivation and the progress of
people.
In order to analyse this process, we can take the most simple example -
the example of natural organisms. Organic cells do not only grow when they
develop (unless they are cancerous) but divide and become autonomous. If
they separate from the main body of cells they die. If larger natural
systems attack their independent development, the cells die or cease to
exist in the same form. All growth of organisms in nature is associated with
autonomous development. The other option is decay and inevitable death.
Similarly, if socialisation and centralisation are viewed as a
unilateral process, they (like cancer cells) will automatically lead to the
mutation of the system. It is true that each subsequent stage of human
development leads to the greater homogeneity of human civilisation. However,
if this thesis is not further developed, it become transformed into a
rejection of its own self. For Stalin and his followers, for Mao and Pol Pot
progress meant socialisation, equal to unification, military discipline and
universal obedience to superiors.
This was the very basis for the doctrine of state socialism and the
gradual unification of society. In the 1920's and 1930's the USSR and in the
1950's the countries of Eastern Europe underwent the total nationalisation
of their industry and agriculture. There was a belief in the theory that via
state regulated homogeneity the differences between village and town,
intellectual and physical work and classes would disappear and that this
would be the basis for subsequent "social homogeneity" and
"nationalisation". This was the model for state socialism. It meant death
for individual activities, creativity and motivation. To a lesser extent it
suffocated the diversity of social life. Naturally it also delayed and in
certain circumstances halted social development.
The most important element in my understanding of this matter is that
integration (socialisation) and autonomation are not mutually exclusive but
a pair of categories which develop in parallel and are mutually conditioned.
The same can also be said of other pairs of processes such as globalisation
and localisation, integration and disintegration, collectivisation and
individualisation, massification and demassification etc.. However
paradoxical this might appear at first glance, I believe that these pairs of
processes have developed in parallel and not to the detriment of one
another. Of course, the phases of socialisation and autonomation,
unification and collapse cannot appear simultaneously.
At each stage in the development of human history the socialisation of
side tunnel with a dead-end and fluster around in the dark, turn around and
return to where you started from.
T
his book is not meant to be either optimistic or pessimistic. It does
not make categorical forecasts but outlines the possibilities. For the world
in which we are living, this approach is particularly important. Our world
is in a state of transition between two epochs and is instable.The question
is which direction will modern humanity take? Summing up the conclusions to
this chapter, I believe that the dangers which I have mentioned can be
grouped into three pessimistic scenarios.
I refer to the first of them as the scenario of "long-term
indeterminacy", or perhaps the scenario of "continuing chaos". This would be
an extended 20 or 30 year period (perhaps even longer) of geo-political
instability and attempts to expand the positions of the great political
powers. France and Germany would want to establish for themselves a leading
role in Europe, independent of the USA and Russia. The Euro-Atlantic
partnership, the keystone of world politics in the last 50 years might be
threatened. Russia, threatened with the possibilities of becoming isolated
as a result of the expansion of NATO might look to the East to form
alliances. Very soon China might begin to have global ambitions and Japan
will turn its economic power into political ambitions. Given this scenario
the transitional companies will be compelled to play a greater "national
patriotic" role rather than the role of a globalising force.
Perhaps, you do not believe that this is possible. Take a look at
Bosnia, crippled children, dead and wounded civilians and raped women. Why
did the USA support the Muslims, Germany the Croats and Russia the Serbs?
Why at the end of the 20th century can we not put a stop to a senseless
letting of blood. Was it differences between three ethnic groups in this
long-suffering country which lead to the differences between the great
powers or was it the other way around?
There will be a constant series of conflicts on the periphery of the
entire post-Soviet system, in the border regions between Islam and
Christianity and in the regions of great poverty. Let us hope that they will
not be as bloody. The greatest danger in this scenario is the wave of
national, regional, cultural and religious egoism which it contains. The
"period of long-term indeterminacy" will not end before the advent of the
21st century.
This period might also be called a time of "chaotic policentralism".
Where there will not be a single super power. There will be no clear
international political or financial order. We will be witness to a slow,
contradictory and conflicting accumulation of aspirations, roles and egoisms
and of the grudging recognition of the rights of others. In the 1970's and
1980's a number of American politicians declared almost half of the planet a
zone of vital American interests. Today this is being done by a number of
Russian, Greek, Turkish, French and even Japanese politicians. The problem
is that in the majority of cases these zones coincide or overlap. The
Balkans is a typical example of an area which Europeans, Americans and
Russians consider an important region for their interests.
Chaotic policentralism is a state in which there are many centres of
power, but the poles of power change as a result of conflict. This disorder
existed at the beginning of the Second Civilisation albeit in different
historical conditions. Unfortunately, global thinking is at such a low level
that the danger of conflict cannot be avoided. This scenario will be
dominated by local conflicts. International crime will flourish and there
will be an increase in the wealth of a small group of international rulers.
My second pessimistic scenario could be called "Back to the bi-polar
world". In actual fact we are still partially in it. Psychologically a large
number of politicians, senior figures in the armies and security forces,
retired officers and a number of others still live in the bi-polar world.
Older people whose whole lives have been connected with the struggle against
the class enemy (communism or American imperialism) dream of a return to the
period of strong-arm politics. There are those in the East who consider
Gorbachev a traitor or an agent of the CIA and dream of the restoration of
the Warsaw Pact and the super power status of Russia. In the West there are
others who advocate the idea of a single world super power in the USA and
the transformation of NATO into a dominant world military force and the
casting out of Russia and China into the back-yard of international
relations.
It would be very easy for these people and their ideas to become
dominant in world politics: for example, the conflict in Bosnia and the
bombing of Serbian targets in September 1995; or the results of the
parliamentary elections in Russia in the same year and the presidential
elections in 1996. Despite perestroika and other great changes and despite
changes of attitude towards Russia, the trust which exists between
politicians in the East and West is still extremely fragile.
It is quite possible that the "bi-polar" model of the world could be
restored as a consequence of the conflicts for the fate of Eastern Europe.
On the one hand, Russia wants to preserve its influence in this region, not
to be isolated from Europe and to have guarantees for its future. On the
other hand, in the West there is an increase in the influence of those who
desire the expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia. The Eastern European
countries themselves, with the only possible exception of the socialist
government in Bulgaria, want to enter NATO and to guarantee its security and
existence within Europe. In this event, every incautious step, each hasty
move without considering the global consequences could turn the clock back
centuries and extend the life of the Third Civilisation artificially.
It is a complete illusion to consider Russia a weak country, engrossed
in its own problems. An influential American state department official told
me in 1994 that "now Russia is weak, this is best time to teach it where it
belongs". I replied that such an idea was imprudent and belonged to the
vocabulary of cold-war talk. Russia possesses a huge military might and huge
resources. And such a suggestion would be sufficient for confrontation to
reassert itself. Whether it is caused by nationalist forces within Russia or
naive politicians in Western Europe, isolation of Russia, in my opinion,
does not have any long-term prospects and hides great dangers.
The question of "whither Eastern Europe?": whether it should enter the
structures of NATO or not, hides a potential danger for the restoration of
the bi-polar world. However, this will not resolve the matter of the
proportionality of world forces. I believe that if Russia is alienated from
the European processes and in particular from mainstream world politics, it
will seek its revenge in Eastern Europe, the Balkans in particular, and in
Asia. The new Eastern bloc may include Russia, its former Asian republics
and China which very soon will be in a position to increase its world
political role.
The fact that a new bi-polar world will be based on a new combination
of states will not alter its inadequacies. Such a scenario would only slow
down the processes of world integration, exacerbate the universal crisis of
the Third Civilisation and cause unhappiness for hundreds of millions of
people. It would also result in a new spiral of armaments, new ecological
dramas and new even greater poverty for Africans and Asians.
The third pessimistic scenario is the "revolution scenario". This is
the least likely of the three, but should not be ignored. It is a revolution
of the poor, socially deprived nations and states, who have gained access to
powerful strategic weapons and nuclear weapons.
Another variation on this scenario is that put forward by the American
researcher Samuel Huntington, that the 21st century will be a century of
wars between civilisations. I shall later reject his theory since I believe
that he is mistaken about the common future of mankind. However, as a
scenario for the transition from one civilisation to another, as a temporary
or local delay to the processes of global reform over a period of about 20
or 30 years, this is entirely possible.
In each of these three "pessimistic" scenarios I can see the
possibility of an increase in terrorism and individual or group uprisings of
isolated and deprived peoples. The danger is that these uprisings might find
support and unifying influences within Islam, fundamentalist regimes or new
utopian doctrines. There is also the real possibility that these three
scenarios might appear in combination. None of them can contribute anything
positive to mankind. One should not forget that it was the idiotic ambitions
of dictators and global messiahs in the 20th century which killed hundreds
of millions of lives. There is a way of avoiding these pessimistic solutions
but it cannot be achieved by conventional means. The traditional solutions
with which we are familiar from recent decades will not help.
The big question is whether we are going back to the Third civilisation
of forward to a new civilisation? Back to the restoration of old
contradictions or forwards to their resolution and the formation of new
global structures. It will in no way be easy to change the stereotypes of
thought and to break the mould of the bi-polar world, protective nationalism
and all the theories and doctrines which supported and continue to support
the waning Third human civilisation. If the new communication systems and
world corporations are the bridge to new forms of imperialism, this will
undoubtedly create a new wave of protective nationalism and regional egoism
based on ethnic or economic factors. This will consequently lead to the
danger of new conflicts and struggles typical of the 20th century - the
century of violent, uncomprehended and savage globalisation, the century of
imperialism and world wars.
Section two
The Fourth Civilisation
Chapter Four
THEORY IN THE TIME OF CRISIS
1. FOREWARNING OF THE END OF TWO THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
Every change of epoch is a change of views of the world. The Third
civilisation not only gave birth to but was also served by theories which
are rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Today it is clear to all of us
that the changes which are taking place in the world can not be explained by
traditional doctrines. The crisis is evident...
T
he 19th and 20th centuries were a time of intellectual supremacy of
certain theoretical concepts and their numerous variations and
metamorphoses. One of them conquered the minds of the activists of the
French revolution, became enshrined in the American constitution and filled
the hearts of several generations of world intellectuals. The 19th century
was the century of liberalism. Its ideas still form the dream of the free
and the wealthy. The second was the theoretical system of Marxism which
appeared as the defender of the deprived and the poor and was a chance of
hope for those who had no property or education.
Or course, the 19th and the 20th centuries did not belong solely to
these two doctrines. The 19th century in varying countries and at varying
times was dominated by restorationism, enlightened absolutism, conservatism
or just reactionary monarchism. On the border between the two centuries a
period of belligerent nationalism and imperialism broke out. The period
between the two world wars saw the strong development of radical ideologies
- communism and fascism and a whole range of statist and semi-statist
doctrines. After the Second World War ideas of the social state (L.Erchard)
and the mixed economy (P.Samuelson) and the national democratic state
(Khrushchev) became popular.
At the same time Marxism as the ideological basis of communism, state
socialism and liberalism as the banner of individual freedoms and capitalism
became the two most powerful driving forces in the world and survived right
up to the present day. Even the "softening" of their ideological systems as
a result of "democratic socialism" and "state capitalism" or their
"hardening" in the forms of communism or fascism did not reduce their
significance as the fundamental ideologies of the Third Civilisation.
Perhaps, I should mention here why I have not included another
important ideological movement - that of conservatism. The conservatives
have always made a cult out of their loyalty to the traditional structures
of life. The conservative values of "hierarchy, order, authority and
loyalty" have not stood up to the test of time and new realities. Communism
and fascism appear to have been conclusively rejected. Monarchism is only
viable as a cultural tradition. Radical and revolutionary theories have lost
their power. Of the old political doctrines, only liberalism and Marxism in
its totalitarian version managed to retain any of their power, at least
until the end of the 1980's.
To what extent, however, can they benefit from the transition between
epochs? Do they answer the needs of the new global realities? Is it
sufficient to say, that liberalism has become a dominant and eternal global
theory, or that Marxism has been reborn in the form of democratic socialism?
Let us look at the first of these. The ideas of liberalism have a long
history going back to the awakening of civil societies, private ownership
and the rights of man. This is its huge historical significance. Hobbs,
Spinosa and Locke in different ways contributed to the creation of liberal
ideas. The geniuses of the Enlightenment gave it a more systematic form and
value system. However, the driving force behind the development of
liberalism was Adam Smith. He saw the state and state control as the main
obstacles to the development of the society in which we live. He was in
favour of the free movement of the work force, the abolition of semi-feudal
remnants and the regulation of industry and foreign trade. He was in favour
of the complete removal of all limitations on trade with land and goods.
A.Smith, D.Riccardo and A.Ferguson as well as all their followers advocated
the limitation of the role of the state to the functions of a "night
watchman" whose job it is to safeguard the freedom of the owners of property
and the means of production. "Anarchy plus a constable, freedom with
security" was the ambition of the first major liberals. At the end of the
18th century and the 19th century, liberalism was already playing a
progressive anti-feudal role, destroying the feudal remnants and opening the
way to civil rights.
For the liberals freedom alone was the basis of social stability.
Following the traditions of A.Smith and considering himself a devout
follower, Jean Battiste Sei idealised the system of free enterprise in the
conviction that the market alone was sufficient to form balance. According
to Sei's well-known law the crises of over-production are temporary and
economic balance is equivalent to the existence of free market relations.
All classical economic doctrines were developed on the basis of such
fundamental conclusions. A century after the appearance of the economic
views of Adam Smith (1776), the basis of the liberal idea - the very idea of
free competition - was consigned to the graveyard. At the end of the 19th
century with the appearance of large monopolies and the worsening crisis of
capitalism, liberal doctrines began to lose their prestige and influence.
Two world wars in the 20th century and the success of more radical and
totalitarian regimes further limited their influence.
Of course, during the first half of the 20th century, liberal ideas
were still exerting influence on many thinkers and politicians. Some of them
followed in the footsteps of William Jevens explaining all phenomena on the
basis of the laws of subjective logic. Others by default became elementary
apologists of the dominant bourgeois views and yet others became advocates
of the views of Menger and Von Viser. All of them, however, were obliged to
recognise that ideas of the automatic self-regulating and stabilising nature
of the free market were mistaken. The world wars, colonial conflicts,
imperialistic conflicts and totalitarianism dealt heavy body blows to the
ideas of liberalism which lost much of its influence for a long time.
Limited, reduced in influence and almost underground, the tradition of
liberal thought continued into the 20th century. This was mainly due to the
hard work of two "long-distance runners" of theoretical liberalism: Ludwig
von Mizes and Friedrich von Haiek. Von Mizes in his "Human Activities"
offers a series of ideas which contribute to the consolidation of the idea
of individualism and individual freedoms. For Mizes the freedom of choice is
at the basis of social development. He believes that economic theory and
structure are entirely subjective. Every expansion of the structure of the
state was regarded by Mizes and Hajek as an anomaly. In the opinion of Mizes
the protection of the rights of hired labour limits freedom and in the
long-term - the natural development of society. He was very critical of
communism and in his work "Socialism" he brilliantly predicted many of the
imperfections of the "socialist experiment".
In the 19th century Liberalism was a strongly progressive science. It
destroyed the foundations of absolutism and opened the way to civil and
political freedoms. It was the theoretical crown of laurels of the modern
age and an expression of the Third Civilisation. Liberalism was the hope of
the ordinary citizen, the bourgeois, the craftsman, the small and medium
scale land owner. It was the ideology of the struggle against the
"unjustified privileges" of the aristocrats and monarchs, the ideology of
those who guarantee the power of the bourgeois above the other members of
society. There is no doubt that in the 19th century one particular rule was
valid - the more widespread the ideas of liberalism, the greater the
authority of the bourgeois class.
Liberalism was a victim of its own success and gave birth to its own
antipathy - Marxism. Someone had to defend the interests of hired labour.
Someone had to bring attention to the plight of a new repressed class with
its own role and problems in society. The freedom of some had turned into
the lack of freedom of others. This was the law of the Third Civilisation,
of the level of progress that had been reached at that moment in the
development of mankind. The collapse of the feudal societies had given birth
to the bourgeoisie and the proletariate and the ideological doctrines which
corresponded to their interests.
Marxism developed as a new wave of intellectual thought but soon turned
into a class doctrine. It was based on the idea of the value manufacturing
output and the capitalist accumulation of wealth which arises from it. Marx
was an undisputed theoretician and thinker. He not only developed the ideas
of Smith but turned them in a completely new direction. While J.B. Sei and
John Stuart Mill absolutised the idea of free enterprise and "Laissez Faire"
economics, Marx took things in a new direction. He looked for the
contradictions inherent in the free market and "proved" that sooner or later
they would lead to monopolism, class conflicts and the objective
transformation of private ownership into public ownership. While Sei and his
followers promoted the capitalism of the 19th century and considered it as
an eternal and balanced system, Marx, on the other hand, described its vices
and called for the replacement of this society with a more just system.
At the root of the theory of the value of labour, he emphasised that
one part of society unjustly exploited the other part in contradiction with
the natural rights of man. The struggle for added value, in the opinion of
Marx, was at the root of class division between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariate. Here Marx is in his role as a theoretician and political
revolutionary. He undoubtedly believed that at some time during the process
of capitalist accumulation, the "Laissez Faire" formula would collapse since
competition would lead to centralisation, monopolisation and eventually,
political and class conflicts. Marx, and later Lenin, frequently reiterated
that monopolisation was a logical consequence of competition. These
conclusions by Marx were indisputedy true of the 19th century and a
significant part of the 20th.
In Chapter 23 of the first volume of "Das Kapital", Marx comes to his
most significant theoretical conclusion. For years to come it was to serve
the interests of Lenin and later Stalin as the keystone of "state
socialism". He believed that the processes of natural accumulation of
industrial capital would not only lead to high levels of concentration but
also objective and inevitable centralisation which would kill the ideas of
"Laissez Faire" and would set preconditions for the transfer of private
ownership to the state. "In a given area", writes Marx, "centralisation will
attain its extreme limit when all the capital invested in it merge into a
single capital. In a given society, this limit will be attained only when
the entire social capital is united in the hands of a single, individual
capitalist or a single group of capitalists."[27] This leads to
the basis thesis which was to be further developed by Lenin - historical
development and progress gradually lead to the increase in the level of
socialisation, in the concentration and centralisation of production.
This conclusion and the conclusion on the historical role of the
working class and its rights to added value (logically - to the sum of
social wealth) are the keystones of Marxist theory. The main conclusion was
that private ownership would be destroyed in order to concede its place to
public ownership. Later on the followers of Marx were to become divided over
this issue. Kaustski considered that the priority of Marxist thought was
that the capitalist society would reform itself and that parliamentary
democracy would stimulate such a process. At the other extreme Lenin and his
followers, motivated by the dramatic situation in semi-feudal Russia were to
raise the flag of the revolutionary struggle for the rights of the poor in
the belief that before capitalism could be transformed into anything else,
inter-imperialistic conflicts would lead to its death and the inevitable
world victory of the proletariate.
This was the main reason why the Marxist tradition divided at the
beginning of the 20th century into two major movements - social democracy
and communism. In both cases, however, they share the same political
doctrines and common theoretical views. Both communism and world social
democracy in the 20th century placed the emphasis on the protection of the
rights of the workers and the socially weak strata of the population and at
the same time the strong regulatory role of the state. Under communism the
role was taken to absurd extreme via the total nationalisation of
production. In social-democracy the role of the state was reduced to its
"natural" dimensions defined by the need for it to protect the interests of
the socially weak.
In 1989-1991 with the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian
structures Marxism suffered a terrible blow. Of course, it is hardly
possible to identify Eastern European totalitarianism with Marxism, Marxism
with Stalinism, Maoism or Potism. Marx was complex and occasionally even
contradictory but his name will remain forever in the annals of the history
of economic and social disciplines. His conclusions canbe disputed, and only
some of them are valid for the period in which he lived. Others arouse our
admiration even today. Amongst the latter, I would cite his philosophical
ideas of dialecticism and analyses of market prices and competition. Toffler
is correct when he says that to ignore the writings of Marx today is
tantamount to being semi-literate. In my book, I do not reject Marx as a
thinker, but I do reject the practical implementation of his ideas and their
politicisation and transformation into dogma.
The globalisation of the world, the universal crisis of the two bloc
system and the appearance of new technology struck Marxist political
practice a blow to the heart. The total nationalisation of society was in
fact in divergence with the realities of world development. The idea that
capitalist accumulation would lead to a unified, centralised society, to a
single system of production for all workers and to a global proletarian
state were mistaken. The first reason for this was because the consolidation
of the proletarian state as a rule was achieved via violence and secondly,
because such views lead to the repression of individual rights and freedoms
and the limitation of human creativity.
The Marxist intellectual tradition lost its influence to new
technologies and social developments in the 1970's and 1980's which were at
odds with the structures of state property. The West had begun to overcome
class contradictions and they had reached entirely new levels of social
development. Modern generations are now witnessing the disappearance of the
traditional working class, the appearance of new social groups and new
social structures. In actual fact both the politically charged "intellectual
discoveries" of Karl Marx - the theory of added value and the universal law
on capitalist accumulation - have been overtaken by history. Neither his
views on expropriation by expropriators, nor the struggles of the world
proletariate correspond to what is happening in the world at the moment.
This does not mean that the Marxist intellectual tradition has to be
forgotten or rejected. It has played an essential role in the development of
the world during a long period of its development. Marx correctly predicted
that the period of free competition would not last long and that it would
lead to imperialism and the increase in inter-imperialist conflicts. Marxism
became a powerful gravitational force for many people during the second half
of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th since it offered a true
reflection of the tragic position of workers during this period and defended
their interests. "State socialism" as it was called was the transitional
type of social progress combined with exalted utopian views and violent
methods for attaining them. On the other hand state socialism guaranteed
social security (work, wages and a basic standard of living) for millions of
people. There is no other reasonable way to describe the popularity of these
teachings and its influence throughout a large part of the world's
populations in the 19th and 20th century.
The Western European social democratic version of Marxism played a role
as a balancing force, a bridge between the different classes. In Eastern
Europe, Asia and Africa it was a series of generally unsuccessful
experiments. The total nationalisation of Stalin in the 1930's, reformed by
Khrushchev and supported by Brezhnev, the "great leap forward" of Mao Tse
Tung at the end of the 1950's and the senseless purges of Pol Pot were all
justified under the banner of Marxist ideas and the struggle for a global
communist future.
The historical fate of Marxism reveals one important truth. When a
teaching imposes itself mechanically on different cultures and traditions or
when it used simply as a banner, it automatically turns into dogma. Every
attempt at reform in the 1970's and 1980's in Eastern Europe was justified
with quotes from Marx and Lenin and supporting quotations from the works of
the great leaders could always be found even in the most contradictory
situation. This was absurd. We were obliged at every turn to refer to the
classic works. Marxism lost its authority and was turned into an compulsory
state religion.
At first glance with the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in
Eastern Europe liberalism seemed to remain the only gravitational force for
the development of mankind, with no recognition of gratitude to Marx or
Lenin. The semi-statism of the world's social democrats is in crisis,
neo-Keynesianism is under pressure from market expansion in the open world
and modern communications seem to be whispering, "less state intervention,
more freedom". The followers of Mizes and Von Hajek hastily declared after
the death of Marxism that there is nothing left but liberalism. This
illusory triumph found its fullest expression in the work of F.Fukoyama,
"The End of History". In the style of Sei's eternal doctrines of the
"eternal" market balancing force, Fukoyama declared the intransigent
superiority of liberal ideas and subsequently the end of history. He seems
to believe that the market, individualism and the private entrepreneur are
the only quantifiable categories.
For Hegel and now Fukoyama, the "end of history" is the fear of the
unfathomable great future, something which needs to be defined now, despite
the fact that by rights it belongs to future generations. Hegel's
long-dreamed-of modern world will appear at the end of history in the same
way as Fukoyama asserts that the most perfect system is liberal democracy
and that it will bring with it the "last man" and the "end of history".
What I cannot accept in these concepts is that history and its
philosophy have a perceivable end and that social schemes and doctrines can
be written in stone for eternity. I prefer to believe that history is
cyclical and that its follows the laws of the great natural systems of the
universe. We still know too little, to be able to give an adequate answer to
this question. We know so little about our own planet and about the galaxies
which surround it and especially the connection between this and the history
of mankind. Despite the poverty of human knowledge it is clear that there is
no proof of the inevitable end of mankind and earthly nature.
The explanation seems to suggest that the end of history will be
accompanied by the universal domination of liberalism. The modern world is
colourful and diverse enough to support the belief that a traditional
ideology can transform itself in a dominant philosophy. Even the elementary
claims that after the collapse of Eastern European totalitarianism and "a
short, sharp shock" liberal doctrines would win the hearts and minds of
Russians, Bulgarians, Poles or Slovaks were hasty. This did not take place
and because of the inherited economic and cultural realities clearly will
not. However, are the Eastern countries of Japan, South Korea or China
symbols of liberal democracies? Will the countries of Latin America, Asia
and Africa be able to develop in this way? The trends prevalent at the
moment in Western Europe and the USA give no grounds for such "liberal"
optimism. Modern liberal doctrines do not correspond to the most significant
modern processes of globalisation, socialisation or the opening-up of
countries and the mutual interaction of different cultures. The very nature
of private property has changed. It is more socialised and integrated than
at any other time. Humanity is faced with completely new problems which fall
outside the domain of liberalism.
Today's global world is disproportionately developed and traditional
liberalism will hardly be able to change this. If we apply its traditional
ideology universally, the world economy will mutate even further. The
wealthy countries will become even more wealthy and the poor even poorer.
The God of wealth for some will be at the same time the God of poverty for
others, leading to a renewal of liberalism and a revitalisation of some new
form of Marxism and defender of the socially weak.
Today practically no-one has any doubts that classical liberal thought
is part of the glorious past. There is, however, another hypothesis that
after the collapse of totalitarian socialism liberalism will be born again.
Some modern liberals assert that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher with
their typically liberal policies brought about the collapse of
communism.[28] Others consider that neo-liberalism is but a
rationalist deviation in the era of violence, typical of this century.
"However, if there is any kind of hope for the future of freedom", wrote
John Grey in 1986, " then it is hidden in the fact that towards the end of
century of political insanity, we are becoming witnesses of a return to the
wisdom of the great theorists of liberalism."[29]
With respect for these views, I would, all the same, like to express my
view that history never repeats itself. We must accept the market, human
rights, individual freedom and so on, but will this alone solve the problems
of the modern world or provide a solution to the challenges with which we
are faced? On their own these liberal doctrines are inadequate for the
processes of globalisation. They will as a matter of course lead to the
development of a number of social conflicts for a relatively long time to
come. They will lead to a deformation of world development and a
consolidation of the division of humanity into the rich and the poor. This
will create a new reaction in the poorer countries and the appearance of new
utopias and local wars. A century ago liberalism very rapidly changed from a
doctrine of spiritual freedom into a doctrine of the rich. Today it is
hardly able to return freedom to the poor, or the freedom taken away by the
electronic media. In the context of the global world liberal doctrines are
rather a refuge for those who want to expand their historical advantages and
the historical lead they have over the others and to dominate the world.
The greatest danger in the context of the global world is that
liberalism will be transformed into a bridge for the domination of cultures
leading to the disappearance of national traditions and entire peoples. In
combination with globalisation market liberalism might easily mutate into
cultural elitism. If we follow the ideological concept of liberalism in the
context of the global world we will be faced with the dangers mentioned in
the previous chapter - chaos and disorder, nationalist and ethnic crises,
the reactions of the poor and all the manifestations of the universal crisis
of the Third Civilisation. Both historically and currently the idea of
liberalism is different from the present state of the world. The worst thing
is that with such ideas we will primitivise world development and we will
turn globalisation into a bridge for the mechanical imposition of one
culture onto another. In practice this means the Americanisation of Russia,
the Germanisation of the Czech Republic and Hungary and China and India
simultaneously to imitate the United States and the United Kingdom and so
on. Least of all we want to resemble ourselves. The world can only lose out
and become ashamed of itself.
Of course, it would be absurd and superfluous to ignore the strengths
of liberal theories. Freedom, human rights, private initiative and property
are things which we have inherited through the centuries and which we will
take with us into the future. The problem is, however, that in the modern
world this is far from enough. Neither liberalism nor Marxism-Leninism can
explain the modern processes of world integration, the reduction of the role
of national states, the appearance and the principles of the global world,
mutual interaction of cultures in the context of internationalisation.
These two doctrines appeared during the industrial era, in the
conditions of strong class division and inequality. They served the needs of
the Third Civilisation with their inherent structures - nations and nation
states. Their basic laws and categories were connected to the problems faced
by mankind during the 19th and 20th century. Today, however, all this has
changed as a result of modern technological processes, as a result of modern
social structures and the evolution of ownership.
Marx's working class does not exist, there is no class hegemony,
proletarian revolutions are senseless. At the same time the ideal private
owner in the conditions of the intermingling of millions of private
activities and the increase in the dependence of each individual does not
exist. Just like the new technologies did not find their place within the
shell of state bureaucratic "socialist" governments, in the same way the
socialisation of private property and the globalisation of the world have
destroyed the basic values of liberalism.
It is true that each of these doctrines can adapt and take on board new
ideas. However, this would be a perpetration ofviolence against history and
academic morals. Such attempts are being carried out at the moment stemming
from the political ambitions and inherited from the past but as a rule they
serve only to delay the reform process. Their hypocrycy will be quickly
perceived. In the early period of my academic research I also allowed myself
to indulge in such illusions attempting to imagine the ideas of sweeping
reform in Eastern Europe as the revitalisation of socialism. At that time
this was about as far as we were allowed to go. Today, when we are
relatively free it would much more honest to confess that the time of
ready-made ideas has long since passed. New generations have the right to
their own ideas and the logical progress of history does not mean the
acceptance of old cliches. Neither Marxism-Leninism can be successfully
adapted to individualism, the market or private enterprise, nor can
liberalism accept within its own systems the international and internal
associations created by new communications. It is equally absurd to believe
that ideological doctrines can be based on a priori class status - theories
about capitalists, theories about workers and peasants. This approach was
suitable in the 19th and 20th centuries when the integration of society was
at a much lower level and social stratification was much more acute and
significant.
I expect political liberals and "socialist" movements to begin to adapt
to the new realities. It is sometimes amusing that those who call themselves
socialist may carry out anti-socialist politics in support of the major
monopolies. There may even be liberals and conservatives who preach politics
in the name of the people and social economic ideas. The comedy of make-up
and disguise will continue for another 10-15 years and maybe more. We will
hear more and more frequently that the changes have only served to confirm
the ideas of Karl Marx and L.Von Mizes. This is, however, to insult these
two great thinkers.
This is why I cannot announce the end of Marxism or liberalism, but can
only give forewarning that the end will come - about that there can be no
doubt. History teaches us that new eras give rise to new ideas. We are now
entering such an era.
2 A RETURN TO THE ROOTS OR THE MAIN THESIS
The theory and the practice of liberalism stresses the absolutism of
the individual and private property and hence the monopoly of power of the
strong over the weak. Marxism-Leninism created the total monopoly of the
state by absolutising socialisation and state ownership. I have come to the
conclusion that neither socialisation not autonomisation can be achieved
individually or absolutely...
I
n 1982 when I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I wanted to find an
answer to the question, "Does state socialism justifiably exist?" Why were
its ideas dominant at that time in a number of countries including Bulgaria?
According to Lenin, "State socialism is based on the socialisation of
capitalist production."[30] By the world "socialisation" Marx,
Engels and Lenin meant the development of the social character of autonomous
social processes. In their opinion humanity was progressing logically from
individual to larger mass forms of production, passing through the stages of
primitive labour to slave owning and feudal manufacturing processes, the
development of the factory eventually to reach the large scale monopolies.
Subsequently Marxism-Leninism states that the next step in socialisation
after monopolies is the creation of social ownership or property controlled
by the state itself.
At first glance, this might appear logical: in the stages of its
progress, humanity passes from primitive individual production to enormous
factories and eventually state control within the framework of the entire
society. Marx and Lenin frequently come back to this emphasising that
private property is too limiting for the new productive forces and that it
gives rise to wars and violence subsequently conceding its position to state
control. There is no difference in principle here between Marx, Lenin,
Stalin, Trotski or Mao Tse Tung. They all saw socialisation as a global
process, the basis and pre-condition for the establishment of a world
communist society, of a "single factory for all workers and peasants"
(Lenin). Taking this as the basis and putting to one side (briefly) the
Marxist thesis of the decay of the state, the pioneer politicians of state
socialism unified life and put up barriers to motivation and the progress of
people.
In order to analyse this process, we can take the most simple example -
the example of natural organisms. Organic cells do not only grow when they
develop (unless they are cancerous) but divide and become autonomous. If
they separate from the main body of cells they die. If larger natural
systems attack their independent development, the cells die or cease to
exist in the same form. All growth of organisms in nature is associated with
autonomous development. The other option is decay and inevitable death.
Similarly, if socialisation and centralisation are viewed as a
unilateral process, they (like cancer cells) will automatically lead to the
mutation of the system. It is true that each subsequent stage of human
development leads to the greater homogeneity of human civilisation. However,
if this thesis is not further developed, it become transformed into a
rejection of its own self. For Stalin and his followers, for Mao and Pol Pot
progress meant socialisation, equal to unification, military discipline and
universal obedience to superiors.
This was the very basis for the doctrine of state socialism and the
gradual unification of society. In the 1920's and 1930's the USSR and in the
1950's the countries of Eastern Europe underwent the total nationalisation
of their industry and agriculture. There was a belief in the theory that via
state regulated homogeneity the differences between village and town,
intellectual and physical work and classes would disappear and that this
would be the basis for subsequent "social homogeneity" and
"nationalisation". This was the model for state socialism. It meant death
for individual activities, creativity and motivation. To a lesser extent it
suffocated the diversity of social life. Naturally it also delayed and in
certain circumstances halted social development.
The most important element in my understanding of this matter is that
integration (socialisation) and autonomation are not mutually exclusive but
a pair of categories which develop in parallel and are mutually conditioned.
The same can also be said of other pairs of processes such as globalisation
and localisation, integration and disintegration, collectivisation and
individualisation, massification and demassification etc.. However
paradoxical this might appear at first glance, I believe that these pairs of
processes have developed in parallel and not to the detriment of one
another. Of course, the phases of socialisation and autonomation,
unification and collapse cannot appear simultaneously.
At each stage in the development of human history the socialisation of