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Israeli historian Leni Yahil provides an answer - the war effort had taken center stage; Himmler
wanted to remain on center stage; and it is for that reason that Himmler defined certain combat
units as falling within the SS:
The very fact that Himmler and his executors became the central force
directing the implacable war against the Jews accorded them, and primarily
Himmler as their leader, a crucial position in the hierarchy of Nazi rule
wherever it extended. Hitler's hatred of the Jews and the importance he
ascribed to solving the Jewish problem according to his concept were among the
factors that ensured Himmler's status as the man who carried out the fuhrer's
program.
It might have been assumed that in wartime, when stress is necessarily laid
on the military struggle, the influence of the SS would have declined, since it
no longer held the center stage. If Hitler had lost interest in Himmler's
activities, the latter's own political career would have come to an end. He
forestalled the danger in two ways: one was by associating the SS with the war
effort through the establishment of the armed or Waffen SS while being careful
to prevent the army's influence over these corps from overriding his own.
(Leni Yahil, The Holocaust: The fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945, Oxford, New
York, 1990, p. 145)
The Nightingale Unit
60 Minutes also mentioned the Nightingale Unit, otherwise known as the Nachtigall Unit. The
Nachtigall Unit was eventually merged with the Ukrainian Roland Unit, some 600 Ukrainian
soldiers in all. These two units were formed on German territory prior to the outbreak of World
War II by Ukrainians who had either not fallen within the Soviet zone of occupation, or who had
escaped from it, and who anticipated German assistance in liberating Ukraine from Soviet rule.
These units too, however, fail to support the picture of Ukrainians "marching off to fight for
Hitler."
Specifically, shortly after the entry of the Germans into Lviv, Stepan Bandera, "(supported by
members of the Nachtigall Unit) decided - without consulting the Germans - to proclaim on 30
June 1941, the establishment of a Ukrainian state in recently conquered Lviv. ... Within days
of the proclamation, Bandera and his associates were arrested by the Gestapo and incarcerated"
(Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 1994, pp. 463-464). Refusing to rescind the proclamation,
Bandera spent July 1941 to September 1944 in German prisons and concentration camps. (Stepan
Bandera is mentioned at this point because he was supported by the Nachtigall Unit; Bandera was
not a member of the Nachtigall Unit.) "Because of their opposition to German policies in
Ukraine, the units were recalled from the front and interned. ... Toward the end of 1942, the
battalion was disbanded because of the soldiers' refusal to take an oath of loyalty to Hitler"
(Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Volume 2, p. 1088). "The battalion was disarmed and
demobilized, and its officers were arrested in January 1943. Shukhevych, however, managed to
escape and join the UPA" (Encyclopaedia of Ukraine, Volume 4, p. 680). Roman Shukhevych who had
been the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer of the Nachtigall unit went on to became
commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a partisan group opposing all foreign
occupation, and which during the Nazi occupation was directed primarily against the Nazis.
Ukrainians in the Nachtigall and Roland Units, then, were also not Ukrainians marching off to
fight for Hitler, but rather they were Ukrainians calculating that an alliance with German
forces would promote their national interests, they were Ukrainians whose willingness to fight
for Hitler or to promote Nazi interests proved to be close to non-existent, and they were
Ukrainians who fell out with their Nazi sponsors in the early stages of the war.
It must be noted also that unlike the Galicia Division, the Nachtigall and Roland Units were not
part of the SS, and so that Mr. Safer was in error when he stated that "Roman Shukhevych ... was
deputy commander of the SS Division Nightingale."
It is another mark of 60 Minutes' biased coverage that in objecting to streets being named after
the above-mentioned Stepan Bandera, it did not mention that he spent most of the war in German
captivity, nor that he lost two brothers at Auschwitz; and in objecting to the commemoration of
the above-mentioned Roman Shukhevych, it did not mention that he escaped from German captivity
and commanded the Ukrainian guerrilla war against the German occupation. These omissions are
part of a pattern of distortions and misrepresentations used by 60 Minutes to create the false
impression of undeviating commitment to Naziism on the part of Ukrainians. Take Ukraine's
staunchest opponents of Naziism, let 60 Minutes' makeup crew touch them up for the camera, and
somehow they appear on the air with swastikas smeared on their foreheads.
And so 60 Minutes has painted a picture entirely at variance with the historical record. The
idea of Ukrainians en masse unselfconsciously celebrating the SS is preposterous and on a par
with the image of Jews sacrificing Christian children to drink their blood. These sorts of
fantastic and inflammatory charges are leveled by the more hysterical elements within each
community, are passed along by the more irresponsible members of the mass media, and are aimed
at consumption by the more naive and gullible members of their respective groups. 60 Minutes'
allegations have smeared members of the Galicia Division and Ukrainians generally with a
reckless disregard of evidence that is readily available to any researcher who is interested in
presenting an impartial picture. It is a blatant calumny for 60 Minutes to hold out any of the
above-mentioned units as evidence that Ukrainians "marched off to fight for Hitler" and it
overlooks also that on the Soviet side fighting the Nazis were about two million Ukrainians
which in view of their much larger number, 60 Minutes could have taken as evidence of Ukrainians
"marching off to fight against Hitler" and it overlooks as well the large number of Ukrainians
fighting against Hitler in the various national armies of the Allied forces.
Morley Safer's Contempt for the Intelligence of his Viewers.
Morley Safer states that "Nowhere, not even in Germany, are the SS so openly celebrated," and
while he is saying this, we might rightly expect that the scenes presented will be supportive of
his statement. What we do see is elderly veterans of the Galicia Division at a reunion in
Lviv. What details of these scenes support Morley Safer's strong conclusion? Let us consider
ten possibilities.
(1) Perhaps Mr. Safer counted swastikas, and their large number supported his strong
conclusion? But no, that can't be it - for there is not a single swastika to be seen anywhere.
Not one! But how is it possible to hold the world's most open celebration of the SS without a
single swastika? Mr. Safer's conclusion does not seem to be supported by the scene presented
in fact, his conclusion seems to be contradicted by the scene presented. Well, but perhaps
there were other clues?
(2) Surely at the world's most open celebration of the SS, one would find the "SS" insignia in
plentiful supply? But no, there is not a single "SS" visible anywhere. The camera scans the
veterans, we can see their medals and decorations, but we cannot see a single "SS." So far,
then, we have the world's most open celebration of the SS, but without a single swastika and
without a single "SS." But let us move ahead more quickly.
(3) The number of portraits of Hitler, commander-in-chief of all the German armed forces, and so
commander-in-chief of the SS? Zero!
(4) The number of portraits of Himmler, head of the SS? Zero!
(5) The number of portraits of any member of the Nazi hierarchy, or indeed of any German? Zero!
(6) Any Nazi salutes being made? No, not one!
(7) Any Nazi songs being sung? None!
(8) A single word of German spoken? No, not one!
(9) Perhaps there was literature circulated during the reunion which revealed Nazi sympathies?
But no such literature was shown. How about at any time prior to the reunion - even during the
entire 50 or so years following the formation of the Division and up until the reunion? 60
Minutes does not appear to have discovered any such Nazi literature.
(10) As these veterans have been living for more than 50 years predominantly in Canada, the
United States, and Australia, then they can readily be interviewed, and so perhaps 60 Minutes
interviewers managed to elicit pro-Nazi statements from them? No, this golden opportunity too
was passed over, not a single question was asked, not a single word spoken, and not a single
pro-Nazi statement was to be heard.
What then are we left with? We seem to be left with Morley Safer making a fantastic claim while
presenting as evidence images devoid of the slightest detail supporting that claim. We are
left, in short, with Morley Safer revealing his contempt for the intelligence of the 60 Minutes
viewer.
CONTENTS:
Preface
The Galicia Division
Quality of Translation
Ukrainian Homogeneity
Were Ukrainians Nazis?
Simon Wiesenthal
What Happened in Lviv?
Nazi Propaganda Film
Collective Guilt
Paralysis of the Comparative
Function
60 Minutes' Cheap Shots
Ukrainian Anti-Semitism
Jewish Ukrainophobia
Mailbag
A Sense of Responsibility
What 60 Minutes Should Do
PostScript
Quality of Translation
Were all those Ukrainians really saying "kike" and "yid"?
In one instance, I could make out the Ukrainian word "zhyd." Following conventions of Ukrainian
transliteration into English, by the way, the "zh" in "zhyd" is pronounced approximately like
the "z" in "azure," and the "y" in "zhyd" is pronounced like the "y" in "myth." Quite true, to
continue, that in Russian "zhyd" is derogatory for "Jew" and "yevrei" is neutral. In Ukrainian,
the same is true in heavily Russified Eastern Ukraine, and even in Central Ukraine. But in the
less Russified Western Ukraine old habits persist, and here especially among the common people
- "zhyd" continues to be as it always has been the neutral term for "Jew," and "yevrei" sounds
Russian.
Thus, in non-Russified Ukrainian, the "Jewish Battalion" of the Ukrainian Galician Army formed
in 1919 was the "zhydivskyi kurin". "Judaism" is "zhydivstvo." A "learned Jew" is "zhydovyn."
"Judophobe" is "zhydofob" and "Jodophile" is "zhydofil." The adjective "zhydivskyi" meaning
"Jewish" was used by Ukrainians and Jews alike in naming Jewish orchestras and theater groups
and clubs and schools and government departments. The Encyclopaedia Judaica (1971, Volume 11,
p. 616) shows the May 18, 1939 masthead and headlines of the Lviv Jewish newspaper which was
published in Polish. The Polish language is similar to Ukrainian, but uses the Roman rather
than the Cyrillic alphabet. The headline read "Strejk generalny Zydow w Palestynie" which means
"General strike of Jews in Palestine." The third word "Zydow" meaning "of Jews" is similar to
the Ukrainian word that would have been used in this context, and again serves to illustrate
that the Jews of this region did not view the word "zhyd" or its derivatives as derogatory.
We find this same conclusion in the recollections of Nikita Khrushchev (in the following
quotation, I have replaced the original translator's "yid" which rendered the passage confusing,
with the more accurate "zhyd"):
I remember that once we invited Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles ... to a meeting at
the Lvov opera house. It struck me as very strange to hear the Jewish speakers
at the meeting refer to themselves as "zhyds." "We zhyds hereby declare
ourselves in favour of such-and-such." Out in the lobby after the meeting I
stopped some of these men and demanded, "How dare you use the word "zhyd"?
Don't you know it's a very offensive term, an insult to the Jewish nation?"
... "Here in the Western Ukraine it's just the opposite," they explained. "We
call ourselves zhyds...." Apparently what they said was true. If you go back
to Ukrainian literature ... you'll see that "zhyd" isn't used derisively or
insultingly. (Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 1971, p. 145)
But 60 Minutes' mistranslation went even further than that - upon listening to the broadcast
more carefully, it is possible to hear that where the editor of the Lviv newspaper For a Free
Ukraine was translated as saying in connection with a joke circulated among the common people
"In terms of the Soviet Union which is abbreviated SSSR, that stands for three kikes and a
Russian," - in fact he was using the unarguably neutral term "yevrei" which it is obligatory to
translate not as "kike" but as "Jew" not only in Russian, but in Eastern and Western Ukrainian
as well.
Thus, in at least two instances, and possibly in all, the 60 Minutes' translator was translating
incorrectly, and in such a manner as to make the Ukrainian speakers appear to be speaking with
an unrestrained anti-Semitism, when in fact they were not. On top of that, the translator
gratuitously spit out his words and gave them a venomous intonation which was not present in the
original Ukrainian. And then too, where the speaker spoke in grammatical Ukrainian, the
translator on one occasion at least, offered a translation in ungrammatical English, making the
Ukrainian appear uneducated or unintelligent - specifically, the Ukrainian "We Ukrainians do not
have to rely on..." was rendered into the English "We Ukrainians not have to rely on...."
Since "zhyd" is currently held to be derogatory in much of Ukraine, any speaker of contemporary
Ukrainian who wishes to give no offense may choose to view it as derogatory in all of Ukraine,
and switch to "yevrei" in all contexts and in all parts of the country. The fact that a Western
Ukrainian old enough to have escaped thorough Russification has not as yet made this switch,
however, is not evidence of his anti-Semitism, and his use of "zhyd" cannot rightly be taken to
be derogatory. In non-Russified Western Ukrainian, there is only one word for Jew, and that is
"zhyd," and there is no word corresponding to the derogatory "kike" or "yid" or "hebe" of
English.
A further discussion of the use of "zhyd" vs "yevrei" can be found within the Ukrainian Archive
in a discussion of the Sion-Osnova Controversy.
CONTENTS:
Preface
The Galicia Division
Quality of Translation
Ukrainian Homogeneity
Were Ukrainians Nazis?
Simon Wiesenthal
What Happened in Lviv?
Nazi Propaganda Film
Collective Guilt
Paralysis of the Comparative
Function
60 Minutes' Cheap Shots
Ukrainian Anti-Semitism
Jewish Ukrainophobia
Mailbag
A Sense of Responsibility
What 60 Minutes Should Do
PostScript
Ukrainian Homogeneity
In his every statement, Mr. Safer reveals that he starts from the assumption that Ukrainians are
homogeneously anti-Semitic and Nazi in their inclinations. In doing so, Mr. Safer does not stop
to wonder how it is that Ukrainians can be so entirely different in this respect from all other
peoples. Take Americans, for instance. Surely we all agree that among Americans, there are
some who would pitch in and help if they saw Nazis killing Jews, and others who would risk their
lives - and give their lives - to stop that very same killing, and of course the great bulk in
the middle who would consider immediate self-interest first, and look the other way and pretend
to see nothing. But Ukrainians, if we are to believe Mr. Safer, are a people apart - exhibiting
no such heterogeneity, clones one of another, genetically programmed to hate Jews.
To suggest such a thing is, of course, preposterous. The obvious reality is that Ukrainians do
exhibit a normal degree of heterogeneity. Had 60 Minutes wanted to, it could have found plenty
of evidence of this: (1) Since the city of Lviv was featured in the 60 Minutes broadcast, 60
Minutes could have mentioned - in fact, it was duty-bound to mention the heroism of
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky's effort on behalf of Jews. (2) Since 60 Minutes was throwing
blanket condemnations over Ukrainians collectively not only for being the world's greatest
anti-Semites, but for the most extreme war crimes and crimes against humanity, it was incumbent
on 60 Minutes to notice the vast number of instances that can be found of Ukrainian sacrifices
to save Jews. (3) Since the city of Lviv was featured on the 60 Minutes broadcast, as were
Ukrainian auxiliary police units, as was Simon Wiesenthal, 60 Minutes should have mentioned that
in the city of Lviv, just such a Ukrainian police auxiliary by the name of Bodnar risked his
life - possibly sacrificed his life - to save the life of Simon Wiesenthal himself.
Let us consider each of these points in turn.
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky
There is little doubt as to the almost saintly role of Ukrainian (Greek)
Catholic Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. Sheptytsky, Archbishop of L'viv and
head of the church, was widely known as being sympathetic to the Jews. ...
The elderly metropolitan wrote directly to SS commander Heinrich Himmler in the
winter of 1942 demanding an end to the final solution and, equally important to
him, an end to the use of Ukrainian militia and police in anti-Jewish action.
His letter elicited a sharp rebuke, but Sheptytsky persisted even though the
death penalty was threatened to those who gave comfort to Jews. In November
1942 he issued a pastoral letter to be read in all churches under his
authority. It condemned murder. Although Jews were not specifically
mentioned, his intent was crystal clear.
We can never know how many Ukrainians were moved by Sheptytsky's appeal.
Certainly the church set an example. With Sheptytsky's tacit approval, his
church hid a number of Jews throughout western Ukraine, 150 Jews alone in and
around his L'viv headquarters. Perhaps some of his parishioners were among
those brave and precious few "righteous gentiles" who risked an automatic death
penalty for themselves and their families by harbouring a Jew under their roof.
The towering humanity of Sheptytsky remains an inspiration today. (Harold
Troper Morton Weinfeld, Old Wounds, 1988, pp. 17-18)
Raul Hilberg adds concerning Sheptytsky:
He dispatched a lengthy handwritten letter dated August 29-31, 1942 to the
Pope, in which he referred to the government of the German occupants as a
regime of terror and corruption, more diabolical than that of the Bolsheviks.
(Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, 1992, p. 267)
Unbiased reporting might have mentioned such details as the following:
One of those saved by Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky was Lviv's Rabbi Kahane
whose son is currently the marshal commander of the Israeli Air Force.
(Ukrainian Weekly, June 21, 1992, p. 9)
Sheptitsky himself hid fifteen Jews, including Rabbi Kahane, in his own
residence in Lvov, a building frequently visited by German officials. (Martin
Gilbert, The Holocaust, 1986, p. 410)
Vast Ukrainian Sacrifices to Save Jews
And Sheptytsky's actions are not unique - Ukrainians risking their lives and giving their lives
to save Jews was not a rare occurrence. In the first Jewish Congress of Ukraine held in Kiev in
1992, "48 awards were handed out to Ukrainians and people of other nationalities who had rescued
Jews during the second world war" (Ukrainian Weekly, November 8, 1992, p. 2). References to
specific cases are not hard to find:
Prof. Weiss [head of the Israeli Knesset] reminisced about Ukraine, the country
of his childhood, and gratefully acknowledged he owed his life to two Ukrainian
women who hid him from the Nazis during World War II. (Ukrainian Weekly,
December 13, 1992, p. 8)
In the Volhynian town of Hoszcza a Ukrainian farmer, Fiodor Kalenczuk, hid a
Jewish grain merchant, Pessah Kranzberg, his wife, their ten-year-old daughter
and their daughter's young friend, for seventeen months, refusing to deny them
refuge even when his wife protested that their presence, in the stable, was
endangering a Christian household. (Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, 1986, p.
403)
Help was given even though the probability of detection was substantial and the penalties were
severe:
Sonderkommando 4b reported that it had shot the mayor of Kremenchug, Senitsa
Vershovsky, because he had "tried to protect the Jews." (Raul Hilberg, The
Destruction of the European Jews, 1985, p. 308)
Consulting the original Einsatzgruppe report reveals that a Catholic priest, Protyorey Romansky,
was involved in the above plot to save Jews, though Romansky's punishment is not specified:
The fact that Senitsa, the mayor of Kremenchug, was arrested for sabotaging
orders, demonstrates that responsible officials are not always selected with
the necessary care and attention. Only after the Einsatzkommandos had
interrogated the official could it be established that he had purposely
sabotaged the handling of the Jewish problem. He used false data and
authorized the chief priest Protyorey Romansky to baptize the Jews whom he
himself had selected, giving them Christian or Russian first names. His
immediate arrest prevented a larger number of Jews from evading German
control. Senitsa was executed. (Einsatzgruppe C, Kiev, Operational Situation
Report USSR No. 177, March 6, 1942, in Yitzhak Arad, Shmuel Krakowski, and
Shmuel Spector, editors, The Einsatzgruppen Reports: Selections From the
Dispatches of the Nazi Death Squads' Campaign Against the Jews July
1941-January 1943, 1989, p. 304)
Similarly illustrative of help being given despite severe penalties is the following:
A German police company in the village of Samary, Volhynia, shot an entire
Ukrainian family, including a man, two women, and three children, for harboring
a Jewish woman. (Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, 1992, p.
201)
This is not to say that all or most Jews found refuge with Ukrainians, nor that all or most
Ukrainians offered refuge to Jews. Far from it. Many stories can be found of Jews being
refused refuge or even being betrayed - but what else could anyone expect? To expect more from
Ukrainians would be to expect them to be saints and martyrs, which would be setting a very high
standard:
Whoever attempted to help Jews acted alone and exposed himself as well as his
family to the possibility of a death sentence from a German Kommando. (Raul
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 1985, p. 308)
But despite the severity of the punishment, Ukrainians did help. Andrew Gregorovich (Forum, No.
92, Spring 1995, p. 24) reproduces a public announcement issued by the "SS and Head of Police
for the District of Galicia" in Sambir, Ukraine, March 1, 1944. The announcement lists ten
Ukrainians who have been sentenced to death by the Germans. Number 7 is Stefan Zubovych,
Ukrainian, married - for the crime of helping Jews. One wonders what Stefan Zubovych might have
thought had he been told just prior to his execution that in decades to come, some among the
people that he was giving his life for would attempt to obliterate his memory and the memory of
other Ukrainians like him, and would attempt instead to depict Ukrainians as irredeemable
anti-Semites. One wonders what the surviving family of Stefan Zubovych, if any did survive,
think today of the thanks that they receive from Morley Safer for the sacrifice that they have
borne.
Given the severity and the imminence of the punishment, it is a wonder that Ukrainians offered
any help at all. Jews who had been saved by Ukrainians have subsequently admitted that in view
of the extreme danger, had their roles been reversed they would not have extended the same help
to the Ukrainians.
Ukrainian help was not limited to a few isolated cases, but rather was widely given:
"It is unfortunate," declared a German proclamation issued in Lvov on April 11
[1942], "that the rural population continues - nowadays furtively - to assist
Jews, thus doing harm to the community, and hence to themselves, by this
disloyal attitude." (Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, 1986, p. 319)
[In 1943] tens of thousands of Jews were still in hiding throughout the General
Government, the Eastern Territories and the Ukraine. But German searches for
them were continuous. (Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, 1986, p. 553)
It would be incorrect to imagine the Germans rounding up and executing all the Jews within a
region, with only a few of the Jews being saved; rather, in Ukrainian cities - which offered
more avenues of escape and concealment than did villages and towns the Jews repeatedly receded
before the advancing German killing units and then flowed back in again after the killing units
had passed - something that would have been possible only with the knowledge and the cooperation
of the indigenous Ukrainians:
Although we succeeded in particular, in smaller towns and also in villages in
accomplishing a complete liquidation of the Jewish problem, again and again it
is, however, observed in larger cities that, after such an execution, all Jews
have indeed disappeared. But, when, after a certain period of time, a Kommando
returns again, the number of Jews still found in the city always considerably
surpasses the number of the executed Jews. (Erwin Schulz, commander of
Einsatzkommando 5 of Einsatzgruppe C, in John Mendelsohn, Editor, The
Holocaust, Volume 18, 1982, p. 98)
Whenever the Einsatzgruppe had left a town, it returned to find more Jews than
had already been killed there. (Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European
Jews, 1985, p. 342)
Olena Melnyczuk in a Courage to Care Award ceremony (sponsored by the Jewish Foundation for
Christian Rescuers/Anti-Defamation League) in which she and other members of her family were
honored for having hidden a Jewish couple during World War II in Ukraine made the following
remarks, the concluding sentence of which bears a particular relevance to our present discussion
of 60 Minutes:
"At the time we were fully aware of consequences that might expect us. We were
aware that our family were doomed to perish together with the people we
sheltered if detected. But sometimes people ask 'would you do it again?' And
the answer is short. Yes. We tell them point blank that our Christian
religion taught us to love your neighbor as yourself, be your brother's
keeper," she stated.
"Sometimes," she continued, "we hear the people asking why so few did what
we did. Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure there were many, many people like us
risking their lives while hiding Jews, but how many of those rescued had the
courage to report the names of their rescuers to Yad Vashem? Somehow being
free of danger they have forgotten what risk those people took." (Ukrainian
Weekly, June 21, 1992, p. 9, emphasis added)
The Forgotten Bodnar
Yes, how some of them do seem to have forgotten. Take Simon Wiesenthal, for example. The chief
focus of discussion between him and Morley Safer seems to have been whether Ukrainians are all
genetically programmed to be worse anti-Semites than the Nazis (Mr. Morley's position), or
whether it was just Ukrainian police units that deserve this description (Mr. Wiesenthal's
position). Now to balance this image of unrelieved Ukrainian anti-Semitism, Mr. Wiesenthal
could have mentioned that on numerous occasions Ukrainians risked their lives, perhaps even gave
their lives, to save his (Mr. Wiesenthal's) life - and not only civilians, but the very same
Ukrainian police auxiliaries whom both Mr. Safer and Mr. Wiesenthal agree were uniformly
sub-human brutes. Here, for example, is Mr. Wiesenthal's own story (as told to Peter Michael
Lingens) concerning a member of a Ukrainian police auxiliary who is identified by the Ukrainian
surname "Bodnar." The story is that Mr. Wiesenthal is about to be executed, but:
The shooting stopped. Ten yards from Wiesenthal.
The next thing he remembers was a brilliant cone of light and behind it a
Polish voice: "But Mr. Wiesenthal, what are you doing here?" Wiesenthal
recognized a foreman he used to know, by the name of Bodnar. He was wearing
civilian clothes with the armband of a Ukrainian police auxiliary. "I've got
to get you out of here tonight."
Bodnar told the [other] Ukrainians that among the captured Jews he had
discovered a Soviet spy and that he was taking him to the district police
commissar. In actual fact he took Wiesenthal back to his own flat, on the
grounds that it was unlikely to be searched so soon again. This was the first
time Wiesenthal survived. (Peter Michael Lingens, in Simon Wiesenthal, Justice
Not Vengeance, 1989, p. 8)
Bodnar must have known that the punishment for saving a Jew from execution and then helping him
escape would be death. And how could he get away with it? In fact, we might ask Mr. Wiesenthal
whether Bodnar did get away with it, or whether he paid for it with his life, for as the
escapees were tiptoeing out, they were stopped, they offered their fabricated story, and then:
The German sergeant, already a little drunk, slapped Bodnar's face and said:
"Then what are you standing around for? If this is what you people are like,
then later we'll all have troubles. Report back to me as soon as you deliver
them [Wiesenthal along with a fellow prisoner]." (Alan Levy, The Wiesenthal
File, 1993, p. 37)
These passages invite several pertinent conclusions. First, we see a Ukrainian police auxiliary
having his face slapped by a German sergeant, which serves to remind us that Ukraine is under
occupation, to show us who is really in charge, to suggest that the German attitude toward
Ukrainians is one of contempt and that the expression of this contempt is unrestrained. We see
also that Bodnar's flat is subject to searches, indicating that although he is a participant in
the anti-Jewish actions, he is a distrusted participant, and a participant who might feel
intimidated by the hostile scrutiny of the occupying Nazis. But most important of all, we see
that the German sergeant is waiting for Bodnar to report back. Alan Levy writes that "Bodnar
was ... concerned ... that now he had to account, verbally at least, for his two prisoners" (p.
37). If Bodnar reports back with the news that Wiesenthal and the other prisoner escaped, then
how might Bodnar expect the face-slapping German sergeant to respond? For Bodnar at this point
in the story to actually allow Wiesenthal and the other prisoner to escape is heroic, it is
self-sacrificing, it is suicidal. And yet Bodnar does go ahead and effect Wiesenthal's escape,
probably never imagining that to Wiesenthal in later years this will become an event unworthy of
notice during Wiesenthal's blanket condemnation of Ukrainians.
And so these three things - the heroic actions of Lviv's Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the
self-sacrificing intervention of the Ukrainian police official, Bodnar, in saving Mr.
Wiesenthal's own life, and the existence of numerous other instances of Ukrainians saving Jews
these are things that were highly pertinent to the 60 Minutes broadcast, and they are things
that would have begun to transform the broadcast from a twisted message of hate to balanced
reporting, but they are things that were deliberately omitted. It is difficult to imagine any
motive for this omission other than the preservation of the stereotype of uniform Ukrainian
brutishness.
Following the writing of the above section on the topic of Ukrainians saving Jews, a flood of
similar material - actually more striking than similar - has come to my attention, far too great
a volume to integrate into the present paper. Therefore, I merely take this opportunity to
present three links to such similar material that has been placed on UKAR: (1) one item is
evidence that Ukrainian forester Petro Pyasetsky may hold the record for saving the largest
number of Jewish lives during World War II (in all likelihood greatly exceeding individuals like
Oscar Schindler or Raoul Wallenberg); (2) another item relates the case of lawyer Volodymyr
Bemko who recounts his participation as defense attorney in numerous prosecutions by the Germans
of Ukrainians on trial for the crime of aiding Jews; and (3) a briefer item outlining how the
Vavrisevich family hid seven Jews during World War II. The first two of these three items are
not brief, and so might best be read at a later time if interruption of the reading of the
present paper seems undesirable.
& CONTENTS:
Preface
The Galicia Division
Quality of Translation
Ukrainian Homogeneity
Were Ukrainians Nazis?
Simon Wiesenthal
What Happened in Lviv?
Nazi Propaganda Film
Collective Guilt
Paralysis of the Comparative
Function
60 Minutes' Cheap Shots
Ukrainian Anti-Semitism
Jewish Ukrainophobia
Mailbag
A Sense of Responsibility
What 60 Minutes Should Do
PostScript
Were Ukrainians Really Devoted Nazis?
Pointing out such salient and pertinent instances of Ukrainian heroic humanitarianism as those
mentioned above would have been a step in the right direction, but it still would not have told
the whole story. Another vital component of the story is that Ukrainians were the victims of
the Nazis, hated the Nazis, fought the Nazis, died to rid their land of the Nazis and to
eradicate Naziism from the face of the earth. This conclusion is easy to document, and yet it
is a conclusion that was omitted from the 60 Minutes broadcast.
Following the trauma of Soviet oppression, following the brutal terror of Communism, the
artificial famine of 1932-33 in which some six million Ukrainians perished, following the
deportation by the Communists of 400,000 Western Ukrainians and the slaughter of 10,000 Western
Ukrainians by retreating Communist forces, the Ukrainian population did indeed welcome the
Germans in 1941. However, disillusionment with the German emancipation was immediate:
The brutality of the German regime became evident everywhere.
The Germans began the extermination of the population on a mass scale. In
the autumn of 1941 the Jewish people who had not escaped to the East were
annihilated throughout Ukraine. No less than 850,000 were killed by the SS
special commandos. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, especially
during the winter of 1941-42, died of hunger in the German camps - a tragedy
which had a considerable effect upon the course of the war, for as a
consequence Soviet soldiers ceased to surrender to the Germans.
At the end of 1941, the Nazi terror turned against active Ukrainian
nationalists, although most of them were not in any way engaged in fighting the
Germans as yet. Thus, in the winter of 1941-42, a group of writers including
Olena Teliha and Ivan Irliavsky, Ivan Rohach, the chief editor of the daily ...
Ukrainian Word, Bahazii, the mayor of Kiev, later Dmytro Myron-Orlyk, and
several others were suddenly arrested and shot in Kiev. The majority of a
group of Bukovinians who had fled to the east after the Rumanian occupation of
Bukovina were shot in Kiev and Mykolayiv in the autumn of 1941. In
Dnipropetrovske, at the beginning of 1942, the leaders of the relief work of
the Ukrainian National Committee were shot. In Kamianets Podilsky several
dozen Ukrainian activists including Kibets, the head of the local
administration, were executed. In March, 1943, Perevertun, the director of the
All-Ukrainian Consumer Cooperative Society, and his wife were shot. In 1942-43
there were shootings and executions in Kharkiv, Zyhtomyr, Kremenchuk, Lubni,
Shepetivka, Rivne, Kremianets, Brest-Litovsk, and many other places.
When, in the second half of 1942, the conduct of the Germans provoked the
population to resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare, the Germans began to
apply collective responsibility on a large scale. This involved the mass
shooting of innocent people and the burning of entire villages, especially in
the Chernihiv and northern Kiev areas and in Volhynia. For various even
minor - offenses, people were being hanged publicly in every city and village.
The numbers of the victims reached hundreds of thousands. The German rulers
began systematically to remove the Ukrainians from the local administration by
arrests and executions, replacing them with Russians, Poles, and Volksdeutshe.
(Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Volume 1, pp. 881-882)
Major-General Eberhardt, the German Commandant of Kiev, on November 2, 1941
announced that: "Cases of arson and sabotage are becoming more frequent in Kiev
and oblige me to take firm action. For this reason 300 Kiev citizens have been
shot today." This seemed to do no good because Eberhardt on November 29, 1941
again announced: "400 men have been executed in the city [of Kiev]. This
should serve as a warning to the population."
The death penalty was applied by the Germans to any Ukrainian who gave aid,
or directions, to the UPA [Ukrainian Partisan Army] or Ukrainian guerrillas.
If you owned a pigeon the penalty was death. The penalty was death for anyone
who did not report or aided a Jew to escape, and many Ukrainians were executed
for helping Jews. Death was the penalty for listening to a Soviet radio
program or reading anti-German leaflets. For example, on March 28, 1943 three
women in Kherson, Maria and Vera Alexandrovska and Klavdia Tselhelnyk were
executed because they had "read an anti-German leaflet, said they agreed with
its contents and passed it on." (Andrew Gregorovich, World War II in Ukraine,
Forum, No. 92, Spring 1995, p. 21)
The notion of "collective responsibility" or "collective guilt" mentioned above by means of
which the Nazis justified murdering a large number of innocent people in retaliation for the
acts of a single guilty person is founded on a primitive view of justice which Western society
has largely - but not completely - abandoned, as we shall see below.
The Ukrainian opposition manifested itself primarily in the underground Ukrainian Partisan Army
(UPA):
The spread of the insurgent struggle acquired such strength that at the end of
the occupation the Germans were in control nowhere but in the cities of Ukraine
and made only daylight raids into the villages. ... They [the Ukrainian
guerrillas] espoused the idea of an independent Ukrainian state and the slogan
"neither Hitler nor Stalin." (Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Volume 1, p.
884)
During the most intensive fighting against the Germans in the fall of 1943 and
the spring of 1944, the UPA numbered close to 40,000 men.... Among major
losses inflicted upon the enemy by the UPA, the following should be mentioned:
Victor Lutze, chief of the SS-Sicherungsabteilung, who was killed in battle in
May, 1943.... (Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Volume 2, pp. 1089-1091)
Up to 200 innocent Ukrainians were executed for one German attacked by
guerrillas. In spite of this a total of 460,000 German soldiers and officers
were killed by partisans in Ukraine during the War. (Andrew Gregorovich, World
War II in Ukraine, Forum, No. 92, Spring 1995, p. 21)
Photograph of partisans
executed by the Nazis.
Photograph of young woman executed by the Nazis, and
young man about to be executed, for partisan activities.
If Morley Safer feels impelled to instruct 60 Minutes viewers that Ukrainians were loyal Nazis,
then he should also pause to explain how it is that the Ukrainians were able to reconcile their
loyalty with German contempt:
When the time came to appoint the Nazi ruler of Ukraine, Hitler chose Erich
Koch, a notoriously brutal and bigoted administrator known for his personal
contempt for Slavs. Koch's attitude toward his assignment was evident in the
speech he delivered to his staff upon his arrival in Ukraine in September 1941:
"Gentlemen, I am known as a brutal dog. Because of this reason I was appointed
as Reichskommissar of Ukraine. Our task is to suck from Ukraine all the goods
we can get hold of, without consideration of the feelings or the property of
the native population." On another occasion, Koch emphasized his loathing for
Ukrainians by remarking: "If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the
same table with me, I must have him shot." (Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A
History, 1994, p. 467)
Koch often said that Ukrainian people were inferior to the Germans, that
Ukrainians were half-monkeys, and that Ukrainians "must be handled with the
whip like the negroes." (Andrew Gregorovich, World War II in Ukraine, Forum,
No. 92, Spring 1995, p. 15)
If Morley Safer wishes to proclaim to the 60 Minutes audience that Ukrainians were enthusiastic
Nazis, then he should simultaneously explain how Ukrainians were able to maintain their
enthusiasm as 2.3 million of them were being shipped off to forced labor in Germany:
By early 1942, Koch's police had to stage massive manhunts, rounding up young
Ukrainians in bazaars or as they emerged from churches or cinemas and shipping
them to Germany. (Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 1994, p. 469)
If Morley Safer insists on announcing to 60 Minutes viewers that Ukrainians were devoted Nazis,
then he should explain to these viewers how Ukrainians were able to maintain their devotion when
the Kiev soccer team - Dynamo - beat German teams five games in a row, and then received the
German reward:
wanted to remain on center stage; and it is for that reason that Himmler defined certain combat
units as falling within the SS:
The very fact that Himmler and his executors became the central force
directing the implacable war against the Jews accorded them, and primarily
Himmler as their leader, a crucial position in the hierarchy of Nazi rule
wherever it extended. Hitler's hatred of the Jews and the importance he
ascribed to solving the Jewish problem according to his concept were among the
factors that ensured Himmler's status as the man who carried out the fuhrer's
program.
It might have been assumed that in wartime, when stress is necessarily laid
on the military struggle, the influence of the SS would have declined, since it
no longer held the center stage. If Hitler had lost interest in Himmler's
activities, the latter's own political career would have come to an end. He
forestalled the danger in two ways: one was by associating the SS with the war
effort through the establishment of the armed or Waffen SS while being careful
to prevent the army's influence over these corps from overriding his own.
(Leni Yahil, The Holocaust: The fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945, Oxford, New
York, 1990, p. 145)
The Nightingale Unit
60 Minutes also mentioned the Nightingale Unit, otherwise known as the Nachtigall Unit. The
Nachtigall Unit was eventually merged with the Ukrainian Roland Unit, some 600 Ukrainian
soldiers in all. These two units were formed on German territory prior to the outbreak of World
War II by Ukrainians who had either not fallen within the Soviet zone of occupation, or who had
escaped from it, and who anticipated German assistance in liberating Ukraine from Soviet rule.
These units too, however, fail to support the picture of Ukrainians "marching off to fight for
Hitler."
Specifically, shortly after the entry of the Germans into Lviv, Stepan Bandera, "(supported by
members of the Nachtigall Unit) decided - without consulting the Germans - to proclaim on 30
June 1941, the establishment of a Ukrainian state in recently conquered Lviv. ... Within days
of the proclamation, Bandera and his associates were arrested by the Gestapo and incarcerated"
(Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 1994, pp. 463-464). Refusing to rescind the proclamation,
Bandera spent July 1941 to September 1944 in German prisons and concentration camps. (Stepan
Bandera is mentioned at this point because he was supported by the Nachtigall Unit; Bandera was
not a member of the Nachtigall Unit.) "Because of their opposition to German policies in
Ukraine, the units were recalled from the front and interned. ... Toward the end of 1942, the
battalion was disbanded because of the soldiers' refusal to take an oath of loyalty to Hitler"
(Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Volume 2, p. 1088). "The battalion was disarmed and
demobilized, and its officers were arrested in January 1943. Shukhevych, however, managed to
escape and join the UPA" (Encyclopaedia of Ukraine, Volume 4, p. 680). Roman Shukhevych who had
been the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer of the Nachtigall unit went on to became
commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a partisan group opposing all foreign
occupation, and which during the Nazi occupation was directed primarily against the Nazis.
Ukrainians in the Nachtigall and Roland Units, then, were also not Ukrainians marching off to
fight for Hitler, but rather they were Ukrainians calculating that an alliance with German
forces would promote their national interests, they were Ukrainians whose willingness to fight
for Hitler or to promote Nazi interests proved to be close to non-existent, and they were
Ukrainians who fell out with their Nazi sponsors in the early stages of the war.
It must be noted also that unlike the Galicia Division, the Nachtigall and Roland Units were not
part of the SS, and so that Mr. Safer was in error when he stated that "Roman Shukhevych ... was
deputy commander of the SS Division Nightingale."
It is another mark of 60 Minutes' biased coverage that in objecting to streets being named after
the above-mentioned Stepan Bandera, it did not mention that he spent most of the war in German
captivity, nor that he lost two brothers at Auschwitz; and in objecting to the commemoration of
the above-mentioned Roman Shukhevych, it did not mention that he escaped from German captivity
and commanded the Ukrainian guerrilla war against the German occupation. These omissions are
part of a pattern of distortions and misrepresentations used by 60 Minutes to create the false
impression of undeviating commitment to Naziism on the part of Ukrainians. Take Ukraine's
staunchest opponents of Naziism, let 60 Minutes' makeup crew touch them up for the camera, and
somehow they appear on the air with swastikas smeared on their foreheads.
And so 60 Minutes has painted a picture entirely at variance with the historical record. The
idea of Ukrainians en masse unselfconsciously celebrating the SS is preposterous and on a par
with the image of Jews sacrificing Christian children to drink their blood. These sorts of
fantastic and inflammatory charges are leveled by the more hysterical elements within each
community, are passed along by the more irresponsible members of the mass media, and are aimed
at consumption by the more naive and gullible members of their respective groups. 60 Minutes'
allegations have smeared members of the Galicia Division and Ukrainians generally with a
reckless disregard of evidence that is readily available to any researcher who is interested in
presenting an impartial picture. It is a blatant calumny for 60 Minutes to hold out any of the
above-mentioned units as evidence that Ukrainians "marched off to fight for Hitler" and it
overlooks also that on the Soviet side fighting the Nazis were about two million Ukrainians
which in view of their much larger number, 60 Minutes could have taken as evidence of Ukrainians
"marching off to fight against Hitler" and it overlooks as well the large number of Ukrainians
fighting against Hitler in the various national armies of the Allied forces.
Morley Safer's Contempt for the Intelligence of his Viewers.
Morley Safer states that "Nowhere, not even in Germany, are the SS so openly celebrated," and
while he is saying this, we might rightly expect that the scenes presented will be supportive of
his statement. What we do see is elderly veterans of the Galicia Division at a reunion in
Lviv. What details of these scenes support Morley Safer's strong conclusion? Let us consider
ten possibilities.
(1) Perhaps Mr. Safer counted swastikas, and their large number supported his strong
conclusion? But no, that can't be it - for there is not a single swastika to be seen anywhere.
Not one! But how is it possible to hold the world's most open celebration of the SS without a
single swastika? Mr. Safer's conclusion does not seem to be supported by the scene presented
in fact, his conclusion seems to be contradicted by the scene presented. Well, but perhaps
there were other clues?
(2) Surely at the world's most open celebration of the SS, one would find the "SS" insignia in
plentiful supply? But no, there is not a single "SS" visible anywhere. The camera scans the
veterans, we can see their medals and decorations, but we cannot see a single "SS." So far,
then, we have the world's most open celebration of the SS, but without a single swastika and
without a single "SS." But let us move ahead more quickly.
(3) The number of portraits of Hitler, commander-in-chief of all the German armed forces, and so
commander-in-chief of the SS? Zero!
(4) The number of portraits of Himmler, head of the SS? Zero!
(5) The number of portraits of any member of the Nazi hierarchy, or indeed of any German? Zero!
(6) Any Nazi salutes being made? No, not one!
(7) Any Nazi songs being sung? None!
(8) A single word of German spoken? No, not one!
(9) Perhaps there was literature circulated during the reunion which revealed Nazi sympathies?
But no such literature was shown. How about at any time prior to the reunion - even during the
entire 50 or so years following the formation of the Division and up until the reunion? 60
Minutes does not appear to have discovered any such Nazi literature.
(10) As these veterans have been living for more than 50 years predominantly in Canada, the
United States, and Australia, then they can readily be interviewed, and so perhaps 60 Minutes
interviewers managed to elicit pro-Nazi statements from them? No, this golden opportunity too
was passed over, not a single question was asked, not a single word spoken, and not a single
pro-Nazi statement was to be heard.
What then are we left with? We seem to be left with Morley Safer making a fantastic claim while
presenting as evidence images devoid of the slightest detail supporting that claim. We are
left, in short, with Morley Safer revealing his contempt for the intelligence of the 60 Minutes
viewer.
CONTENTS:
Preface
The Galicia Division
Quality of Translation
Ukrainian Homogeneity
Were Ukrainians Nazis?
Simon Wiesenthal
What Happened in Lviv?
Nazi Propaganda Film
Collective Guilt
Paralysis of the Comparative
Function
60 Minutes' Cheap Shots
Ukrainian Anti-Semitism
Jewish Ukrainophobia
Mailbag
A Sense of Responsibility
What 60 Minutes Should Do
PostScript
Quality of Translation
Were all those Ukrainians really saying "kike" and "yid"?
In one instance, I could make out the Ukrainian word "zhyd." Following conventions of Ukrainian
transliteration into English, by the way, the "zh" in "zhyd" is pronounced approximately like
the "z" in "azure," and the "y" in "zhyd" is pronounced like the "y" in "myth." Quite true, to
continue, that in Russian "zhyd" is derogatory for "Jew" and "yevrei" is neutral. In Ukrainian,
the same is true in heavily Russified Eastern Ukraine, and even in Central Ukraine. But in the
less Russified Western Ukraine old habits persist, and here especially among the common people
- "zhyd" continues to be as it always has been the neutral term for "Jew," and "yevrei" sounds
Russian.
Thus, in non-Russified Ukrainian, the "Jewish Battalion" of the Ukrainian Galician Army formed
in 1919 was the "zhydivskyi kurin". "Judaism" is "zhydivstvo." A "learned Jew" is "zhydovyn."
"Judophobe" is "zhydofob" and "Jodophile" is "zhydofil." The adjective "zhydivskyi" meaning
"Jewish" was used by Ukrainians and Jews alike in naming Jewish orchestras and theater groups
and clubs and schools and government departments. The Encyclopaedia Judaica (1971, Volume 11,
p. 616) shows the May 18, 1939 masthead and headlines of the Lviv Jewish newspaper which was
published in Polish. The Polish language is similar to Ukrainian, but uses the Roman rather
than the Cyrillic alphabet. The headline read "Strejk generalny Zydow w Palestynie" which means
"General strike of Jews in Palestine." The third word "Zydow" meaning "of Jews" is similar to
the Ukrainian word that would have been used in this context, and again serves to illustrate
that the Jews of this region did not view the word "zhyd" or its derivatives as derogatory.
We find this same conclusion in the recollections of Nikita Khrushchev (in the following
quotation, I have replaced the original translator's "yid" which rendered the passage confusing,
with the more accurate "zhyd"):
I remember that once we invited Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles ... to a meeting at
the Lvov opera house. It struck me as very strange to hear the Jewish speakers
at the meeting refer to themselves as "zhyds." "We zhyds hereby declare
ourselves in favour of such-and-such." Out in the lobby after the meeting I
stopped some of these men and demanded, "How dare you use the word "zhyd"?
Don't you know it's a very offensive term, an insult to the Jewish nation?"
... "Here in the Western Ukraine it's just the opposite," they explained. "We
call ourselves zhyds...." Apparently what they said was true. If you go back
to Ukrainian literature ... you'll see that "zhyd" isn't used derisively or
insultingly. (Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 1971, p. 145)
But 60 Minutes' mistranslation went even further than that - upon listening to the broadcast
more carefully, it is possible to hear that where the editor of the Lviv newspaper For a Free
Ukraine was translated as saying in connection with a joke circulated among the common people
"In terms of the Soviet Union which is abbreviated SSSR, that stands for three kikes and a
Russian," - in fact he was using the unarguably neutral term "yevrei" which it is obligatory to
translate not as "kike" but as "Jew" not only in Russian, but in Eastern and Western Ukrainian
as well.
Thus, in at least two instances, and possibly in all, the 60 Minutes' translator was translating
incorrectly, and in such a manner as to make the Ukrainian speakers appear to be speaking with
an unrestrained anti-Semitism, when in fact they were not. On top of that, the translator
gratuitously spit out his words and gave them a venomous intonation which was not present in the
original Ukrainian. And then too, where the speaker spoke in grammatical Ukrainian, the
translator on one occasion at least, offered a translation in ungrammatical English, making the
Ukrainian appear uneducated or unintelligent - specifically, the Ukrainian "We Ukrainians do not
have to rely on..." was rendered into the English "We Ukrainians not have to rely on...."
Since "zhyd" is currently held to be derogatory in much of Ukraine, any speaker of contemporary
Ukrainian who wishes to give no offense may choose to view it as derogatory in all of Ukraine,
and switch to "yevrei" in all contexts and in all parts of the country. The fact that a Western
Ukrainian old enough to have escaped thorough Russification has not as yet made this switch,
however, is not evidence of his anti-Semitism, and his use of "zhyd" cannot rightly be taken to
be derogatory. In non-Russified Western Ukrainian, there is only one word for Jew, and that is
"zhyd," and there is no word corresponding to the derogatory "kike" or "yid" or "hebe" of
English.
A further discussion of the use of "zhyd" vs "yevrei" can be found within the Ukrainian Archive
in a discussion of the Sion-Osnova Controversy.
CONTENTS:
Preface
The Galicia Division
Quality of Translation
Ukrainian Homogeneity
Were Ukrainians Nazis?
Simon Wiesenthal
What Happened in Lviv?
Nazi Propaganda Film
Collective Guilt
Paralysis of the Comparative
Function
60 Minutes' Cheap Shots
Ukrainian Anti-Semitism
Jewish Ukrainophobia
Mailbag
A Sense of Responsibility
What 60 Minutes Should Do
PostScript
Ukrainian Homogeneity
In his every statement, Mr. Safer reveals that he starts from the assumption that Ukrainians are
homogeneously anti-Semitic and Nazi in their inclinations. In doing so, Mr. Safer does not stop
to wonder how it is that Ukrainians can be so entirely different in this respect from all other
peoples. Take Americans, for instance. Surely we all agree that among Americans, there are
some who would pitch in and help if they saw Nazis killing Jews, and others who would risk their
lives - and give their lives - to stop that very same killing, and of course the great bulk in
the middle who would consider immediate self-interest first, and look the other way and pretend
to see nothing. But Ukrainians, if we are to believe Mr. Safer, are a people apart - exhibiting
no such heterogeneity, clones one of another, genetically programmed to hate Jews.
To suggest such a thing is, of course, preposterous. The obvious reality is that Ukrainians do
exhibit a normal degree of heterogeneity. Had 60 Minutes wanted to, it could have found plenty
of evidence of this: (1) Since the city of Lviv was featured in the 60 Minutes broadcast, 60
Minutes could have mentioned - in fact, it was duty-bound to mention the heroism of
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky's effort on behalf of Jews. (2) Since 60 Minutes was throwing
blanket condemnations over Ukrainians collectively not only for being the world's greatest
anti-Semites, but for the most extreme war crimes and crimes against humanity, it was incumbent
on 60 Minutes to notice the vast number of instances that can be found of Ukrainian sacrifices
to save Jews. (3) Since the city of Lviv was featured on the 60 Minutes broadcast, as were
Ukrainian auxiliary police units, as was Simon Wiesenthal, 60 Minutes should have mentioned that
in the city of Lviv, just such a Ukrainian police auxiliary by the name of Bodnar risked his
life - possibly sacrificed his life - to save the life of Simon Wiesenthal himself.
Let us consider each of these points in turn.
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky
There is little doubt as to the almost saintly role of Ukrainian (Greek)
Catholic Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. Sheptytsky, Archbishop of L'viv and
head of the church, was widely known as being sympathetic to the Jews. ...
The elderly metropolitan wrote directly to SS commander Heinrich Himmler in the
winter of 1942 demanding an end to the final solution and, equally important to
him, an end to the use of Ukrainian militia and police in anti-Jewish action.
His letter elicited a sharp rebuke, but Sheptytsky persisted even though the
death penalty was threatened to those who gave comfort to Jews. In November
1942 he issued a pastoral letter to be read in all churches under his
authority. It condemned murder. Although Jews were not specifically
mentioned, his intent was crystal clear.
We can never know how many Ukrainians were moved by Sheptytsky's appeal.
Certainly the church set an example. With Sheptytsky's tacit approval, his
church hid a number of Jews throughout western Ukraine, 150 Jews alone in and
around his L'viv headquarters. Perhaps some of his parishioners were among
those brave and precious few "righteous gentiles" who risked an automatic death
penalty for themselves and their families by harbouring a Jew under their roof.
The towering humanity of Sheptytsky remains an inspiration today. (Harold
Troper Morton Weinfeld, Old Wounds, 1988, pp. 17-18)
Raul Hilberg adds concerning Sheptytsky:
He dispatched a lengthy handwritten letter dated August 29-31, 1942 to the
Pope, in which he referred to the government of the German occupants as a
regime of terror and corruption, more diabolical than that of the Bolsheviks.
(Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, 1992, p. 267)
Unbiased reporting might have mentioned such details as the following:
One of those saved by Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky was Lviv's Rabbi Kahane
whose son is currently the marshal commander of the Israeli Air Force.
(Ukrainian Weekly, June 21, 1992, p. 9)
Sheptitsky himself hid fifteen Jews, including Rabbi Kahane, in his own
residence in Lvov, a building frequently visited by German officials. (Martin
Gilbert, The Holocaust, 1986, p. 410)
Vast Ukrainian Sacrifices to Save Jews
And Sheptytsky's actions are not unique - Ukrainians risking their lives and giving their lives
to save Jews was not a rare occurrence. In the first Jewish Congress of Ukraine held in Kiev in
1992, "48 awards were handed out to Ukrainians and people of other nationalities who had rescued
Jews during the second world war" (Ukrainian Weekly, November 8, 1992, p. 2). References to
specific cases are not hard to find:
Prof. Weiss [head of the Israeli Knesset] reminisced about Ukraine, the country
of his childhood, and gratefully acknowledged he owed his life to two Ukrainian
women who hid him from the Nazis during World War II. (Ukrainian Weekly,
December 13, 1992, p. 8)
In the Volhynian town of Hoszcza a Ukrainian farmer, Fiodor Kalenczuk, hid a
Jewish grain merchant, Pessah Kranzberg, his wife, their ten-year-old daughter
and their daughter's young friend, for seventeen months, refusing to deny them
refuge even when his wife protested that their presence, in the stable, was
endangering a Christian household. (Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, 1986, p.
403)
Help was given even though the probability of detection was substantial and the penalties were
severe:
Sonderkommando 4b reported that it had shot the mayor of Kremenchug, Senitsa
Vershovsky, because he had "tried to protect the Jews." (Raul Hilberg, The
Destruction of the European Jews, 1985, p. 308)
Consulting the original Einsatzgruppe report reveals that a Catholic priest, Protyorey Romansky,
was involved in the above plot to save Jews, though Romansky's punishment is not specified:
The fact that Senitsa, the mayor of Kremenchug, was arrested for sabotaging
orders, demonstrates that responsible officials are not always selected with
the necessary care and attention. Only after the Einsatzkommandos had
interrogated the official could it be established that he had purposely
sabotaged the handling of the Jewish problem. He used false data and
authorized the chief priest Protyorey Romansky to baptize the Jews whom he
himself had selected, giving them Christian or Russian first names. His
immediate arrest prevented a larger number of Jews from evading German
control. Senitsa was executed. (Einsatzgruppe C, Kiev, Operational Situation
Report USSR No. 177, March 6, 1942, in Yitzhak Arad, Shmuel Krakowski, and
Shmuel Spector, editors, The Einsatzgruppen Reports: Selections From the
Dispatches of the Nazi Death Squads' Campaign Against the Jews July
1941-January 1943, 1989, p. 304)
Similarly illustrative of help being given despite severe penalties is the following:
A German police company in the village of Samary, Volhynia, shot an entire
Ukrainian family, including a man, two women, and three children, for harboring
a Jewish woman. (Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, 1992, p.
201)
This is not to say that all or most Jews found refuge with Ukrainians, nor that all or most
Ukrainians offered refuge to Jews. Far from it. Many stories can be found of Jews being
refused refuge or even being betrayed - but what else could anyone expect? To expect more from
Ukrainians would be to expect them to be saints and martyrs, which would be setting a very high
standard:
Whoever attempted to help Jews acted alone and exposed himself as well as his
family to the possibility of a death sentence from a German Kommando. (Raul
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 1985, p. 308)
But despite the severity of the punishment, Ukrainians did help. Andrew Gregorovich (Forum, No.
92, Spring 1995, p. 24) reproduces a public announcement issued by the "SS and Head of Police
for the District of Galicia" in Sambir, Ukraine, March 1, 1944. The announcement lists ten
Ukrainians who have been sentenced to death by the Germans. Number 7 is Stefan Zubovych,
Ukrainian, married - for the crime of helping Jews. One wonders what Stefan Zubovych might have
thought had he been told just prior to his execution that in decades to come, some among the
people that he was giving his life for would attempt to obliterate his memory and the memory of
other Ukrainians like him, and would attempt instead to depict Ukrainians as irredeemable
anti-Semites. One wonders what the surviving family of Stefan Zubovych, if any did survive,
think today of the thanks that they receive from Morley Safer for the sacrifice that they have
borne.
Given the severity and the imminence of the punishment, it is a wonder that Ukrainians offered
any help at all. Jews who had been saved by Ukrainians have subsequently admitted that in view
of the extreme danger, had their roles been reversed they would not have extended the same help
to the Ukrainians.
Ukrainian help was not limited to a few isolated cases, but rather was widely given:
"It is unfortunate," declared a German proclamation issued in Lvov on April 11
[1942], "that the rural population continues - nowadays furtively - to assist
Jews, thus doing harm to the community, and hence to themselves, by this
disloyal attitude." (Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, 1986, p. 319)
[In 1943] tens of thousands of Jews were still in hiding throughout the General
Government, the Eastern Territories and the Ukraine. But German searches for
them were continuous. (Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, 1986, p. 553)
It would be incorrect to imagine the Germans rounding up and executing all the Jews within a
region, with only a few of the Jews being saved; rather, in Ukrainian cities - which offered
more avenues of escape and concealment than did villages and towns the Jews repeatedly receded
before the advancing German killing units and then flowed back in again after the killing units
had passed - something that would have been possible only with the knowledge and the cooperation
of the indigenous Ukrainians:
Although we succeeded in particular, in smaller towns and also in villages in
accomplishing a complete liquidation of the Jewish problem, again and again it
is, however, observed in larger cities that, after such an execution, all Jews
have indeed disappeared. But, when, after a certain period of time, a Kommando
returns again, the number of Jews still found in the city always considerably
surpasses the number of the executed Jews. (Erwin Schulz, commander of
Einsatzkommando 5 of Einsatzgruppe C, in John Mendelsohn, Editor, The
Holocaust, Volume 18, 1982, p. 98)
Whenever the Einsatzgruppe had left a town, it returned to find more Jews than
had already been killed there. (Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European
Jews, 1985, p. 342)
Olena Melnyczuk in a Courage to Care Award ceremony (sponsored by the Jewish Foundation for
Christian Rescuers/Anti-Defamation League) in which she and other members of her family were
honored for having hidden a Jewish couple during World War II in Ukraine made the following
remarks, the concluding sentence of which bears a particular relevance to our present discussion
of 60 Minutes:
"At the time we were fully aware of consequences that might expect us. We were
aware that our family were doomed to perish together with the people we
sheltered if detected. But sometimes people ask 'would you do it again?' And
the answer is short. Yes. We tell them point blank that our Christian
religion taught us to love your neighbor as yourself, be your brother's
keeper," she stated.
"Sometimes," she continued, "we hear the people asking why so few did what
we did. Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure there were many, many people like us
risking their lives while hiding Jews, but how many of those rescued had the
courage to report the names of their rescuers to Yad Vashem? Somehow being
free of danger they have forgotten what risk those people took." (Ukrainian
Weekly, June 21, 1992, p. 9, emphasis added)
The Forgotten Bodnar
Yes, how some of them do seem to have forgotten. Take Simon Wiesenthal, for example. The chief
focus of discussion between him and Morley Safer seems to have been whether Ukrainians are all
genetically programmed to be worse anti-Semites than the Nazis (Mr. Morley's position), or
whether it was just Ukrainian police units that deserve this description (Mr. Wiesenthal's
position). Now to balance this image of unrelieved Ukrainian anti-Semitism, Mr. Wiesenthal
could have mentioned that on numerous occasions Ukrainians risked their lives, perhaps even gave
their lives, to save his (Mr. Wiesenthal's) life - and not only civilians, but the very same
Ukrainian police auxiliaries whom both Mr. Safer and Mr. Wiesenthal agree were uniformly
sub-human brutes. Here, for example, is Mr. Wiesenthal's own story (as told to Peter Michael
Lingens) concerning a member of a Ukrainian police auxiliary who is identified by the Ukrainian
surname "Bodnar." The story is that Mr. Wiesenthal is about to be executed, but:
The shooting stopped. Ten yards from Wiesenthal.
The next thing he remembers was a brilliant cone of light and behind it a
Polish voice: "But Mr. Wiesenthal, what are you doing here?" Wiesenthal
recognized a foreman he used to know, by the name of Bodnar. He was wearing
civilian clothes with the armband of a Ukrainian police auxiliary. "I've got
to get you out of here tonight."
Bodnar told the [other] Ukrainians that among the captured Jews he had
discovered a Soviet spy and that he was taking him to the district police
commissar. In actual fact he took Wiesenthal back to his own flat, on the
grounds that it was unlikely to be searched so soon again. This was the first
time Wiesenthal survived. (Peter Michael Lingens, in Simon Wiesenthal, Justice
Not Vengeance, 1989, p. 8)
Bodnar must have known that the punishment for saving a Jew from execution and then helping him
escape would be death. And how could he get away with it? In fact, we might ask Mr. Wiesenthal
whether Bodnar did get away with it, or whether he paid for it with his life, for as the
escapees were tiptoeing out, they were stopped, they offered their fabricated story, and then:
The German sergeant, already a little drunk, slapped Bodnar's face and said:
"Then what are you standing around for? If this is what you people are like,
then later we'll all have troubles. Report back to me as soon as you deliver
them [Wiesenthal along with a fellow prisoner]." (Alan Levy, The Wiesenthal
File, 1993, p. 37)
These passages invite several pertinent conclusions. First, we see a Ukrainian police auxiliary
having his face slapped by a German sergeant, which serves to remind us that Ukraine is under
occupation, to show us who is really in charge, to suggest that the German attitude toward
Ukrainians is one of contempt and that the expression of this contempt is unrestrained. We see
also that Bodnar's flat is subject to searches, indicating that although he is a participant in
the anti-Jewish actions, he is a distrusted participant, and a participant who might feel
intimidated by the hostile scrutiny of the occupying Nazis. But most important of all, we see
that the German sergeant is waiting for Bodnar to report back. Alan Levy writes that "Bodnar
was ... concerned ... that now he had to account, verbally at least, for his two prisoners" (p.
37). If Bodnar reports back with the news that Wiesenthal and the other prisoner escaped, then
how might Bodnar expect the face-slapping German sergeant to respond? For Bodnar at this point
in the story to actually allow Wiesenthal and the other prisoner to escape is heroic, it is
self-sacrificing, it is suicidal. And yet Bodnar does go ahead and effect Wiesenthal's escape,
probably never imagining that to Wiesenthal in later years this will become an event unworthy of
notice during Wiesenthal's blanket condemnation of Ukrainians.
And so these three things - the heroic actions of Lviv's Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the
self-sacrificing intervention of the Ukrainian police official, Bodnar, in saving Mr.
Wiesenthal's own life, and the existence of numerous other instances of Ukrainians saving Jews
these are things that were highly pertinent to the 60 Minutes broadcast, and they are things
that would have begun to transform the broadcast from a twisted message of hate to balanced
reporting, but they are things that were deliberately omitted. It is difficult to imagine any
motive for this omission other than the preservation of the stereotype of uniform Ukrainian
brutishness.
Following the writing of the above section on the topic of Ukrainians saving Jews, a flood of
similar material - actually more striking than similar - has come to my attention, far too great
a volume to integrate into the present paper. Therefore, I merely take this opportunity to
present three links to such similar material that has been placed on UKAR: (1) one item is
evidence that Ukrainian forester Petro Pyasetsky may hold the record for saving the largest
number of Jewish lives during World War II (in all likelihood greatly exceeding individuals like
Oscar Schindler or Raoul Wallenberg); (2) another item relates the case of lawyer Volodymyr
Bemko who recounts his participation as defense attorney in numerous prosecutions by the Germans
of Ukrainians on trial for the crime of aiding Jews; and (3) a briefer item outlining how the
Vavrisevich family hid seven Jews during World War II. The first two of these three items are
not brief, and so might best be read at a later time if interruption of the reading of the
present paper seems undesirable.
& CONTENTS:
Preface
The Galicia Division
Quality of Translation
Ukrainian Homogeneity
Were Ukrainians Nazis?
Simon Wiesenthal
What Happened in Lviv?
Nazi Propaganda Film
Collective Guilt
Paralysis of the Comparative
Function
60 Minutes' Cheap Shots
Ukrainian Anti-Semitism
Jewish Ukrainophobia
Mailbag
A Sense of Responsibility
What 60 Minutes Should Do
PostScript
Were Ukrainians Really Devoted Nazis?
Pointing out such salient and pertinent instances of Ukrainian heroic humanitarianism as those
mentioned above would have been a step in the right direction, but it still would not have told
the whole story. Another vital component of the story is that Ukrainians were the victims of
the Nazis, hated the Nazis, fought the Nazis, died to rid their land of the Nazis and to
eradicate Naziism from the face of the earth. This conclusion is easy to document, and yet it
is a conclusion that was omitted from the 60 Minutes broadcast.
Following the trauma of Soviet oppression, following the brutal terror of Communism, the
artificial famine of 1932-33 in which some six million Ukrainians perished, following the
deportation by the Communists of 400,000 Western Ukrainians and the slaughter of 10,000 Western
Ukrainians by retreating Communist forces, the Ukrainian population did indeed welcome the
Germans in 1941. However, disillusionment with the German emancipation was immediate:
The brutality of the German regime became evident everywhere.
The Germans began the extermination of the population on a mass scale. In
the autumn of 1941 the Jewish people who had not escaped to the East were
annihilated throughout Ukraine. No less than 850,000 were killed by the SS
special commandos. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, especially
during the winter of 1941-42, died of hunger in the German camps - a tragedy
which had a considerable effect upon the course of the war, for as a
consequence Soviet soldiers ceased to surrender to the Germans.
At the end of 1941, the Nazi terror turned against active Ukrainian
nationalists, although most of them were not in any way engaged in fighting the
Germans as yet. Thus, in the winter of 1941-42, a group of writers including
Olena Teliha and Ivan Irliavsky, Ivan Rohach, the chief editor of the daily ...
Ukrainian Word, Bahazii, the mayor of Kiev, later Dmytro Myron-Orlyk, and
several others were suddenly arrested and shot in Kiev. The majority of a
group of Bukovinians who had fled to the east after the Rumanian occupation of
Bukovina were shot in Kiev and Mykolayiv in the autumn of 1941. In
Dnipropetrovske, at the beginning of 1942, the leaders of the relief work of
the Ukrainian National Committee were shot. In Kamianets Podilsky several
dozen Ukrainian activists including Kibets, the head of the local
administration, were executed. In March, 1943, Perevertun, the director of the
All-Ukrainian Consumer Cooperative Society, and his wife were shot. In 1942-43
there were shootings and executions in Kharkiv, Zyhtomyr, Kremenchuk, Lubni,
Shepetivka, Rivne, Kremianets, Brest-Litovsk, and many other places.
When, in the second half of 1942, the conduct of the Germans provoked the
population to resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare, the Germans began to
apply collective responsibility on a large scale. This involved the mass
shooting of innocent people and the burning of entire villages, especially in
the Chernihiv and northern Kiev areas and in Volhynia. For various even
minor - offenses, people were being hanged publicly in every city and village.
The numbers of the victims reached hundreds of thousands. The German rulers
began systematically to remove the Ukrainians from the local administration by
arrests and executions, replacing them with Russians, Poles, and Volksdeutshe.
(Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Volume 1, pp. 881-882)
Major-General Eberhardt, the German Commandant of Kiev, on November 2, 1941
announced that: "Cases of arson and sabotage are becoming more frequent in Kiev
and oblige me to take firm action. For this reason 300 Kiev citizens have been
shot today." This seemed to do no good because Eberhardt on November 29, 1941
again announced: "400 men have been executed in the city [of Kiev]. This
should serve as a warning to the population."
The death penalty was applied by the Germans to any Ukrainian who gave aid,
or directions, to the UPA [Ukrainian Partisan Army] or Ukrainian guerrillas.
If you owned a pigeon the penalty was death. The penalty was death for anyone
who did not report or aided a Jew to escape, and many Ukrainians were executed
for helping Jews. Death was the penalty for listening to a Soviet radio
program or reading anti-German leaflets. For example, on March 28, 1943 three
women in Kherson, Maria and Vera Alexandrovska and Klavdia Tselhelnyk were
executed because they had "read an anti-German leaflet, said they agreed with
its contents and passed it on." (Andrew Gregorovich, World War II in Ukraine,
Forum, No. 92, Spring 1995, p. 21)
The notion of "collective responsibility" or "collective guilt" mentioned above by means of
which the Nazis justified murdering a large number of innocent people in retaliation for the
acts of a single guilty person is founded on a primitive view of justice which Western society
has largely - but not completely - abandoned, as we shall see below.
The Ukrainian opposition manifested itself primarily in the underground Ukrainian Partisan Army
(UPA):
The spread of the insurgent struggle acquired such strength that at the end of
the occupation the Germans were in control nowhere but in the cities of Ukraine
and made only daylight raids into the villages. ... They [the Ukrainian
guerrillas] espoused the idea of an independent Ukrainian state and the slogan
"neither Hitler nor Stalin." (Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Volume 1, p.
884)
During the most intensive fighting against the Germans in the fall of 1943 and
the spring of 1944, the UPA numbered close to 40,000 men.... Among major
losses inflicted upon the enemy by the UPA, the following should be mentioned:
Victor Lutze, chief of the SS-Sicherungsabteilung, who was killed in battle in
May, 1943.... (Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Volume 2, pp. 1089-1091)
Up to 200 innocent Ukrainians were executed for one German attacked by
guerrillas. In spite of this a total of 460,000 German soldiers and officers
were killed by partisans in Ukraine during the War. (Andrew Gregorovich, World
War II in Ukraine, Forum, No. 92, Spring 1995, p. 21)
Photograph of partisans
executed by the Nazis.
Photograph of young woman executed by the Nazis, and
young man about to be executed, for partisan activities.
If Morley Safer feels impelled to instruct 60 Minutes viewers that Ukrainians were loyal Nazis,
then he should also pause to explain how it is that the Ukrainians were able to reconcile their
loyalty with German contempt:
When the time came to appoint the Nazi ruler of Ukraine, Hitler chose Erich
Koch, a notoriously brutal and bigoted administrator known for his personal
contempt for Slavs. Koch's attitude toward his assignment was evident in the
speech he delivered to his staff upon his arrival in Ukraine in September 1941:
"Gentlemen, I am known as a brutal dog. Because of this reason I was appointed
as Reichskommissar of Ukraine. Our task is to suck from Ukraine all the goods
we can get hold of, without consideration of the feelings or the property of
the native population." On another occasion, Koch emphasized his loathing for
Ukrainians by remarking: "If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the
same table with me, I must have him shot." (Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A
History, 1994, p. 467)
Koch often said that Ukrainian people were inferior to the Germans, that
Ukrainians were half-monkeys, and that Ukrainians "must be handled with the
whip like the negroes." (Andrew Gregorovich, World War II in Ukraine, Forum,
No. 92, Spring 1995, p. 15)
If Morley Safer wishes to proclaim to the 60 Minutes audience that Ukrainians were enthusiastic
Nazis, then he should simultaneously explain how Ukrainians were able to maintain their
enthusiasm as 2.3 million of them were being shipped off to forced labor in Germany:
By early 1942, Koch's police had to stage massive manhunts, rounding up young
Ukrainians in bazaars or as they emerged from churches or cinemas and shipping
them to Germany. (Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 1994, p. 469)
If Morley Safer insists on announcing to 60 Minutes viewers that Ukrainians were devoted Nazis,
then he should explain to these viewers how Ukrainians were able to maintain their devotion when
the Kiev soccer team - Dynamo - beat German teams five games in a row, and then received the
German reward: